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Abstract
This study addresses a vulnerability in the trust-based STP protocol that allows ma-
licious users to target an Ethernet LAN with an STP Root-Takeover Attack. This subject is
relevant because an STP Root-Takeover attack is a gateway to unauthorized control over the
entire network stack of a personal or enterprise network. This study aims to address this prob-
lem with a potentially trustless research solution called the STP DApp. The STP DApp is the
combination of a kernel /net modification called stpverify and a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain
framework in a NodeJS runtime environment in userland. The STP DApp works as an Intrusion
Detection System (IPS) by intercepting Ethernet traffic and blocking forged Ethernet frames
sent by STP Root-Takeover attackers. This study’s research methodology is a quantitative pre-
experimental design that provides conclusive results through empirical data and analysis using
experimental control groups. In this study, data collection was based on active RAM utilization
and CPU Usage during a performance evaluation of the STP DApp. It blocks an STP Root-
Takeover Attack launched by the Yersinia attack tool installed on a virtual machine with the
Kali operating system. The research solution is a test blockchain framework using Hyperledger
Fabric. It is made up of an experimental test network made up of nodes on a host virtual machine
and is used to validate Ethernet frames extracted from stpverify.
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Cyber Operations is an academic field of study designated by the National Security
Agency (NSA) that utilizes computer science and engineering to research security problems
and enhance national security (NSA, 2021). One way to research a security problem would be
to analyze the root cause or its point of origin. The identification of the root cause can initiate
the search for a solution. The root cause of a security problem is typically in an area where a
weakness begins. In the idiom, ”a chain is only as strong as its weakest link,” a ”weak link” is the
root cause that can make an otherwise foolhardy chain useless for its purpose. The first question
for a security researcher will be to ask if the security problem exists. Upon validating the security
problem, the second question would be to find the underlying root cause of the security research
problem. What can designate one link weaker than another in a security research problem?
Rahalkar (2018), in his book, Network Vulnerability Assessment, describes a vulnerability as a
weakness in a digital information system (Rahalkar, 2018). More specifically, the vulnerabilities
that he referenced in his book are in handling data in transport. A data transport system provides
the path taken by data from its origin to its destination. A vulnerability in this path would be
a weakness that could affect the Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) of the data.
This triad is a common benchmark in measuring the breadth of digital security (Fenrich, 2008).
To find the origin of these defining characteristics in is a subject of debate. However, it provides
a high-level understanding of secure information transport. If Alice were to send Bob an email,
the message would leave an email client on her computing device and reach Bob’s email client
in another location. In this path, a security professional would analyze whether there was any
point where this email could have been accessed by an unauthorized party, thus, weakening
the Confidentiality of the message transport. Integrity is equally as crucial as it defines the
trustworthiness of the data. If an unauthorized user accessed the email and they changed the
contents, a weak link exists in the path. Lastly, Availability ensures that Alice can trust that the
email she sent will reach Bob due to the information systems’ stability used to send the email.
A weakness in one of these primary security tenets can create a significant security
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problem. A solution to such a situation would be to find a stable reinforcement that would
prevent further vulnerability in the information system. When the email leaves Alice’s computer
to its destination, it follows a network path. A network path is like a road that data takes to reach
its destination. Metaphorically speaking, congestion or construction can disrupt an otherwise
uneventful drive. Equally, a vulnerability in a network path can also disrupt data transport.
Securing a vulnerability to strengthen the network path adds security measures so the
unauthorized intruder cannot access, rewrite or blockAlice’s email from reaching Bob. Securing
information is not a new concept. Secure communication started with military communications
in warfare (Dooley, 2013). It was the messenger’s ultimate job to ensure the security of informa-
tion from one location to another. Julius Caesar (1919) would describe one example in his book,
The Gallic Wars (Caesar, 1919). He describes protecting his messages by using a set pattern
to manipulate the message to make it unrecognizable to an unauthorized reader (Caesar, 1919).
This pattern, otherwise known as a cipher, is one of the earliest known forms of cryptology to
secure the transport of information from source to destination (Cohen & Kahn, 1997; Dooley,
2013).
Open Systems Intercommunication (OSI) Reference Model
The Open Systems Intercommunication (OSI) can break down the path that Alice’s
email takes from her computer to Bob’s computer into seven abstract network infrastructure
today. These layers are called abstract because there is no defining physical feature to each
layer. The OSI model defines each layer by its duty in handling the transport of the data on the
network path. The network path works like an assembly line where each layer has a specific
task to complete a working product. Hubert Zimmerman (1983) and the International Standards
Organization (ISO) formalized the OSI reference model in 1977. The OSI model’s creation was
to standardize network communication (Day & Zimmermann, 1983). The OSI network archi-
tecture includes universal standards and protocols organized in abstract layers. Unfortunately,
the current network infrastructure under the OSI model has significant limitations and design
issues that date back to its inception, including vulnerabilities that provide malicious actors an
opportunity to gain unauthorized access to network systems (Huang, 1995; Rahalkar, 2018).
The OSI reference model’s seven abstract layers are the Physical, Data Link, Network,
Transport, Session, Presentation, and Application layers. (Howser, 2020). Each layer in the OSI
reference model provides a service by implementing layer-specific protocols. All the layers are
interconnected and use the protocols to provide services to the layer above it, beginning at the
Physical Layer and ending with the Application Layer (Day & Zimmermann, 1983). Originally
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defined as abstract layers by John Day and Hubert Zimmerman (1983), the Physical Layer con-
sists of standards to maintain the network systems’ devices. For example, a security protocol
stating that the data center must have a human guard would prevent an unauthorized intrusion to
the physical devices at the Physical Layer. The Physical Layer, or Layer 1, sends data to Layer
2, the Data Link Layer, as a bit. A bit, or a binary digit, is the atomic form of digital data. Bits
are the lowest form of data broken down into the smallest unit. To connect Layer 1 to Layer
2, a form of media is required to connect one device to another for data transport. Media can
be physical or wireless. For example, physical media would be a copper wire cable connecting
two computers (Howser, 2020). Media connects a device to the network using a Network Inter-
face Card (NIC). Devices connect and communicate with media connections in between to form
Local Area Networks (LANs). Wide Area Networks (WANs) connect separate LANs to each
other. A unique identifier is assigned to each NIC to control access to the data transmitted and
received to specific devices. The unique identifier is like an address for each network device
and it uses a format defined by the Media Access Control (MAC) protocol (IEEE, 2018).
The Data Link Layer
The MAC address, also known as a physical or hardware address, allows a device to
send and receive data using source and destination addresses. The data can be sent from a device
in three different ways based on its intended destination. If a device sends data meant for one
recipient in the LAN, it is called unicast messaging (Howser, 2020). A broadcast message
is destined for receipt by all LAN devices, and a multicast message is addressed to specific
devices with unique MAC addresses in the LAN (Howser, 2020). When a message is broadcast
to all devices in the LAN, the destination address is FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF (Cisco Networking
Academy, 2020). The Data Link Layer transports data in different ways based on the LANs
topology. Two examples of Data Link Layer topologies are Token Ring and Ethernet LAN
(Thompson, 2019).
A legacy topology using a Token Ring prevents collisions of transmitted and received
data by passing a token to each device in the LAN, to each device one at at time (Cisco Net-
working Academy, 2020). Collisions can cause data loss because when two devices transmit
data simultaneously, it must be re-transmitted by both devices causing network lag (Lammle,
2011). Like the game of passing the baton, when a computer gets its turn with the token, it
transmits and receives data. Once the computer with the token has completed data transmission,
it passes the token to the ring’s next computer. The Institute of Electrical Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), an organization of professionals for technological advancement, defined a set of stan-
4
dards for Token Ring LANs called IEEE 802.4. Support for IEEE 802.4 dwindled after 2008
when the Ethernet LAN topology took de-facto prevalence in the market (Thompson, 2019).
In standard Ethernet-based LANs, the Data Link Layer provides three services (IEEE,
2016). The first service consists of layer-specific standardized protocols to prevent errors in the
Physical Layer data. The second service is with a protocol that manages connections among
Ethernet devices. These Data Link Layer devices are called bridges or switches, and they move
data across a LAN using MAC addresses as their source and destination points (Mehra & Krish-
nan, 2018). Two or more connected switches form a LAN, and a WAN connects two or more
adjacent LANs (Sharma et al., 2018). The third service is ensures error free data transported to
and from the Network Layer (Howser, 2020).
Figure 1. Token Ring vs. Ethernet LAN
The IEEE has defined a set of standards for network services using Ethernet. Wired
Ethernet is a technology used to connect devices in a LAN and WAN using physical media
based on IEEE’s Project 802.3 (IEEE, 2018). Wireless Ethernet technology is defined under
IEEE 802.11x and works with a different protocol set. For this study’s purpose, the focus will
be on the protocols used for wired Ethernet technology in the IEEE 802.3 standard (IEEE, 2016).
IEEE 802.3 defines the low-level services in the Physical and Data Link Layer for wired Eth-
ernet. The protocols provide these wired Ethernet services and conform to IEEE 802.3 (IEEE,
2018). Together, the Data Link Layer protocols deliver data among physical devices in a LAN,
beginning with protocols that provide services like error checking the OSI layers below and
above.
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Figure 2. Visual Representation of a LAN vs. WAN
The Data Link Layer has two abstract subsections called the MAC sub-layer and the
Local Link Control (LLC) sub-layer (Cisco Networking Academy, 2020). The MAC sub-layer
provides protocol services, including Data Encapsulation and the Media Access Control (MAC)
protocol (Cisco Networking Academy, 2020). At a high level, Data Encapsulation is a service
that has three functions in the MAC sub-layer. It puts the Physical Layer binary data into a
format called an Ethernet frame that allows its transport within the Data Link Layer (Cisco
Networking Academy, 2020). It also uses Ethernet addressing to add a source and destination
MAC address to the frame to be sent to the correct MAC address in the LAN. Lastly, it adds a
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) code at the end of the Ethernet frame to allow a hash check
for errors in transmission (Chu, 2019). TheMAC protocol manages Flow Control which defines
and controls how frames are transmitted and received (Zimmerman & Spurgeon, 2014; Cisco
Networking Academy, 2020).Further, the MAC protocol also handles the NIC hardware-based
unique identifier used as addressing for data transport in the Data Link Layer (Howser, 2020).
The LLC sub-layer provides a service to the Network Layer by identifying the Layer 3 protocol
used for the Ethernet frame (Cisco Networking Academy, 2020). The LLC and MAC sub-layer
services play a key role in ensuring stable and efficient data transport from the OSI network
stack’s lower and upper layers.
TheData Link protocols have enabled LANnetworks to connect to other LANnetworks
worldwide but attacks on the Data Link Layer remain prevalent (Mahmood et al., 2020). This
section provided a high-level overview of how the abstract Data Link Layer works within the
OSI network infrastructure. The next section will provide insight into the security vulnerabilities
that leave the Data Link Layer open to common attacks.
6
Common Attacks on the Data Link Layer
The last section described the Data Link Layer and its role in the network infrastructure.
This section will introduce its vulnerabilities and current attacks targeting the Data Link Layer.
A common gateway attack that begins at the Data Link Layer is the Man in the Middle (MITM)
attack (Rahalkar & Jaswal, 2019). Publicly available security tools make common attacks like
MITM attacks accessible to the average internet user (Chantzis et al., 2021). The MITM allows
a malicious user to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or stay dormant in the Ethernet LAN
for information gathering (Singh, 2019). Layer 2 is arguably the most vulnerable to MITM
attacks (Sak& Ram, 2016). Security precautions and software are more prevalent for Layers 3
and up (Mahmood et al., 2020). A breach in Layer 2 will inevitably affect the data’s security
in the layers above it (Mahmood et al., 2020). In a MITM attack, an unauthorized user gains
access to a LAN network.
LAN networks can be internal networks connected together in an office or span several
buildings. Typically, the Data Link Layer is most available to insider attacks and social engi-
neering (UcedaVelez & Morana, 2015). A MITM attack works by inserting a rogue device into
a LAN and routing traffic through it (Pingle et al., 2018). MITM attacks are initiated in the Data
Link Layer because it is the weakest entry point (Gregg & Watkins, 2006). Some attackers that
are information gathering with sniffers collect data coming from the upper layers, such as the
Network and Application Layers (Rietz et al., 2018). Even if the rest of the layers have set up
standard security settings, the unauthorized surveillance at the Data Link Layer compromises
the Confidentiality of the data being passed through the other layers in the network stack (Lai
et al., 2014; Rai et al., 2011).
Once a rogue device has a network connection to the LAN, the malicious user can use a
sniffer to look at data going through the network. Sniffers access emails, email attachments, chat
messages, network device configurations, web browser data and traffic, HTTP requests contain-
ing transaction information, and login information (Anu & Vimala, 2018). Although a MITM
initiated the sniffing attack at Layer 2 from Ethernet II frames, the sniffed frames are the Net-
work and Application Layers’ data. The Data Link Layer protocol encapsulated the data from
those layers in that frame. Using the information from a sniffer, an attacker can also forward
traffic using various publicly available software tools for these attacks. They can also perform
a DoS attack to disrupt the LAN system resources’ Availability by forwarding enough traffic
to overload a resource. Regardless of the attacks’ methods, protocols such as STP that govern
the wired 802.3 Ethernet LANs are trust-based. The network does not validate new devices
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and payloads sent by a MITM attacker for authenticity. The STP-enabled network devices in
an Ethernet LAN trust each other; therefore, it is trust-based (Mahmood et al., 2020; Perlman,
1985; Yeung, Yan & Leung, 2006). Several trust-based protocols have been a part of the net-
work infrastructure since the 1980s and persist today. For example, the default server setup in a
network allows for similar accessibility requirements; therefore, server systems’ typical internal
LAN environment will have open communications and channels to perform efficiently (Keeriy-
attil, 2018). An intruder that uses an internal server to perform malicious acts using these open
channels takes advantage of the internal LAN’s trust-based infrastructure (Keeriyattil, 2018).
Attacks that are initiated and executed in the Data Link Layer include passive and ac-
tive attacks. Passive attacks do not involve any direct participation in the network, and active
attacks involve direct manipulation of the attacker’s network. Common attacks that have per-
sisted over time have been passive sniffing attacks and active attacks, including MITM attacks,
MAC attacks, ARP attacks, STP attacks, and dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) at-
tacks. Noted but not in this study are two attacks on proprietary network switches called Cisco
Discovery Protocol (CDP attacks) and Virtual LAN (VLAN) attacks (Mahmood et al., 2020;
Yeung et al., 2006). They all take advantage of the trust-based nature of the protocols utilized
to compromise the LAN systems. The initial step for the attacker to perform these attacks is to
gain access to the Ethernet LAN of interest with a network packet analyzer device. A network
sniffer or analyzer is software that captures traffic in the connected LAN network for moni-
toring and analysis (Gregg & Watkins, 2006). A few examples of commonly used network
sniffers are Wireshark, dsniff, and Cain and Abel. This software performs a passive attack when
used for malicious reasons because network traffic monitoring can allow the attacker to gather
unauthorized information for malicious purposes. It is a passive attack because the attacker is
only receiving information and not sending any traffic with a network analyzer (Siswanto et al.,
2019). The attacker can choose to use a laptop, tablet, single-board computer, mobile phone, or
networked device to host software and has a NIC. On Ethernet-based devices, a NIC has a MAC
address and is used to send and receive unicast, multicast, and broadcast data (Cisco Networking
Academy, 2020). As was mentioned earlier, unicast and broadcast messages are sent to specific
MAC addresses, so a NIC under an Ethernet protocol will only receive messages addressed to
their unique MAC address (Howser, 2020). However, when using a network analyzer, to pick
up all the traffic passing through the network, even a unicast message meant for another device,
the NIC set to monitor mode intercepts all traffic (Sak & Ram, 2016).
The network sniffer has a capture filter that will allow an attacker to choose the type of
traffic for protocol analysis (Siswanto et al., 2019). For example, since the network sniffer works
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in the Data Link Layer of an Ethernet LAN, the filter can be configured to save all Ethernet II
frames. More protocol analysis filters can be used to choose a specific protocol in the frame’s
Ethertype like ARP requests or HTTP requests (Gregg & Watkins, 2006).
Through information gathered with a sniffer, an attacker may pick up data to launch an
active attack. Data like IP addresses and MAC addresses are used to perform a spoofing attack.
An attacker will take on another device’s identity and perform malicious tasks like that in a
spoofing attack. Identity theft is like spoofing, where a thief can gather personally identifiable
information about a victim and start opening credit cards with this new identity, unbeknownst
to the victim. MITM attacks are considered a significant threat to network security. They can
be performed in three successive or mutually exclusive steps: entry and attack limited to just the
LAN, access from the LAN to remote attack, and exclusively remote entry and attack (Ornaghi
A. & Valleri, 2003). Although this concept is dated, the attacks that happen in this manner are
relevant today. This study will focus on vulnerabilities and attacks within the LAN; however,
it is crucial to note that pertinent attacks that compromise the Network Layer are provided a
gateway from the initial LAN attack (Marconi Foundation, 2018; Rietz et al., 2018).
An attacker targeted by the LAN may compromise a device connected to the router
or act as the router itself. The gateway router is the device used to enforce Network Layer
protocols, including the IP protocol (Cisco Networking Academy, 2020). The infiltration into
the Ethernet LAN can provide an attacker insider knowledge using the ARP protocol. Although
it is a protocol associated with the Network Layer, the attacks use the MAC sub-layer protocol’s
vulnerability. The ARP protocol matches IP addresses with MAC addresses of a device and
continually updates lists with no validation, making it trust-based. With the knowledge of IP
and MAC addresses from devices in the network, an attacker can use MAC spoofing to enter
the network. With MAC spoofing, the attacker passes the rogue device as a legitimate device
by assigning it a MAC address and IP address already verified in the network. The attacker can
then intercept communication between two users in the LAN by changing ARP cache entries.
An ARP cache is a list of stored IP address / MAC address combinations of devices within the
LAN. If a LAN device does not know the MAC address associated with an IP address, it will
send out an Ethernet II frame with an ARP request, and if a device in the LAN has the pairing, it
will send back an ARP reply with the MAC address. An ARP cache entry is updated when two
devices in a LAN communicate, and an Ethernet II frame for an ARP reply updates the ARP
cache on a device (Younes, 2017). An attacker already in the network can broadcast an ARP
reply without an associated ARP request to each LAN device using the attacker’s spoofed MAC
address. The attacker will update the ARP cache for those two computers with their own MAC.
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Now all packets meant for the other computer will go directly to the attacker’s machine. Since
the attacker changed the ARP cache, this type of attack is called a poisoning attack. Hence, it is
called an ARP cache poisoning attack (Conti et al., 2016).
A Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table poisoning attack is similar, but it is di-
rected at a switch instead of a computer. The switch has a table of MAC addresses associated
with port numbers on the switch. Each port number andMAC address combination will connect
directly to a networked device. The attacker has already associated themselves with a port in
the switch and can generate Ethernet II frames replacing the source MAC address in the MAC
header with all the other MAC addresses on the Ethernet LAN’s switch. Now, the attacker
will direct all the traffic directed to any device connected to the switch to the attacker’s device.
Since the other devices are no longer receiving traffic, compromising the network resources’
Availability, this doubles as a DoS attack (Trabelsi, 2012). An intruder can perform a DoS
attack called MAC address flooding by generating many Ethernet frames with spoofed MAC
addresses to the switch to overload the CAM table with more entries than it can hold due to
its limited buffer size. The switch is designed to work as a hub due to a fail-safe that allows
it to continue communicating with the LAN devices. However, a hub only broadcasts traffic,
so all computers, including the rogue machine, will receive all traffic (Anu & Vimala, 2018).
The CSMA/CD protocol is used in half-duplex communications on the Data Link Layer. Half-
duplex communications work by sending and receiving on separate media or control sending
and receiving at separate times when working on the same media (Cisco Networking Academy,
2020). Measures taken by the CSMA/CD protocol to avoid collisions can result in other DoS
attacks within a wired Ethernet LAN. In a topology like the Token ring, one device is transmit-
ting data, and other devices wait for random times to send data (Cisco Networking Academy,
2020). An attacker automates a continuous stream of Ethernet frames to hinder other device
transmissions in a Single Adversary Attack (SAA). Two rogue devices send data to block other
devices from communicating in a Colluding Adversary Attack (CAA), there will be (Dasari,
2017).
An Application Layer protocol compromised in the Data Link Layer using a standard
MITM attack is the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP). DHCP is a trust-based net-
work server that assigns IP addresses to new hosts, and it takes advantage of a ticket-based
solution that requires a key to secure the MAC / IP address combinations. It is called Ticket-
basedAddress Resolution Protocol (TARP).MAC spoofing or otherMITMmechanisms placing
a rogue DHCP server in a LAN can allow an attacker to assign a new host on the network an IP
address, a subnet address, and a gateway address. It can also be housed anywhere in the LAN
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and can be a part of router software (Younes, 2017). The IP address, like a MAC address, is a
unique address for a networked device. The subnet is an IP address grouping system based on
the number of IP addresses available to the LAN. The gateway address is the IP address associ-
ated with the router that sends traffic into and out of the LAN. This IP assignment is temporary
so that the attacker can send a DHCP server a request message for an IP lease renewal using
the spoofed MAC and IP address. A Local Ticket Agent (LTA) authenticates the MAC and
IP address combination sent by the attacker and sends a ticket back to the rogue DHCP server
(Younes, 2017). This ticket acts as validation for the DHCP server with an ARP reply frame
generated with the same spoofed addressing to update all the ARP cache entries in the LAN
(Younes, 2017). Now the attacker can control which devices use the DHCP server as a router
to maintain positive control of all the traffic passing in and out of the LAN.
Lastly, a notable protocol that made it possible to expand small, isolated LANs to the
internet we have today, resides in the Data Link Layer. Radia Perlman originally designed the
Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) in 1985 to prevent loops and broadcast storms created in smaller
LANs (Perlman, 1985). By resolving this issue, STP enabled multiple LANs to connect to the
Layer 3 routers forming WANs, significantly expanding the number of interconnected devices
from small LANs to the internet’s worldwide connectivity today (Newnham, 2016). Malicious
users commonly use the STP Root-Takeover attack to take advantage of a vulnerability caused
by the STP protocol on modern networks. There has been an update to the STP protocol since its
inception in 1985 to enhance resource usage called rSTP (Wojdak, 2003). IEEE later standard-
ized it because of its low convergence times that decrease network lag in larger networks (IEEE,
2016). The change in the Spanning Tree Algorithm (STA) in the STP protocol due to rSTPmade
it more vulnerable because this protocol’s focus was to increase resource usage rather than se-
cure data transmission (Marro, 2003). The vulnerability is due to rSTP allowing all Ethernet
LAN switches to send BPDUs (Marro, 2003).
This chapter’s introduction is meant to provide baseline knowledge to understand the
research problem in this study. This section provides a high-level description of the OSI model’s
network infrastructure, the Data Link Layer, and its vulnerabilities. It introduces the STP pro-
tocol and its vulnerability, leading to the STP Root-Takeover attack, which is the subject of this
study. The following sections take a deeper dive into the the subject of this study: STP protocol
and the STP-Root Takeover attack.
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Background of the Study
The last section provided an overview of the Data Link Layer, and common attacks
to it. It also introduces STP, a Data Link Layer protocol. The beginning of this section is a
high-level overview of the STP protocol and its vulnerability that is the subject of this study.
Introduction to STP
To understand how the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) works would be to understand
the steps this protocol takes to complete its function on the switch. STP works on the Data Link
Layer, also known as Layer 2 in the OSIModel. The Data Link Layer transports data in the form
of Ethernet. Before the inception of the STP protocol, the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network (ARPANET) had created a LAN to support an unclassified network for US Military
bases. The network later came to be called NIPR (Non-classified Internet Protocol Router), the
standard internet used by the Department of State (DOD) (Evans, 2018). ARPANET had an
Ethernet LAN topology that allowed for a small group of computers. Two issues that needed
to be resolved were its insufficient scalability and redundant links that form loops. How does
a loop manifest itself on redundant links? Two switches are set up with two connections. The
second connection is a redundant link that was created as a fail-safe for the first link. However,
when both links are available on the network, data meant to move from switch A to a computer
connected to switch B could not leave switch B. Instead, the data ended up in a loop from switch
A to switch B due to amplification (Perlman, 1985). Multiple broadcast frames echoed into the
Ethernet LAN can amplify this cyclic redundancy, forming what is known as a broadcast storm.
The broadcast storm is a much larger loop that also prevents the data from reaching other devices
in the LAN. Due to frequent loops and broadcast storms, the Ethernet LAN network could not
expand further than a manageable and small LAN (Perlman, 1985).
In 1985, Digital Equipment Corporation assigned Radia Perlman to create an algorithm
to expand the LAN without the disruption of a broadcast storm. She created STP to prevent the
redundant loops and change the shape of the network path, solving the redundant link and scal-
ability issue (Perlman, 1985). Goals achieved by STA are standardized LANs for automated
interconnections of LANs, allow redundancy of bridges and LANs as a fail-safe, make the LAN
self-configuring, minimize memory and bandwidth usage of the STA, fast convergence, LAN
bridges hold forwarding tables with topology information, eliminate loops, and automated topol-
ogy adjustment for removed or failed bridges (Perlman, 1985).
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Spanning Tree Algorithm
The Spanning Tree Algorithm (STA) creates a self-organizing topology that allows
data to travel efficiently. It automatically creates broad network paths and expanding networks
to connect to other LANs. The Spanning Tree topology is in the form of a tree with one Root
(Perlman, 1985). As described in the introduction, all network devices in the Ethernet LAN have
a unique identifier called a MAC address (Howser, 2020). The MAC address is also used as the
unique identifier, or ID, for each STP-enabled bridge in the LAN. The STA self-configures to use
the bridge with the lowest priority and lowest bridge ID in the LAN as Root. The bridge with the
shortest path to the Root is called the Designated Bridge. In the case of multiple LAN segments,
each LANwill have a Designated Bridge (Rai et al., 2011). In this case, each Designated Bridge
is considered the Root of its LAN (Perlman, 1985). Their path distance organizes all the bridges
that fall under the Designated Bridge in a LAN segment to the Root; therefore, the rest of the
tree structure bridges have a longer path than their predecessors to the Root (Perlman, 1985). As
part of the shortest path requirement, the Designated Bridge interface with the shortest path to
the Root is called the Root Port. Among the Designated Bridges, the interface with the shortest
path to the Root is considered the Designated Port (Rai et al., 2011). Every new STP-enabled
bridge added to the LAN considers itself the Root and sends out messages alerting other bridges
in the LAN of its ID and path cost. Once it receives a BPDU message showing a Root with a
lower ID, it adjusts its forwarding table. It attempts to be the Designated Bridge until it alerted
another bridge with a lower path cost (Perlman, 1985). Along with the ID and path cost, the
BPDUs share the waiting time for a new message. If a bridge exceeds that waiting time, it is
discarded from the topology (Rai et al., 2011).
The bridges would indiscriminately share the most efficient path to reach other network
switches and avoid broadcast storms. The STP algorithm creates an automated and fluid net-
work topology allowing for scalability with minor administrative calculation. This automation
allowed the network to be self-organizing and adaptable (Perlman, 1985). Further, it allowed
the network’s expansion to connect multiple LANs to fulfill the ARPANET’s original goal: to
enable LAN to connect to any computer on the net (Roberts & Wessler, 1970). The function
of STP is to compute the topology that the data will follow to reach a destination by hopping
through various switches. The algorithm estimates efficient transmission by calculating the port
path cost (PPC) to build the topology, hence avoiding redundancy or looping (Lai et al., 2014).
The IEEE standardized a revision of this protocol and called it 802.1d. (Lammle, 2013).
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Bridge Protocol Data Unit Messaging
The STP protocol creates its topology by the free exchange of Bridge Protocol Data
Unit (BPDU) messages between switches. The BPDU messages are sent to every switch in
the Ethernet LAN using a broadcast destination address. The BPDU frames contain a BPDU
message, conf_BPDU, containing the Root ID, Root Path Cost (RPC) and Bridge ID (BID), and
the message timing attributes. The Root ID is the BID of the Root. The RPC calculates the
shortest path to the Root, and the BID identifies the ID of the bridge that is sending the BPDU.
Message timing attributes are based on STP timers specified by the Root (Rai et al., 2011). There
are three STP timers: hello_time, forward_delay, andmax_age (Rai et al., 2011. The hello_time
is the interval of time between conf_BPDUs sent, the forward_delay is the maximum listening
and learning time allowed between conf_BPDUs, and max_age is the maximum amount of time
the bridge is allowed to send a conf_BPDU before being removed from the topology (Rai et
al., 2011). The hello_time calculated between the bridge and the Root is the RPC. The RPC
determines the election of the Designated Bridge. The STA follows an iteration of the free
exchange in the BPDU messages to determine which switch has the shortest hello_time, and
that is how the Designated Bridge (Root for each LAN segment) is elected. An Ethernet LAN
topology where more than one switch has the same hello_time (Marro, 2003; Perlman, 1985;
Rai et al., 2011).
Figure 3. The Anatomy of a BPDU frame
If this topology is of an extensive network connecting several LAN segments, the Root
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would be at the top connected to Designated Bridges, also considered the Root of the LANs
segments (Perlman, 1985). Multiple LANs connect to the Root bridge to creating a connection
between the LAN segments. Metaphorically speaking, the Ethernet bridge can be compared to
a bridge that connects two pieces of land. In a topology with a Root and a Designated Bridge,
the Designated Bridge has the lowest RPC out of all the LAN switches. Further, the lowest
RPC determines which ports on the Root and Designated Bridge transmit data. After the Des-
ignated Bridge is chosen, the Root chooses a Designated Port which is the interface with the
least RPC to the Designated Bridge. It is used to forward data to the Designated Bridge’s Root
Port (Marro, 2003). When a new Root is elected by the LAN bridges, they send Topology
Change Notification (TCN) BPDU (tcn_BPDU ) messages to the nearest Designated Bridge.
The Designated Bridge sends this TCN to its Root port which forwards the TCN to the Root.
The Root uses a Topology Change (TC) flag on all BPDU messages to the Designated Bridges
to initiate convergence (Rai et al., 2011). Convergence is the STA’s process to complete the
original Ethernet LAN topology conversion to the revised topology with a new Root. The Root
acknowledges each switch in the LAN and updates the topology on all switches to complete
the convergence. During convergence, Ethernet frames are not forwarded, and the convergence
time on an average Ethernet LAN is between 30-50 seconds (Marro, 2003; Whalen, M. Bishop,
2009). Perlman’s (1985) BPDU messaging system, as described in this section, provides a set
standard to separate Ethernet frames for data in transport from BPDUs. The BPDU is specifi-
cally linked to the functionality of STP. The next section describes a modification made to STP,
creating the standard used for Ethernet LAN switching today (IEEE, 2016).
STP vs. rSTP
As the network grew exponentially, a revision of 802.1d, the rapid Spanning Tree Pro-
tocol (rSTP), began its adoption as the de-facto standard in 2001 to increase topology conver-
gences’ time efficiency (Wojdak, 2003; Marro, 2003; IEEE, 2016). Due to a demand for ef-
ficiency to fit an expanding network, IEEE standardized rSTP as 802.1w (IEEE, 2016).With
overwhelming support by the industry, 802.1w became a standard to replace 802.1d, which be-
came a legacy. After this STP vs. rSTP section, all references to STP in this study will be to
the current 802.1w standard (IEEE, 2016). The main functional difference between the IEEE
802.1d and 802.1w standard is the latter has lower convergence times in larger networks to de-
crease lag time. In 802.1d, only the Designated Bridge could send TCNmessages to each switch
individually.
Efficiency in lag time, due to a shorter convergence, was made with modification to
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the STA. In the original STP (802.1d), only a Designated Bridge Root Port can send a BPDU
message for an official topology change (Perlman, 1985). In IEEE 802.1w, all switches send the
TCN messages through the tree to the Root to decrease the time required for convergence and
increase efficiency in lag time (Marro, 2003). rSTP (802.1w) introduces ”inferior” BPDUs that
any switch can send with a port in a forwarding state (Wojdak, 2003). An interface configured
in the forwarding state can send a BPDU and update filtering tables containing topology infor-
mation (Wojdak, 2003). In STP, the Root sends TC and receives TCN BPDU messages. The
rSTP modification has one type of BPDUwith flags containing state information of the BPDU’s
source (Wojdak, 2003). In rSTP, Ethernet LAN switches can self-configure by switching neigh-
boring switch interfaces to a forwarding state, allowing them to adjust their own filtering tables
that hold information on all topology BIDs and port states (Wojdak, 2003). The original STA
had the Designated Bridge send out periodic hello_time messages to check the availability of
other LAN devices. The rSTP modification allows all LAN devices to remove a device and
adjust the filtering table accordingly to speed up convergence times for larger networks. This
section describes the difference between STP and rSTP and how the change in the standard
also allowed for a substantial modification to the STA described earlier. STP was created when
LANs were smaller and localized. A need for fast convergence times came at the time of the
Internet revolution which connected more devices to metropolitan area networks. The larger
network infrastructure required faster convergence times to work efficiently (Wojdak, 2003).
Unfortunately, such resource efficiency came at a cost to security as discussed in the follow-
ing section which outlines the security flaws in STP to include those manifested by the 802.1w
incarnation of STP.
Security Flaws in STP
The previous section describes the difference between the original STP and STP. This
section reveals the security flaws in the current STP standard. Moving forward, all references
to the current STP standard are based off of the IEEE 802.1w de-facto standard (IEEE, 2016).
Marro (2003) identified three points of vulnerability that originate from the functionality of STP
(Lai et al., 2014; Marro, 2003). It is important to note that according to the Review of Literature;
Lai et al. (2014) last acknowledged these vulnerabilities in 2014. Because the IEEE 802.1w
standard for STP remains, a correct assumption was made in the proposal defense that such
vulnerability points still exist in the current network infrastructure. For this reason, the initial
test verified that these vulnerabilities still exist (Lai et al., 2014; Marro, 2003). A high-level
overview of these points of vulnerability begins with the trust-based model of the STP protocol.
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802.1d and 802.1w are derived from a trust-based STP protocol which does not require the
validation of the BPDU messages (Lai et al., 2014; Marro, 2003). Second, due to the increase
in switches broadcasting BPDU messages in 802.1w, STP allows for more network messaging
during a state change, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) due to BPDUmessage flooding (Lai
et al., 2014; Marro, 2003). Lastly, the Root is not monitored if there is a change in topology,
so the rest of the network may not detect the wrong Root has taken over after a convergence
regardless of how quickly it occurs (Lai et al., 2014; Marro, 2003). Since STP allows all switches
to send BPDUmessages, any bridge can elect, the Root role if the network’s switches detect the
Root Path Cost (RPC) lower in a different port or switch. This allows an attacker to eliminate
the old Root and gain full access to data transported through multiple LAN segments previously
connected to the old Root. In his introduction to rSTP,Wojdak (2003) describes a point-to-point
link that allows switches to control forwarding states of other switches. Topology changes in
STP occur when another switch is elected as the Root because it has a lower priority and ID in
the BPDU. When a different Root takes over, the BPDU messages sent to notify the switches of
the topology change do not undergo any validation. The adoption of 802.1w increased the STP
protocol’s vulnerability by allowing these BPDU messages to be sent among LAN switches
allowing topology control outside of the Root. It also allows any LAN switch to access and
change filtering tables which provides a larger surface for attackers to access and manipulate
topology information. Lastly, the removal of any LAN device when it does not respond for a
specified amount of time was controlled by hello_timemessages sent from the Root. In 802.1w,
any Ethernet LAN switch has full topology information to include routes to the Root (Wojdak,
2003). Access to this filtering table can allow an attacker the privilege to remove switches and
stateful interfaces in an Ethernet LAN. STP’s trusting nature assumes that BPDUmessages sent
by any Ethernet LAN switch are valid and come from a good source. These vulnerabilities set
the stage for seven kinds of Layer 2 attacks: MAC attacks, STP attacks, CPD attacks, VLAN
attacks, DHCP attacks, ARP attacks, and WLAN attacks (Mahmood et al., 2020; Rahalkar,
2018; Yeung, Yan & Leung, 2006; Younes, 2017).
STP Root-Takeover Attack
Due to the relevance of STP attacks in common MITM and DoS related incidents,
this study focuses on a specific STP attack called the STP Root-Takeover attack. To stage the
STP Root-Takeover attack, the malicious user performs a MITM to gain entry into the network.
Then the attacker can send a BPDU using a new Root identifier (BID) that spoofs their malicious
device as the Root (Rai et al., 2011). This allows the attacker to claim the Root role using the STP
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Root-Takeover attack . After an STP Root-Takeover attack, an attacker can use this malicious
device for flooding or topology manipulation (Whalen, M. Bishop, 2009). Yeung et al. (2008)
identified four attack tools that malicious attackers use to perform the Root-Takeover attack
on Linux Ethernet bridges (Yeung et al., 2008; Whalen, M. Bishop, 2009). The vectors for
these attacks are a file called stp.c, which generates pre-configured BPDU frames, Ettercap that
launches the STP attack, and SToP, which modifies existing BPDU messages (K. Yeung, Fung
&Wong, 2008). Yersinia is the fourth exploitation tool available to perform STPRoot-Takeover
attacks by decoding the current topology and launching different STP attacks by forging BPDU
messages (Lai et al., 2014). It claims the Root role by sending a BPDUwith a lower ID, keeping
all of the rest of the BPDU information the same. All these tools are readily available to the
public using the Metasploit Framework and the Kali Linux Operating System. Both house a
comprehensive collection of exploitation tools for several attacks. Unfortunately, the Literature
Review shows this 2014 study as the last experiment with these tools, so this study required an
initial trial experiment on the latest LTS versions of the Kali Operating System and Ethernet
LAN switches.
This chapter has introduced a subsection of the network infrastructure called the Data
Link Layer. It identifies the research problem and correlates the trust-based STP protocol with
the root cause of the STP Root-Takeover attack. A further introduction is required for a set of
encryption algorithms that have emerged to provide security to trust-based frameworks. This
set of algorithms combines to form the blockchain protocol. The next section introduces the
blockchain protocol and why it can provide a solution to security problems caused by a trust-
based framework.
Introduction to Blockchain
The first part of the chapter provides an introduction to the STP Root-Takeover attack
as central to the study. This section introduces blockchain as a solution to the research problem.
Blockchain technology provides a security solution in several industries with trust-based frame-
works in the current infrastructure. However, it has not fully emerged as a viable use case at the
enterprise level. A viable use case is possible when the technology is adopted due to its part in
economic growth from creating an efficient increase in productivity (Davidson et al., 2018). Use
cases have been introduced in the supply chain, healthcare, contract management, financial ser-
vices to eliminate the need for third-party oversight and manual administrative work (Lawrence,
2017). The lack of established use cases makes blockchain a grassroots technology. It remains
at a research and development phase in many industries due to the economic impact of a com-
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plete conversion to the new system (R. Shores, personal communication, May 15, 2019). The
opportunity for a conversion would allow for secure and automated peer-to-peer systems using
blockchain technology. However, due to how blockchain works and how fully integrating it will
provide a radical change to any infrastructure. Cryptographic algorithms drive the technology
that gives it unique capabilities that may have some relevance in securing modern-day network
security issues (Gilder, 2018).
Blockchain was introduced in a white paper by Satoshi Nakamoto as an automated sys-
tem that tracks transactional records with an electronic cash system called Bitcoin (Nakamoto,
2008). As Bitcoin performs as a virtual monetary unit, the blockchain records all the transac-
tions produced with it using a combination of cryptographic algorithms. The combination of
these algorithms forms the protocols that automate the blockchain processes. Together, Bitcoin
and the blockchain form the Bitcoin Core. Since 2009, various privatized blockchains have been
introduced in multiple industries and markets (Strawn, 2019). This study will focus on Satoshi
Nakamoto’s original blockchain from the Bitcoin Core and how themechanics of these protocols
can solve the security loopholes in the current network infrastructure. The original blockchain
is the Bitcoin Core, driven by its three main characteristics; immutability, trustlessness, and de-
centralization. Due to a combination of cryptographic algorithms and hashing algorithms, the
blockchain creates secure protocols that enable these three characteristics. The blockchain is im-
mutable because attackers cannot easily change the transaction records. Any alteration made is
preserved in the blockchain in the order with which the change was created (Haughwout, 2017).
This form of version control provides a record of all transactions. To say blockchain is trustless
means that all parties providing services to the blockchain are not trusted. Instead, they work
in conjunction with a shared trust. Without the reliance of a trusted third party, validation of its
functionality is maintained by a protocol called consensus. Nodes provide the resources to exe-
cute the transactions. They are anonymous and only provide computing and electrical resources
to administer the automated transactions and have no hand in interfering with its automated
workings. Trust between nodes is not required because the distributed nodes are worldwide,
and transparency provides less opportunity due to all blockchain records’ public nature. Lastly,
blockchain has nodes distributed around the world with no central authority. A central coordi-
nator or institution typically handles decision-making in a trusted process. However, blockchain
is a distributed and decentralized database with no reigning authority (Davidson et al., 2018).
Together, these three elements drive a peer-to-peer technology that can provide a reliable secu-
rity infrastructure in an environment that has not been designed with security in mind (Gilder,
2018).
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As mentioned in this study, the current network stack is not fundamentally designed
with a reliable security solution due to the fragmented nature of Data Link Layer security and
its gateway to compromising the entire network’s security. The grassroots pioneers did not
build peer-to-peer (P2P) internet technology on security (Gilder, 2018). Nodes connected to
the internet would provide services in a bidirectional pattern. In the late 1980s, services would
include P2P file sharing and communication services like Internet Relay Chat (IRC) (Gilder,
2018). Centralized services that replaced P2P services initialized a client-server model that re-
lied on services from a server (Gilder, 2018). Soon, these became services provided by large
institutions. The nodes receiving the services came to be called clients (Strawn, 2019). This
framework’s evolution offers an idea of how the current internet came to be, notably, its effects
on having been built on already insecure network architecture. The introduction of cryptography
to add security to network communications came about with the cypherpunks in the early 1990s.
The cypherpunks consisted of cryptographers and programmers alike (Bartlett, 2016). The ba-
sis of cypherpunk ideology was privacy (Hughes, 1997). Further, privacy is brought about by
autonomous transaction systems. These systems would allow the users to reveal their identi-
ties on their terms, including anonymous mail, cryptography, digital signatures, and electronic
money (Hughes, 1997). Centralized services like email clients compromised privacy in the com-
munications, including an email sent between Alice and Bob (Hughes, 1997). In Cypherpunk
Manifesto, Hughes stated that a centralized email service has access to Alice and Bob’s identities
and their communications contents. Further, the network is such that the email is sent in plain-
text and does not protect it from sniffing attacks. The invention of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
led to the encryption of email services that are used today (Bartlett, 2016). The introduction of
Bitcoin to society was an introduction to an autonomous electronic cash transaction system that
allowed privacy in monetary transactions and is an achievement attributed to the cypherpunks
under Satoshi Nakamoto’s guise (G. Higgins, personal communication, May 1, 2019).
PGP, electronic cash systems, and the myriad of corporate services provided in the
client-server model today now reinforce and comprise the internet and its porous network stack.
Gilder (2018) stated in Life after Google that today’s internet infrastructure is the weakest link,
and its solution is a peer-to-peer-based architecture for blockchain technology (Gilder, 2018).
This study is based on the trustless, immutable, and decentralized aspects of the blockchain’s
cryptographic algorithms to create an autonomous transaction system. The fundamental strategy
to build new infrastructure with blockchain technology requires changes from the ground up.
According to Gilder (2018) in his book Life after Google, an architecture built with security in
mind needs not be focused on security. In other words, the technology upon which new network
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infrastructure is built will be inherently secure and will not require a security strategy (Gilder,
2018). For example, a smartphone shopper will assume it will have capabilities, including end-
to-end communication using telephone services, SMS, and the internet (Gilder, 2018). They will
not say, ”I want a smartphone that will allowme to make phone calls and allowme to browse the
internet.” Inherently secure network architecture will not require additional services to provide
security (Gilder, 2018). Provided that the Physical Layer will require security at the human
element, how can a secure infrastructure use the blockchain protocol at the Data Link Layer?
Blockchain protocol can establish a P2P architecture from its technology to look at network
attacks that take advantage of the STP protocol’s vulnerability, a well-established protocol used
on Ethernet-based networks worldwide, according to Gilder (2018) in Life after Google (Gilder,
2018). This section introduced blockchain and the ideology behind the technology. The next
section introduces blockchain as a network security solution.
Blockchain as a Security Solution for the STP Root-Takeover Attack
The last section introduced blockchain and this section explores how it can secure a
trust-based network protocol like STP. The trustless characteristic of blockchain is in direct
opposition to the trusted nature of the STP protocol. As was mentioned before, it is assumed
trust that causes the vulnerabilities with the STP protocol. To say that blockchain is trustless
is to say that all the components in the blockchain’s automation have no reliance on a third
party. There is no hierarchical reliance of trust of one node over another to maintain a secure
architecture. Due to the inherent nature of its functionality, there is no implicit trust (Wessling et
al., 2018). All nodes are equally required to validate transactions using the consensus protocol.
The blockchain’s encrypted contents are transparent in the public record, reducing required trust
in the human element and physical systems (Wessling et al., 2018). Insufficient trust in a central
management system and the need for a publicly verifiable reputation system lead us to leverage
public ledger techniques, including blockchain, to design routing protocols (Ramezan & Leung,
2018). Another point of contention with many solutions to the STP problem is with central
authorities. When there is centralization, there is an implicit trust built into the system. A bank,
for example, is a central authority that has a database that records money going into and out
of a bank account. Using this bank as a central authority requires trust in the accuracy of bank
account records. Bitcoin core was designed to eliminate implicit trust in the banking industry
andwas created to replace it with an automated and self-sustaining economic system (Nakamoto,
2009).
A centralized blockchain requires trust in a central authority to handle validation accu-
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rately. A permissioned and centralized blockchain, including some privatized blockchain solu-
tions created for institutional use, requires authentication to a central authority. These features
could create a weak link, so the concept of the permissionless blockchain was borne. Carrying
Bitcoin Core’s blockchain’s original ideology, the built-in consensus protocol in a permission-
less blockchain is the basis for the efficiency and security in the blockchain system (Zhang et
al., 2019). This idea sets up the possibility of doing away with authenticating new devices on
the network rather than using the consensus protocol to add new nodes to the topology. In the
STP protocol, the switch elected as the Root for a given Ethernet LAN maintains the switch
topology for speed and efficiency. It sends BPDU messages to the rest of the LAN switches
to determine any changes in the topology. Suppose BPDU messages are coming from a Root
of a different identity, like a rogue switch. In that case, the other switches will automatically
accept the change and will adapt the new Root using the trust-based STP protocol. A validation
mechanism from the consensus protocol will ensure that all switches, including the Root, are
made aware and approve of the election of a new Root in the LAN’s network topology. The
validation mechanism will ensure that a rogue device is not accepted as a new Root, preventing
an STP Root-Takeover attack directed at the STP vulnerability in an Ethernet LAN.
STP uses BPDUmessaging to determine the strength of the links between the switches.
As mentioned earlier, the RPC is shared freely among trusted switches to determine the most
efficient topology according to the amount of time it takes for frames to be sent from one switch
to another. The efficiency check used in STP can also be emulated using blockchain technology.
A blockchain has a distributed node structure; nodes broadcast data in the distributed network to
add new transactions and perform continual validation similar to how switches communicate via
the BPDU messages. Bazari et al. (2019) have proposed finding nodes in a blockchain with the
highest performance degradation. The nodes that are considered weaker are removed from the
network to increase the efficiency of blockchain broadcasts (Bazari et al., 2019). This solution
reflects STP’s primary function by measuring the efficiency among the switches in the network.
This section describes two ways in which the STP protocol can use blockchain algorithms to
circumvent trust-based validation in an STP-enabled network. One is to use use consensus for
Root validation and second is the use of efficiency checks to remove dead or weak nodes in
the network. The next section declares the problem statement and describes the purpose of the
study.
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Problem Statement and Purpose of Study
The whole chapter up until this section has been an introduction to concepts that are
related to the research problem in this study. This section will narrow down the research topic
with a declaration of the problem statement and the purpose of this study.
The protocols that govern the services in the Data Link Layer of the network stack are
not designed with security in mind (Gilder, 2018). Consequently, the vulnerabilities incur a risk
to every subsequent layer in the OSI referenced network stack (Rietz et al., 2018). To maintain
the network’s integrity, a security solution is recommended for this fundamental weak link.
Ideally, end-to-end secure communications starting from the Ethernet frames in the Data Link
Layer is recommended (Gilder, 2018; Strawn, 2019). As it stands, the STP protocol, the IEEE
standard for an Ethernet network, is used to automate continual Ethernet network LAN changes
to increase efficient data transmission and connect to the other Ethernet LANs and the internet.
There are publicly available attacks that target the STP protocol’s vulnerability (IEEE, 2018).
This leads to the main problem statement: The STP service uses trust-based BPDU messaging
from the Root to determine the LAN topology among switches. An STP Root-Takeover attack
is possible if a malicious actor injects forged BPDU messages fashioned to look like they have
originated from a legitimate Root switch. Due to insufficient validation of the BPDU messages,
the rogue device is integrated into the LAN’s topology, which may cause a Denial of Service
due to BPDU message flooding or a topology misconfiguration by electing a malicious device
as a Root (Nijim et al., 2017).
The research solution and the purpose of this study is the implementation of a hybrid
system that replaces the trusted STP protocol with a proof of concept model emulating a de-
centralized and trustless solution based on the Ethereum Platform’s broadcast and consensus
algorithms. A hybrid system integrates with the current client-server model because a complete
transformation to incorporate blockchain technology would replace the existing infrastructure
(Gilder, 2018). This study’s research solution uses a hybrid blockchain using a small-scale,
permissioned, and peer-to-peer blockchain framework as a potential solution to block attacks
in the Data Link Layer and subsequent layers of the network stack. The Ethereum platform’s
blockchain is similar to Bitcoin Core’s blockchain, described as trustless, immutable, and de-
centralized. It has an Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) that performs tasks one at a time within
the blockchain. These tasks are called Smart Contracts (Buterin, 2014). This research proposes
Smart Contracts to validate the Root in the BPDUs sent for the STP-enabled LAN. The solu-
tion explores this system to secure the Data Link Layer from malicious STP Root-Takeover
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attacks that inject forged BPDU frames to claim the Root and cause a Denial of Service due to
malicious topology misconfiguration and BPDU flooding attacks that overwhelm the network
devices with BPDU messages. The purpose of this study is designed to test whether the use
of blockchain protocol-based hybrid systems can use validation to block a forged BPDU frame
from an STP Root-Takeover attack. The goal of this section was to clarify the problem statement
for the research in the study. It also introduces the specific purpose of this study as a solution
for the declared research problem. The next section provides validation for the importance of a
research solution for this problem.
Relevance of the Study
The last section defined the problem statement and purpose of study. This section
discusses the relevance of this problem. As defined by the OSI reference model, Ethernet’s
current network infrastructure is based on the early P2P and client-server model built to connect
computers worldwide. The trust-based client-server model raises concerns that can only be
resolved by rebuilding a new network infrastructure from the ground up (Gilder, 2018; Strawn,
2019). This issue is of insufficient security in the design, beginning with virtualized data in the
Data Link Layer to the Application Layer where the user and the computer function. Starting
with the Data Link Layer, the underlying protocols that perform its services are built on a trust-
based algorithm. Trust means the protocols do not perform validation on the services rendered
and are open to common attacks performed by publicly available attacker tools. Further, there
is no insufficient information and resources available to perform these attacks successfully (Lin
et al., 2017; Strawn, 2019).
A significant number of attacks that are performed on network systems are based out
of the Data Link Layer (Marconi Foundation, 2018). An attacker can gain access by passively
gathering information required for an active attack using a publicly available network sniffing
tool (Pingle et al., 2018). After collecting the required information about devices in the LAN,
the attacker can ”spoof” the unique identifiers of a legitimate device onto a rogue device to
enter the network. Without proper validation, this rogue device can now function within the
LAN and perform further attacks to increase its foothold and deprive legitimate LAN users
of required resources (Pingle et al., 2018). This infiltration is the gateway to compromise the
Network Layer and Application layer, which extends the attacker’s ability to control devices
and gather information beyond the local Ethernet LAN (Gilder, 2018). Sniffing and MITM
attacks are performed frequently at the Data Link Layer, which requires a solution that prevents
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attacks by invalidated rogue devices that infiltrate the Ethernet LAN. Layer 2 used in all end-
to-end network transmissions to include Metropolitan Network systems and Industrial Control
Systems (ICS), a security solution that can prevent intrusions before they happen is vital. These
systems manage data, and it is not easy to base detection and prevention on signatures and
anomalies (IEEE, 2016; Lin et al., 2017). The DoS attacks and Distributed Denial of Service
attacks (DDOS) attacks are high at the Data Link Layer (Nijim et al., 2017).
Using cryptographic blockchain protocols as a switch validation solution could replace
the current trust-based model of the STP protocol with a hybrid trustless-based blockchain pro-
tocol. Ultimately, if encryption can prevent the STP Root-Takeover attack, it may contain other
common attacks. A secure network infrastructure may be built by integrating security-based
protocols in every network stack layer (Gilder, 2018; Marconi Foundation, 2018).
This chapter provides a high-level overview of the network infrastructure and a detailed
account of the STP protocol and its vulnerability to the STP Root-Takeover attack. The Data
Link Layer is a subsection of the network infrastructure that is prone to common attacks. In it,
the STP protocol performs a critical function to maintain the Ethernet LAN. It has a weak spot
that is advantageous to the cyber attacker, and the blockchain protocol provides a unique solution
to mitigate to the weakness introduced in this study. The next chapter highlights the research
that has been done to rectify the vulnerability that leads to the STP Root-Takeover attack. It




The previous chapter was a deep dive of the constructs, concepts and their applications
which are relevant to the study. The introduction provided a high level overview of the current
network infrastructure and where the security problem begins. The STP Root-Takeover attack
is but one example of the opportunities that cybercriminals have to gain access to an Ethernet
LAN. Most cyberattacks target the Ethernet LAN because it is a way to gain access to infor-
mation and systems that form internal network. Access to this internal network can begin with
infected email attachments, browser attacks or a direct connection to the network. Both of these
avenues provide an opportunity for successful attacks because of vulnerabilities in the Data Link
Layer, the subsection of the network that forms the Ethernet LAN. Typically, these attacks go
unnoticed because they begin with passive information gathering to provide what is required
for more aggressive attacks ( Rietz et.al, 2018). The Data Link Layer represents a small piece
of much larger problem because its vulnerability provides a gateway for unauthorized users to
gather information and take control of a home or enterprise network and all of the computer
systems connected to it (Younes, 2017). The subsection of the network infrastructure defined
in the research problem is the Data Link Layer and it’s specific trust-based service is the STP
protocol. Several attacks on the STP protocol are introduced in the previous chapter, however
the STP Root-Takeover attack is the center of this study as it fine tunes the perimeters of the
research solution and its defense (Lai et al., 2015). Having introduced a research problem in
Chapter 1, this chapter will document the literature review conducted for this study. The liter-
ature review starts with an overview of the conceptual framework used for searching literature
as a part of the literature review process. After this, a description of the research problem as it
relates to the research solutions is introduced. It is followed by an analysis and critique research
solutions based on positions taken by the researchers. The research solutions can be divided
into three main categories: validation based on cryptography, Alternatives to the STP protocol
and blockchain-based solutions. The literature review is guided by the theoretical framework
introduced in the next section.
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Theoretical Framework
The previous section outlines the Review of Literature chapter and introduces the phi-
losophy behind a literature review. The theoretical framework is a guide for reviewing current
research in a study. It is a conceptual model that provides a structured framework to create an
understanding of the research problem as it stands currently (Connelly, 2014). The theoretical
framework for the research study is structured by a six-step literature review process which be-
gins with the selection of a study topic (Machi & McEvoy, 2016). The first chapter provides
an overview of the STP protocol, the STP Root-Takeover attack and blockchain as a possible
solution. To fine tune the topic of this study, a research topic question must be developed. The
research question in this study is the following: Can a blockchain be used to mitigate an STP
Root-Takeover attack? To fine tune the topic of the research study is the first step to a complex
literature review based on the chosen topic (Machi & McEvoy, 2016). The second step in the
literature review process begins with the argument of discovery and its goal is to present the cur-
rent state of knowledge on the subject. This goal is achieved by gathering information related to
the topic and analyzing it. The argument of advocacy is a critique of the knowledge gained and
applied to the research question (Machi & McEvoy, 2016). The third step is to select literature
to review which is based on the chosen topic and the type of material that will best present the
arguments required as evidence for the claims made in the study (Machi &McEvoy, 2016). The
choice of resources is a decisive action that provides an opportunity to defend claims made in
the study. For example, academic debates, professional experience and expert opinion can be
used collect current knowledge (Machi & McEvoy, 2016). The research topic for the study is
based on global knowledge that has been collected over years. A literature review that is con-
ducted based on the search of peer-reviewed academic literature is a known source of expert
opinion. The search was fine tuned to prefer literature within the last five years due to the fast
paced nature of information technology. Further, a preference was made to books, guides, con-
ference proceedings and academic journals based on information technology for the literature
review in the study. Both of these selections will ensure current knowledge in the topic. The
databases that comprise the literature used in this study provide validated sources of research.
The integrity of a research study is based on validated research because uses verified research
methodology. This study is based on research methodology so it is natural to base it off of the
research and recommendations of scholarly research.
A significant part of scholarly research is the peer review. Peer review is a form of
validation used in scholarly research through the verification of research methodology. It is a
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critique of the research made anonymously and/or by experts in the same field of study. Peer
review can be seen as similar to the validation methods used in peer-to-peer technology of the
blockchain. The trustless validation provided by peer review provides integrity to scholarly re-
search. The search for literature was divided into two subjects: security research in the STP pro-
tocol and network security research in blockchain. The goal is twofold: to assess the research for
underlying commonalities and critique the research solutions provided in both subjects against
the research solution in this study. These two goals are defined by Machi and McEvoy (2016)
as a discovery argument and critique of the literature; steps four and five respectively. The final
step of the process is this chapter which is a written documentation of the literature review. This
section described the theoretical framework as a guide for the literature review. The next section
describes the research question and introduces current solutions that pertain to it.
The STP Root-Takeover Research Problem
The literature review in this chapter explores current solutions, designs and models that
have been introduced to mitigate the STP Root-Takeover attack. Various ideas to this problem
have been introduced and a few are implemented on a small scale. The STP Root-Takeover
attack is an example of how existing vulnerabilities in the Data Link Layer can provide an
unauthorized user control of an Ethernet LAN. The specific vulnerability in the Data Link Layer
that allows for the success of the STP Root-Takeover attack is the STP protocol. The STP
protocol manages the topology of an Ethernet LAN using trust based messaging among network
devices (Lammle, 2020). The lack of validation in a trust based system has no mechanism to
prevent a rogue device from masquerading as a valid Ethernet device (Singh et. al., 2018). The
subsection of the network infrastructure defined in the research problem is the Data Link Layer
and it’s specific trust-based service is the STP protocol. Several attacks on the STP protocol are
introduced in the previous chapter, however the STP Root-Takeover attack is the center of this
study as it fine tunes the perimeters of the research solution and its defense. Although serious
vulnerabilities in the Data Link Layer cause MITM attacks, MAC spoofing and sniffing attacks,
the study will be centered upon an aggressive attack that provides a solid example of why trust
based systems such as the STP algorithm require revision. The research problem is validated by
solutions produced to prevent STP Root-Takeover attack.
The STP Root-Takeover attack is based on the STP protocol which is designed to au-
tomate the expansion of LANs. Perlman (1985) defines the goal of the STP protocol to create a
self configuring topology that can interconnect LANs and avoid loops (Perlman, 1985). When
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the algorithm, Perlman (1985) described of the characteristics of this protocol:
• The topology forms a spanning tree with a unique Root and the predecessors of all of the
bridges in the tree are closer to that Root
• The Root is elected based on having the lowest ID which comes from its unique hardware
address. The topology is initially created by each bridge electing itself as Root.
• The Designated Bridge has the lowest path cost to the Root. The lowest path cost can be
calculated by the amount of bandwidth time it takes to send a message to the Root.
• The Designated Bridge is responsible for sending out hello_time messages that track path
cost to the Root and check for non-functioning bridges in the network
• Bridges in the topology that do not respond are removed from the topology.
The goal of the STP protocol was to expand the network , connect LAN segments, de-
tect and mitigate redundant links and prevent loops (Perlman, 1985). At the time of its inception
in 1985, the requirement for security measures was not evident and the trust-based STP proto-
col became a de-facto standard for network expansion (IEEE, 2018). The STP Root-Takeover
attack in this study is performed by disrupting the election of the Root by the STP algorithm in
an Ethernet LAN. The network devices in the Ethernet LAN will typically pass messages called
bridge protocol data units (BPDU) that name the current Root and provide other identifying
characteristics such as the hello_time and RPC. The Root is elected by having the lowest ID,
therefore, the attacker infiltrates the Ethernet LAN and sends a forged frame with the lowest
ID to claim the Root role. The new Root is accepted and acknowledged by all of the Ethernet
LAN devices to create a new topology. In claiming the Root role, the attacker has the ability to
manipulate data in the Ethernet LAN, manage connected LAN segments, perform DoS attacks
and reroute all traffic to their own device. This attack is possible because the network devices in
the Ethernet LAN do not have a mechanism to validate the source of a forged BPDU frame. The
lack of validation makes the STP protocol trust-based which is the root cause of its vulnerability
to this attack. The following three sections divide the solutions into three main solution cate-
gories: cryptographic, alternatives to STP and blockchain-based. The next section introduces
the use of cryptography as a means for network device validation.
Cryptographic Validation of Ethernet Devices
The last section describes the research topic central to the Review of Literature chapter.
This section introduces the first category of solutions reviewed and analyzed. The literature
29
review produced two interesting cryptographic solutions that are used to add validation to the
trust-based nature of the STP protocol. As it stands, the trust based STP protocol does not
validate new devices that are added to an Ethernet LAN. Although the STP protocol was adopted
to solve the issue of expansion, the issue of security in the Data Link Layer is a problem (Lai et
al., 2014). The use of cryptography provides proven and secure techniques used to handle issues
of validation (Aumasson 2017). These techniques can be integrated into a network protocol like
STP to handle the validation of new network devices and solve the problem of trust. These
solutions use a different forms of cryptography that provide unique verification techniques for
STP switch validation. The solutions described in this section are public key cryptography and
hashed message authentication codes.
Public Key Infrastructure for Validation
Shortly after creating the STP algorithm, Perlman (1988) introduces public key in-
frastructure (PKI) to a network layer protocol design that validates network layer devices by
verifying the source device’s digital signature. PKI provides validation by verifying the source
of digital information through public and private keys (Aumasson, 2017). The public key is
shared among all network devices and verification of a specific device’s identity is made using
it’s unique private key. The public key is required to verify the private key, therefore, all valid
devices in a network using PKI validation would have a public and private key pair (Aumas-
son, 2017). The use of two different keys, one to encrypt and the other to decrypt, makes it a
form of asymmetric cryptography (Aumasson, 2017). Although the design that Perlman (1988)
suggested does not provide a solution to the trust-based nature of the STP protocol in the Data
Link Layer, it recommends the use of validation for the trust-based nature of a network proto-
col in the network layer (Perlman, 1988). The introduction of PKI for trust-based validation a
few years after the STP protocol was introduced, provides some insight into how security was
viewed at the time of the network infrastructure’s inception. Perlman’s (1988) thesis validates
that the trust based nature of network protocols in the infrastructure was a problem, however,
the integration of PKI cryptography for validation was not fully realized in the STP protocol.
A PKI solution was produced by Lai et al. (2014) to validate devices in an Ethernet
LAN using the STP protocol. The solution is trust based in that the Ethernet LAN is made up of
switches called trusted switches. Each switch, upon joining the LAN, must obtain a certificate
to distribute BPDU messages. This certificate is obtained by a LAN-based certificate authority
(CA) with the public key. The CA is a trust-based issuer of certificates. It works by validating
a switch and providing it an encrypted certificate as proof of attestation (Boonkrong, 2020).
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The certificate is only distributed to switches that have an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) which
is the private key that all valid switches have before joining the LAN (Lai et al., 2014). This
solution performs validation of switches by providing each of them with a unique identity. The
attestation of this unique identity is made by the LAN’s trusted CA that issues it a certificate.
This solution is able to provide validation of the network device and stop a switch that has not
been provided with a valid AIK (Lai et al., 2014). The research shows that the solution blocks
a rogue switch in the Ethernet LAN from sending BPDU frames because it does not have a
certificate. The researchers launched an attack using the Yersinia attack tool to provide evidence
that this solution blocks frames from a switch that has not been provided a certificate to validate
it on the Ethernet LAN (Lai et al., 2014). While this solution effectively blocks a forged BPDU
frame from allowing a rogue device to claim the Root role, there are two factors that make the
solution difficult to implement. First, it requires that all switches have a chip that provides its
private key. Second, the certificate is granted by a trusted CA that verifies the chip. Although
these two components provide effective security, it is a proprietary system that would require
agreement on a common CA and the ability to work with the additional hardware chip on every
network device. This issue can burden its expansion to a large scale network infrastructure.
Hashed Message Authentication for Validation
An alternative to the asymmetric PKI solution is the hashed message authentication
code (HMAC). Message authentication code (MAC) is a symmetric form of cryptography that
uses a single shared key. It is important to note that this type of a MAC is different from the
MAC protocol described in Chapter 1’s introduction and the unique hardware address used
through the study. The type of MAC described in this section is related to a type of symmetric
cryptography that requires more trust than the asymmetric PKI. The MAC does not use unique
and unshared private keys, it is an alternative algorithm that provides message integrity and
authentication (Fall & Stevens, 2011). TheHMACuses an additional hash algorithm to add to its
strength (Krawczyk, 1997). A study by Whalen & Bishop (2009) produced a solution that uses
a “password-keyed HMAC”. Each network device in the Ethernet LAN will be programmed
to create a hashed password based on the HMAC algorithm. It will add this password to the
BPDU payload in the unused digest field of the BPDU frame (Whalen & Bishop, 2009). The
receiving device will recompute the password using HMAC and make a comparison check for
validation of the BPDU frame. This solution is tested on devices that are kernel compiled to use
the HMAC algorithm verification mechanism. The solution in this study introduces the use of
HMAC as a form of verification to remove external factors such as certificate authorities and key
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exchange (Whalen & Bishop, 2009). Rather, it is a precompiled and integrated authentication
mechanism to validate BPDU frames. This solution is lightweight and provides a proof-of-
concept for resolving issues with attestation in the STP protocol, however, the use of the HMAC
algorithm as a standard is difficult to attain. A problem with the use of the shared password is
that it would be difficult to keep secret and requires trust. Such a password would have to
be configurable to change by organization and may cause overhead for local administration.
Although the solution is more efficient than the CA, the amount of trust required in the expansion
of this protocol addendum would create another vulnerability. Moreover, the amount of time
required to perform HMAC encryption calculations and add them to each Ethernet frame may
cause a lag in the STP protocol’s performance (Rai et al,. 2011). The HMAC solution concludes
the review of cryptographic solutions. The next section introduces four unique alternatives to
prevent STP Root-Takeover attacks.
Alternate Solutions for STP Device Validation
The previous section provides an overview of cryptographic solutions that have been
proposed to alleviate the threat of an STP Root-Takeover attack. The use of PKI and HMAC
are common mechanisms for authentication and access control that are useful in alleviating the
risk of layer two attacks (Whalen & Bishop, 2009; Boonkrong, 2020). This section dives into
solutions that find results in infrastructure changes that manipulate how the STP algorithm is
rendered on the Ethernet LAN. The literature search through academic journals have provided
alternatives such as a vendor-specific Cisco solution, LAN partitioning, an intrusion detection
system (IDS), and a software defined network (SDN) solution.
Cisco stops the STP Leak
The Cisco solutions include three widely used configurations in the Cisco IOS to block
the STP protocol’s automated functionality. These configurations are called Root Guard, STP
Portfast, BPDUguard, STP loop guard and BPDU filter (Cisco, 2007; Gooley et al., 2019).
Root Guard blocks switches from Root election, requiring the manual configuration of the Root
instead of using automated topology changes for Root election . STP Portfast can be configured
on switch interfaces to prevent the topology change notification (TCN) messages that alert all
devices of a new Root. This prevents the switches from automatically changing the topology’s
Root based on the BPDU messages (Gooley et al., 2019). BPDUguard blocks BPDU messages
on individual switch interfaces which prevents them from connecting to rogue switches (Singh,
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2020). It is an additional safety mechanism that is administered globally on the switch should
a BPDU frame slide past the STP Portfast configuration (Gooley et al., 2019). STP loop guard
prevents loops when a link fails a transmission because loop prevention is the original job of the
STP protocol. Without the STP protocol, an Ethernet LAN is vulnerable to loops and broadcast
storms that may prevent the traversal of data to other devices in the network (Perlman, 1985).
Although a fix may have been added in recent years, the STP loop guard and Root Guard
cannot function synchronously on a single interface allowing the switch to be elected as Root
and start a loop (Yeung et al., 2008). It is also important to note the BPDUGuard and Root
Guard may be helpful in preventing an STP Root-Takeover attack, but leave the Ethernet LAN
vulnerable to other attacks (Lai et al., 2014). Also, this solution is vendor-specific, so it can
only be used with switches configured with Cisco IOS. Lastly, this Cisco solution does not
resolve security issues in the STP protocol. Instead, it blocks it from working by using so
many prevention mechanisms its like trying to prevent a water balloon from leaking by patching
each hole. Finding an efficient topology with BDPU messages and blocking loops in redundant
networks is left to the administrators in charge of networkmaintenance because the STP protocol
is deterred from its function (Rai et al., 2011). Manual topology configurations and monitoring
efficient path cost is heavy work due to insufficient automation from the STP protocol (Lai et
al., 2014; Rai et al., 2011; Yeung et al., 2006).
Spoof the Spoofer with a Partitioned Infrastructure
While a common enterprise solution to the STP vulnerability has been maintained with
messy Cisco configurations, another solution to prevent Layer 2 attacks at the infrastructure-
level had emerged. In a typical STP Root-Takeover attack, a forged BPDU frame is created
by gathering topology information from sniffing attacks . Sniffing attacks, although passive,
are deadly because it weaponizes the unauthorized user with data required to launch aggressive
attacks (Forshaw, 2017). Yeung et al., (2006) had proposed a system that will hide topology in-
formation in BPDU messaging. This solution is implemented by partitioning an Ethernet LAN
into two: internal and external. The internal non-infrastructure switches and the external infras-
tructure would be organized with a gateway switch in between. The non-infrastructure LAN
switches would use pseudo bridge ID and pseudo Root IDs to hide basic topology information
to prevent malicious attacks from the internal LAN (Lai et al., 2014). The infrastructure par-
tition would contain STP enabled switches in the network outside of the LAN. This solution
provides a secure network infrastructure by using a common strategy in stronger control of the
network: the demilitarized zone (DMZ). In the field of network security, the DMZ is a perimeter
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created for added security with an inside that is protected from the outside (Davies, 2019). The
solution is creative because the STP algorithm’s functionality is not altered or blocked as it is
with the Cisco solution. A possible problem with the modified and nonstandard STP protocol
implemented for the internal LAN, is that it will require administrative adaptation making it fea-
sible for a smaller network rather than a larger one (Rai et al., 2011). This solution can prevent
information gathering from an internal attack, however, the outer infrastructure is vulnerable
to the STP Root-Takeover attack. This vulnerability may provide the gateway to a targeted ef-
fort for spoofing the pseudo IDs to match the internal switches. Further, it is unclear whether a
spoofing attack using the pseudo IDs can be prevented in the event of a successful man in the
middle attack on the external LAN and the gateway switch.
The IDS/DIDS Solution
One of the biggest problems with Layer 2 exploits such as the MITM or the STP Root-
Takeover attack is that they often go unnoticed unless the attackers make themselves known by
launching a DoS attack or until it has affected the layers above it (Lai et al., 2014). The role of
an intrusion detection system (IDS) is to use common attack patterns to detect a possible attack
(Shrivastava, 2020). The IDSwill inspect all network traffic in search of an anomaly (suspicious
network traffic). Upon detection of an anomaly, the IDS will typically send a warning in the
form of an email or alert that is received by an administrator (Cox & Gerg, 2004). With respect
to the STP Protocol vulnerability at hand, an IDS solution has been proposed to prevent an STP
Root-Takeover attack by inspecting traffic in the Ethernet LAN for anomalies. The IDS in this
solution targets the network traffic passing through the switch interfaces (Rai et al., 2011). Any
switch can receive a BPDU message with a lower ID and update its database electing the the
switch with the lower ID as the new Root. This newly elected Root is broadcast as a BPDU
message to all of the switches in the Ethernet LAN. In turn, the rest of the switches in the LAN
will accept this new Root and update their databases (Rai et al., 2011). The solution proposes
that an IDS can be added to all or a set amount of switches in the Ethernet LAN. This IDS will
have an algorithm called a Root_Change_Handler that detects BPDUs that indicate a new Root.
It uses other verification algorithms to detect malformedBPDUs and anomalies in the topology’s
STP timing calculations from the BPDU payload (Rai et al., 2011). The IDS sends a probe to
the new Root for an acknowledgment with the topology’s state information to verify it. Rai et
al., (2011) maintain that if the STP Root-Takeover attack is administered from a rogue switch, it
would not have the stateful information required to acknowledge the probe, thus triggering the
detection alarm (Rai et al., 2011).
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This IDS solution has algorithms that get triggered from the common STPRoot-Takeover
attack allowing for a successful detection. Moreover, Rai et al., (2011) have taken measures to
ensure less false positives by considering the stateful information collected about the topology.
However, if the attacker collects the stateful information by listening for a longer period of time,
it may be able to mimic the thresholds calculated by the algorithm, allowing it to spoof its way
into the Root role of the Ethernet LAN. Also, an IDS is intended to alert administrators of a
possible issue. The problem with this type of a system is that alerts are often ignored due to
the frequency of false positives (Cox & Gerg, 2004). Since the detection system does not stop
the activation of the new Root role, the attacker may perform more aggressive attacks before
administration is able to identify and prevent them from occurring (Ljubuncic & Litterer, 2019).
A Software Designed Network Approach
The typical Ethernet LAN, as described in Chapter 1, historically started with hard-
ware switches that were connected by hardware media. The hardware network infrastructure is
slowly being replaced with virtualized and software based systems that provide centralization
of network device controls. In a hardware system, each switch in the Ethernet LAN is described
as autonomous with varying configurations based on network requirements. A software de-
signed network (SDN), centralizes the administration of network devices ( Pujole, 2020). A
hypervisor, or virtualized environment, allows for an Ethernet LAN to made completely of soft-
ware and network traffic can be centrally processed (Dotson, 2019). For example, the previous
IDS solution required that a certain number of switches to be configured as an IDS (Rai et al.,
2011). The IDS solution in a virtualized environment, would allow centralized network traffic
inspection through one IDS instead of having to configure it on every switch. The evolution of
software based systems in virtualized environments has also brought software based networks
to the forefront (Pujole, 2020). SDNs have begun to pave the way for rapidly introducing and
changing technology used without the hassle of expensive hardware upgrades (Santos, 2020).
To keep with the current STP Root-Takeover attack issue which still plagues modern day vir-
tualized technology, a solution for the trust-based STP protocol to validate devices still exists
(Lai et al., 2014; Rietz et al., 2018). Rietz et al., (2018) assert that due to STP vulnerabilities,
attackers can still gain access to the Layer 2 despite Layer 3 detection systems on the modern
software based network infrastructure (Rietz et al., 2018). They claim that an SDN solution can
protect a network from STP-based Layer 2 & 3 attacks without changing the configurations of
the Ethernet LAN devices (Rietz et al., 2018). An SDN can provide a separate controller that
controls network traffic without the administrative overhead of configuring each device. The
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controller can provide administrative control of Ethernet frames with rules to provide secure
switching (Rietz et al., 2018). The SDN solution limits broadcasting to control network flow.
Broadcasting, as was defined in the introduction, is Communication using a broadcast destina-
tion address to send a message to all the Ethernet LAN devices. Since such a broadcast address
echos the broadcasted frames to all of the LAN devices, DoS attacks after claiming the Root role
in the STP Root-Takeover attack can limit system availability to the victim (Easttom, 2018).
Although this solution does not address the STP Root-Takeover attack specifically, the
solution provides for firewall rules that can isolate BPDU frames that show a change in the Root
role and send them to a centralized SDN controller for administrative control. This will prevent
the quick adoption of a new rogue Root bridge and allow a process for inspection and the ability
to manipulate the network traffic. The solution is a model that provides network inspection
that can prevent STP based attacks as well as other Layer 2 & 3 attacks on other protocols
(Rietz et al., 2018). Although broad, this type of a solution can be fine tuned to prevent many
attacks. This type of a design does not show experimentation in production, however, introduces
a paradigm shift in how network security is maintained. If network security solutions based on
SDNs provide a Layer 2 frame inspection and control, the system will not be vulnerable to
Layer 2 attacks which lead to attacks in higher layers (Rietz et al., 2018). An improvement to
this solution would be an artifact that can demonstrate frame and packet inspection through the
centralized SDN controller. Currently, this solution does not exhibit real evidence of preventing
an STP based attack andwould be stronger with a software based solution that provides empirical
data.
So far, the literature search and brought forth cryptographic solutions that demonstrate
modifications to the STP protocol to provide validation of newly elected Roots using PKI and
HMAC. Alternative solutions have provided other formats to manipulate the STP protocol from
automatically validating Roots. Three out of these four alternative solutions are dated and do
not necessarily follow the evolution of the modern network infrastructure. They are solutions
that work on hardware based networks and solve issues that encompass hardware and software
based networks creating more overhead and expensive adoption (Pujole, 2020). These three
alternatives are:
• The Cisco solution blocks and manipulates the implementation of the STP protocol at a
granular level.
• A partitioned infrastructure that contains an internal and external LAN by hiding the
topology information.
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• An IDS that is installed on each STP enabled switch in the LAN that detects anomalies.
The fourth solution follows the adoption of software based system infrastructures that
have created a new paradigm in network and system architecture (Pujole, 2020). The SDN con-
troller in the fourth alternative solution provides a software based approach to a centralized net-
work traffic flow. As virtualized environments with an infrastructure built on hypervisors start to
hit more enterprise systems, the advancement leads to approaches that work in cloud based archi-
tectures. These emerging technologies lead the average consumer towards approaches like the
SDN (Abuelenain, 2021). To carry the research solution to new technology and software-based
solutions, the introduction of blockchain technology as a medium for security based solutions
provides a stronger shift. The second part of the literature search points to blockchain solutions
to network security problems such as the STP Root-Takeover attack in the research question.
Blockchain solutions for the STP Root-Takeover Attack
The last section was an overview of trends in security solutions to resolve vulnerabil-
ities in the standardized STP protocol. It poses as a survey of solutions that follow the trend
in enterprise network infrastructure. The most dated solutions provide cryptographic validation
for network devices in the Ethernet LAN. Other solutions that were proposed various changes
to the STP protocol that can work in the traditional hardware based Ethernet LAN (Cisco, 2007;
Rai et al., 2011; Yeung et al., 2006) . An SDN solution introduced the power of software based
network traffic inspection to solve a host of Layer 2 & Layer 3 vulnerabilities (Rietz et al.,
2018). To push forward with the SDN solution, such a strategy can be experimented and tested
using blockchain technology. Blockchain technology is software that provides unique security
elements such as consensus (validation), distribution (cloud share), encryption and hashing to
its use cases (Lantz & Cowrey, 2020). Blockchain is at a grassroots level so it is difficult to pro-
duce specific use cases that deliver empirically proven conclusions. All use cases are considered
startup development because businesses that propose using it are in a research and development
phase (R. Shores, personal communication, May 15, 2019). Network security solutions have
been introduced in startup development using blockchain as an SDN for encrypted traffic flow
in a distributed cloud. An SDN that is implemented in a distributed network would not have a
single SDN controller as was described by Rietz et al.(2018) but is maintained by a distributed
set of SDN controllers that manage the network nodes (Amin, 2017). This means that all of the
network traffic will be managed by a distributed network of nodes. Nodes are individual sys-
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tems connected to a distributed cloud network that provide resources such as managing the path
of network traffic (Raj, 2019). The basis for a blockchain system is that it it provides validation
and consensus through a distributed peer to peer system (Bashir, 2020). Each node is a peer and
provides resources to keep the blockchain network running. This construct allows for an auto-
mated system that is not governed by a central authority (Bashir, 2020). To maintain Byzantine
fault tolerance (BFT), each node is incentivized (Bashir,2020). BFT is a concept that ensures
that all nodes in the network maintain a single version of the blockchain network (Bashir, 2020).
The name is derived from the Byzantine General’s Problem which is the idea that all general’s
in the army must maintain a majority vote in a single plan to attack a city. The problem lies in
how to keep each general from going astray (Raj, 2019). BFT is the solution that ensures that
all of the generals in the army stick to the same plan. Consensus is the BFT solution to maintain
a distributed blockchain network where each node agrees on the the contents of the blockchain
(Raj, 2019). Typically, the agreement would be made through Proof ofWork (PoW) or a general
majority agreement on a hash value. PoW is used in the Bitcoin Core network which requires
intensive hash calculations to be rewarded for adding a block to the network (Bashir, 2020).
Blockchain-based Contractual Routing Protocol
Ramezan and Leung (2018) stated a standard blockchain solution that uses its entire
technology in its architecture uses incentives and rewards for users that provide resources to
maintain a decentralized infrastructure. The peer-to-peer network of distributed nodes add no
cost to a central authority so it is independent of central management. The proposed solution
uses a blockchain network with nodes that accept payment for routing data packets through
consensus. Routing of data packets involves a path selection for the data to follow from source
to destination in the network (Zinin, 2001). The proposed model is called the Blockchain-Based
Contractual Routing (BCR) protocol. The BCR protocol maintains a blockchain network that
connects IoT devices together allowing a peer to peer distributed system using smart contract
routing. The lack of trust in the vendors of IoT devices triggered the creation of this model
(Ramezan & Leung, 2018). Ramezan and Leung (2018) proposed a multi-hop network with a
gateway that provides the authority on a network by enabling communication, approving new
devices and uploading data and firmware required for the IoT devices to function (Ramezan &
Leung, 2018). Transactions are added to the blockchain to incentivize miners with tokens that
later increase in value (Ramezan & Leung, 2018). Ramezan and Leung (2018) acknowledge
that attackers in the blockchain network can maliciously disrupt the routing of data packets by
providing the wrong route or dropping data packets. They run a simulation of the smart contracts
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on a network and test whether their consensus algorithms can lower the amount of attacks.
The BCR protocol provides a different perspective to network traffic control. It allows
for validation using smart contracts and consensus algorithms. Although this solution does not
specifically gear itself towards the Layer 2 STP protocol vulnerability, it does present a solu-
tion that provides an alternative software based network traffic manager. Although this solution
manages the routes of data, it requires consensus verification that manages the source, destina-
tion and path of network traffic. This construct can be used to manage Ethernet traffic and use
consensus algorithms to deter malicious nodes. The model creates a typical blockchain solution
that uses a decentralized peer to peer network. The problem with creating a standing solution
for the STP Root-Takeover attack is that it must adapt to the current network infrastructure.
The BCR protocol calls for a redefinition of the network infrastructure whether it is used to
connect IoT devices or manage an Ethernet LAN. Secure transmission and verification adds the
blockchain security aspect to the solution, however, its implementation is not realistic on the
network infrastructure as it stands today. The next option is based on the underlying security
issues with the current network infrastructure and has specific solutions for securing the Data
Link Layer.
Marconi Protocol
The premise of the Marconi protocol is based on three problems addressed about the
current network infrastructure: (1) Ethernet frames are not designed with encryption exposing
data transported in Layer 2 (2) The inflexibility of the current network infrastructure causes
an additional expense due to the requirement of security add-on features (3) The centralized
model of the current network infrastructure leaves availability up to the internet service providers
(Marconi Foundation, 2018). The following features are provided in the whitepaper by Marconi
Foundation:
• The Marconi protocol proposes a communication channel called a Marconi pipe for the
transport of network traffic among peers (Marconi Foundation, 2018).
• The encryption of network traffic begins at layer two with Ethernet frames to ensure end
to end encryption for all data in the network infrastructure using Diffie-Hellman between
peers in the blockchain network.
• The Marconi peer to peer distributed network is made up of nodes that are awarded with
tokens for providing bandwidth and resources.
• The model is said to be self-sustaining and can work in conjunction with the current
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network infrastructure.
• Packet inspection can locate anomalies despite the encryption.
• Packet relays will provide untraceable routing paths.
• Peer ranking strategies are used to ensure the quality of packet management and speed.
The Marconi Foundation set up a model for a network infrastructure that follows the
ideology from which blockchain is based. It ranks privacy and decentralization as a priority
for a sustainable network infrastructure starting from the ground up. As an SDN, its a perfect
blockchain solution has been created to provide security starting at the Data Link Layer. It is a
platform through the Ethereum blockchain that has redesigned encrypted packets and provides a
new infrastructure to build newDecentralizedApplications (DApps). The solution is an example
of how blockchain can provide a new infrastructure using protocols that provide encryption
built into the Data Link layer providing a way to transport data and ensure privacy (Marconi
Foundation, 2018).
Unfortunately, the current network infrastructure runs on a centralized client-server
model that is so integral to the underlying system, that such a network would not easily run
side by side with the current system as the Marconi Foundation claims (Gilder, 2018). Such a
system can only be built from the ground up and maintained if a need for a new network infras-
tructure arose. This circumstance seems inconceivable which is why its feasibility for success
as a a replacement for the current network infrastructure is low. A significant issue in transform-
ing current problems to blockchain solutions is the rate at which the existing infrastructure can
handle the change. The worldwide infrastructure and acceptable IEEE standards are built upon
standards that will take years to change. A viable use case to fix the current infrastructure is to
integrate a hybrid system that will work with current acceptable technology but sacrifice some
blockchain functionality. The next solution is built on a software based network infrastructure.
The technology for this infrastructure is currently in use and may provide more insight into a
sustainable option for the near future.
Blockchain Virtual Extensible LAN
Amin (2017) introduces a Layer 2 infrastructure based on the blockchain. It is a solu-
tion that does not require the STP protocol but introduces a new one based on the management of
Layer 2 virtual LANs (VLANs) . Although this solution is not a specific amendment of the tra-
ditional STP function, it provides an alternate management of Ethernet frames that is free of the
STP topology requirement and may eliminate the vulnerability from BPDU messaging. The se-
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curity of separate Ethernet LANs that are connected to the same Layer 3 network device (router)
can be managed by partitioning them into VLANs. Where an Ethernet LAN can be formed by a
physical separation, a VLAN forms a logical separation of a network (Mathew& Prabhu, 2017).
The STP protocol was created to expand the traditional Ethernet LAN by creating an algorithm
that stops loops created by redundant links (Perlman, 1985). The SDN paradigm shift allows
for load sharing network traffic through redundant links that do not form loops. Distributed ser-
vices such as cloud technology manage the distribution of traffic through algorithms that permit
load sharing (DeJonghe, 2018). In the current SDN construct, the blockchain network will find
redundant links advantageous for a multipath data flow (Amin, 2017). It’s goal of is to expand
the scalability of these segments by using redundant links for efficient data transmission in a
distributed network (Amin, 2017). The solution is called a Blockchain Virtual Extensible Local
Area Network (BLAN) (Amin, 2017). It works with cloud-based Layer 2 bridges called a virtual
extensible LAN (VXLAN) network and it encapsulates Ethernet frames from layer two with an
four additonal headers: VXLAN, UDP, IP and MAC (C, 2016). It uses a cloud based protocol
called equal cost multi path (ECMP) to load balance traffic flow. Current VXLANs work in
virtualized hypervisor environments such as Vmware NSX (C, 2016). The BLAN follows this
format but in with blockchain technology. As a blockchain, the VXLANs would be distributed
among nodes. All MAC addresses of the network devices in the VXLANs will be distributed by
a controller that maintains a list (Amin, 2017). Amin (2017) states that using this construct in
a private blockchain would be “faster, cheaper and respects the organization’s privacy”(Amin,
2017).
The BLAN solution introduces a blockchain to a current SDN infrastructure that in-
cludes Layer 2 & 3 technology. It is inferred that the use of STP is not required due to VXLAN
bridging and the maintenance of MAC address lists using a controller in the BLAN. Typical
layer 2 bridging using VXLANs in the typical Vmware NSX architecture does not use the STP
standard (Vmware, 2019). If this is the case for the BLAN, the vulnerability caused by BPDU
messaging will not exist and the STP Root-Takeover attack and other attacks based on the STP
protocol are eliminated. The blockchain solution is a feasible solution based off of current cloud
technology. The increased usage of SDN network technology according to emerging trends in
data center technology (DeJonghe, 2018). This solution is based on a purely software based net-
work using Cisco software features for blocking BPDU messaging and a Vmware environment
for Layer 2 & 3 network traffic management. This environment is in accordance with emerging
trends, however, it does not have a place with hardware-based Ethernet LANs. The use of the
BLAN would require a transition to an SDN environment prior to adoption.
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Summary
The literature search, analysis and critique has revealed a broad survey of suggested
security solutions to prevent the STP Root-takeover attack. The solutions provided created three
sets of solutions to provide a perspective of the current standing of the layer two vulnerability.
The first subset was cryptographic solutions to provide validation of devices in the STP protocol.
This is a solution that directly gets to the heart of the vulnerability in the STP protocol; the lack
of switch validation in BPDUmessaging allows an attacker to claim the Root role in an Ethernet
LAN. This validation can be performed by PKI or HMAC techniques to verify new switches (Lai
et al,. 2014; Whalen & Bishop, 2009). Unfortunately, the cryptographic solutions have not been
accepted as a standard even though there is awareness of the vulnerability. The second subset of
solutions reveals ideas on how to offset the functionality of STP by creating variations of it. A
Cisco solution uses a granular means for blocking its BPDU messaging functionality and using
another means for avoiding loops. It does not solve anything but provides a way to control the
topology (Cisco, 2007). A partitioned network solution provides a means of masking topology
information in an internal LAN to make information gathering more difficult in a sniffing attack
(Yeung et al., 2008). An IDS solution to detect anomalies using algorithms that save topology
information provides alerts, however, a lot of damage can be done by the time such an attack
is mitigated (Rai et al., 2011). An IDS or Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) uses
signatures and self-learning software to maintain equilibrium but many attacks bypass these
mechanisms (Lin et al., 2017). Lastly, the most recent technology to match current trends in
network administration is the SDN solution that allows for an inspection of all network traffic
and provide control over layer two traffic inspection and firewalling (Rietz et al., 2018).
The third subset in the literature search was blockchain solutions that could provide a
base for network security solutions that would block the STP Root-Takeover attack. The first
option was a model for a network of IoT devices which was focused on the route management
of data packets. A simulation was made to demonstrate that it could use consensus algorithms
to limit attacks from malicious nodes that would provide false routes or drop packets (Ramezan
& Leung, 2018). The second option was by the Marconi Foundation which provided a secure
network infrastructure that provided symmetric key encryption on all data transported starting
at Layer 2. It would get bandwidth from peer to peer nodes and incentives for resource sharing
(Marconi Foundation, 2018). These two blockchain options do not seem feasible because they
require a sustainable blockchain network to run efficiently. Such a feat could take a long time.
They are also difficult to adopt because of the current network infrastructure. The last blockchain
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solution called BLAN has the option for a private blockchain network that is adaptable to the
current environment. (Amin, 2017). Moreover, it is built on emerging SDN technology already
in existence such as Vmware NSX and Cisco STP Portfast (C, 2016). This option is the most
feasible of the blockchain options, however, most networks have not advanced to an SDN type of
environment. Also, the peer to peer distribution of this network can take some time to establish.
This chapter was an exploration of the current standing in research for solutions to the STP
Root-Takeover attack. There are several different approaches and one thing is in common: the
root cause of this vulnerability is that it is based on a trust-based model of the STP protocol.
Hence, all the proposed solutions looked into a technique to eliminate the election of a Root
without validation.
One problem throughout the literature review is the feasibility of integrating the new
solution into a well-established network infrastructure. The issue of integration leads to a hy-
brid solution that would not require a complete upgrade of the current network infrastructure.
Instead, the solution should be a permissioned blockchain that does not require a peer to peer
network in a distributed environment. The problemwith the permissionless blockchain that runs
on a peer to peer and decentralized network is that it takes a long time to establish. Further, a lot
of marketing, research and development is required to establish a fully functioning blockchain
network with distributed and anonymous peer nodes. Such a feat is difficult to obtain for the
means of an experimental study for this research problem. In lieu of the decentralized, trustless
blockchain, a hybrid approach would use the security characteristics of the blockchain that pro-
vide immutability. This approach can ensure the integrity of the data in the blockchain and use
the key elements of validation using hashing and encryption. These characteristics would pro-
vide more security to STP device validation than the earlier cryptographic solutions provided.
It would also be more feasible than the options that required hardware changes, modifications
to the STP protocol and a fully functioning decentralized blockchain network. The key to adop-
tion and acceptance is to provide a solution that is adaptable to current systems to provide a
stepping stone for change. The hybrid solution provides a testable environment to demonstrate





The STP protocol is a Data Link Layer algorithm for automated network device man-
agement in an Ethernet LAN. The trust-based nature allows the election of a topology manage-
ment device without validating the named root bridge in the frame. Rogue devices enter Ethernet
LANs through MITM attacks and launch false STP traffic to the switches electing themselves
with the root role to gain control of the Ethernet LAN. This determination led to finding a so-
lution using one of the most robust multilayered trustless solutions available: blockchain. This
research problem analysis provided a deductive approach to choosing an appropriate research
framework for the study. After resolving the initial decision to research and test a viable solu-
tion to solving the STP protocol algorithm’s vulnerability by finding a means of validation, the
second decision was to resolve how the research study would be conducted. There is a multitude
of perspectives from which to deduce a specific choice in the field of research. A careful study
of these available choices would reveal a specific research path that provides the best fit for the
study topic. Creswell defines the logical deduction of narrowing a broad perspective down to
procedural specifics as a sum of three successive steps: research approaches, research design,
and research methods (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). An inquiry into the available paths can
bring a specific topic more focused thought as a decision is made at each fork in the road to a
successful study. The following three sections provide the analysis of these three successfive
steps with the research topic. The next section begins with the research approach that is optimal
for the study.
Research Approach
The first step and the broadest perspective to choose the ultimate research path to de-
termine the most decisive direction to take from three high-level choices (Creswell & Creswell,
2018). The three choices from which to determine one approach are quantitative, qualitative,
and mixed methods. The first two approaches, quantitative and qualitative, provide the broadest
difference in perspective because the third approach, mixed methods, combines the two meth-
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ods (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The qualitative research approach allows the researcher to
ask open-ended questions to determine the direction of progress. Its flexibility allows for a
more fluid approach that helps in a situation where a narrowly determined solution would not fit
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018). There are several research problems in information technology
that provide a good fit for a qualitative research approach. One examplewould be the IEEE’s fea-
sibility of taking on a significant change in complex traditional network infrastructure (Creswell
& Creswell, 2018). This research study could be conducted with interviews with open-ended an-
swers to apply the most integrity in the research study’s direction (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
Social issues, an appropriate research category for this type of research approach, would be the
economic impact to the dissolution of several critical areas of vulnerabilities that have allowed
them to prosper. For example, if a solution to block MITM attacks existed, it would impact
network security companies as they would no longer have a problem to resolve.
The quantitative research approach allows a researcher to determine answers to close-
ended questions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). If the subject of these questions is not a person,
it can be a variable in an experiment. Finding the answers to questions that involve a binary
response, such as ”it either works or it doesn’t,” would be more fitting in a quantitative research
approach (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Such experiments can be set up in a controlled lab envi-
ronment where the variables and relationships between them can be studied for a multiple-choice
or true/false answer. The carefully determined narrowing of responses works well with research
questions answered by testing a specific hypothesis a researcher wants to explore (Creswell
&Creswell, 2018). A research topic that may work towards a solution for a vulnerability that
either works or does not would be best resolved using a quantitative approach (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018). An approach using non-human variables, such as computers in a controlled
setting, could be if encryption can deter a vulnerability. The two variables used in this study
would be computers that use encryption technology and a set of computers that do not. The same
set of factors to manufacture the vulnerability and observe the results would be the relationship
between the variables.
If the researcher wanted to work with a narrow set of results but wanted additional
insight with open-ended ideas, a mixed-methods approach would be appropriate (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018). This research study would be time-consuming because it would require two
studies combined into one to complete (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The study results would
add a human approach to an otherwise ”black and white” answer. An example of a mixed-
methods approach with a security vulnerability-lab experiment would be to determine the fea-
sibility of encryption software in deterring vulnerabilities with the two-variable approach, and
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slower network speeds inconvenience the computer operators’ open-ended reactions. This type
of studymay be of interest to a security company that would be interested in exploring the impact
of this new security technology on human emotions (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Concerning
the narrow approach to how the proposed solution will be tested in a lab environment, it can be
logically concluded that the appropriate approach to this research study would be quantitative.
The research question is narrowly ended in that a common vulnerability was tested in a con-
trolled lab environment. A research solution was tested in the same lab environment to analyze
its causal relation to the attack vector. The next step to narrow down the research approach is
to determine a research design most applicable to the research study.
Research Design
The previous section’s research approach analyzed why a quantitative research ap-
proach is appropriate for this study’s security research question. The quantitative approach
was chosen because the topic of study requires specific and conclusive results from the data col-
lected. Moving forward with this research approach, the next set of choices pertains to a logical
conclusion on what type of research design to take. A research design explores the way inquiry
is made to collect data for the research question.
The quantitative research approach offers two designs that determine how variables are
chosen and how to observe their relationships. The critical difference is in how these variables
are chosen and how their relationships are evaluated. The philosophy behind this difference
comes from post-positivist theory (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Postpositivism is a progres-
sive response made by the scientific community to the positivist theory that states purism and
absolute truth is ”true knowledge” (Diaz, 2014). Where positivism provided a purist a for-
mat for the realization of conclusions through deductive reasoning and logic, the movement to-
wards finding a solid basis for these conclusions provided the element of causality. In other
words, a post-positivist would ask, ’What are the elements that cause this conclusion to be
true?’. Since positivism is based on assumptions, post-positivist thought’s mere orientation lies
in the scientific method (Johnson, 2009). Therefore, the collection of empirical data became an
idea to strengthen a conclusion. The main difference between positivism and postpositivism is
the causality that determines the outcome and its resulting reductionism (Creswell & Creswell,
2018). In causality, a determining factor is how one element may cause a change in another.
In reductionism, a logical conclusion to a post-positivist problem is deduced by measurements
and tangible evidence. Therefore, post-positivist thought determines the cause of change in an
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element by making conclusions about collected data. Typically, this theory would result in mea-
suring a specific causal effect on a reduced set of variables. The post-positivist theory behind
the scientific method typically entails empirical data collection that agrees or disagrees with the
scientific method’s hypothesis (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
The research in the effectiveness of a technical solution on non-human variables is not
reduced to validating ideas that can be stated as true, false, or meaningless. Therefore, this
study’s approach would have no value without measurements and data to prove its validity. A
positivist debate could provide a conclusion that determines the effectiveness of information
security. The subject derivation of a conclusion would be based on logic and reasoning alone,
and this provides no value for the analysis of a software tool. The post-positivist approach, which
follows the scientific method, has the means to derive a logical conclusion with measurable data.
The research problem allows for a technical approach to conclude the analysis of measurable
data. Concerning the preference for postpositivism in this study, the quantitative approach’s
resulting design options are observation and data collection through a survey or experimental
design. Survey design takes an approach to causality in that observation of specific variables,
and their relationships require more time to reach a conclusive result (Blalock, 1991). Hence,
this type of causality takes a correlative approach (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). With many
research topics, live subjects provide a more complicated approach to a reduced set of results.
The survey design would be a good approach.
Alternatively, the second option to observing causality is with experimental design.
The research problem requires a conclusion that is based on a causal approach with non-human
variables. This study’s variables provide measurable data that can provide value in experimen-
tation and collecting measurements and empirical data. In an experiment, variables and tests can
be provided and manipulated with conclusive results (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The criti-
cal difference is that variables and their relationships are defined in a controlled environment.
Although causality in experimental design can be performed on live subjects in a controlled envi-
ronment, such as medical observation of subjects taking medication and a placebo, it is appropri-
ate when observing inanimate objects. The manipulation of variables and their relationships for
tests comes with slight complications when studying inanimate objects (Creswell & Creswell,
2018). Further, setting up a controlled environment with inanimate resources provides an ideal
setting for experimental design. For example, if an experiment were to be performed on the
effects of specific resources on a computer were to be measured, there is no measure of ethics
for manipulation of the variables, and the selection of controlled variables is straightforward.
The research study is the examination of variables and the collection of data and measurements
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through tests in a controlled lab environment. The test subjects are software, virtual computers,
and networking switches, a specific subset of network infrastructure variables without random
sampling. Experiments will measure direct causality making the experimental design most ap-
propriate for the choice of variables, data observation, and collection (Creswell & Creswell,
2018).
The components of this research study for research design include the variables, pro-
cedure, and measures. The variables are chosen based on available resources that will represent
the overall network architecture. The experimental design choice provides various types of
variable assignments. There are the pre-experiment, true experiment, quasi-experiment, and
single-subject design (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The critical factor in how the true experi-
ment and quasi-experimental designs differ is sampling a control group and experimental group
for comparison. One group is observed and measured for control data where another is provided
the experimental condition. The condition is observed on two groups, so it is essential to have
both groups have equal representation (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). In the true experiment, a
random sampling ensures that one group’s observation will not vary from the other outside of
the experimental condition. The quasi-experimental approach to observing both groups has a
manipulated variable of interest that is required due to infeasible random sampling due to the
research topic and lack of true variance (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The pre-experimental
design uses one group and observes the intervention results with the same group’s experimental
condition. A single-subject design is used to observe a single subject over time (Creswell &
Creswell, 2018).
This research study uses a control group that is observed under the attack in the research
study. The same control groupwill be used when applying the experimental condition to observe
results and data. This type of experimental design is described as the pre-experimental research
design.
Research Methods
The research approach is a quantitative experiment with a pre-experimental research
design. The last step in fine-tuning the research plan is to describe the research methods used
with the control group’s variables, procedures, and measurements (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
This section introduces the pre-experimental design variables and analyzes how they were used
in the research plan. Next, a detailed procedure is provided based on the pre-experimental design
plan. A plan for data collection is added to prove the research study’s validity and its solution.
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Lastly, an illustration of responses will be provided as part of the research framework to provide
a disclaimer to questions that could arise to the research topic’s legitimacy, choice of variables,
design, and possible conclusions from the resulting data.
Figure 4. The Research Methodology Decision Tree
The pre-experimental research design has a control group of independent variables.
This control group was measured and observed before and after the dependent variable was
added to it. The independent variables of the control group represent how the vulnerability
exists in the current network infrastructure. The control group was set up and observed for
effectiveness in a lab experiment. The control group was made up of three vital elements for
the STP Root-Takeover attack. This control group was configured to prove that the attack still
exists using the current standards for STP in the Data Link Layer. The experiment required
a virtualized setup using available resources to represent the real-world network infrastructure
affected by the STP Root-Takeover attack. This virtualized lab environment housed the first
independent variable, the Ethernet LAN. It comprises STP-enabled software switches connected
with the IEEE 802.3 standardized Ethernet LAN topology in a hypervisor environment. This lab
setup provides a software-based representation of the abstract data link layer running standard
protocol services in the Ethernet LAN per the IEEE standard (IEEE , 2018). A manipulation
check measure was utilized on an independent variable to ensure observable data and test the
effectiveness of the ability to manipulate the independent variable (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).
The manipulation check measure used in this experiment is the second independent variable
applied to the control group, the attack vector. The second independent variable is the STP Root-
Takeover attack vector used to manipulate the first independent variable, the Ethernet LAN.
This manipulation was tested for validity in observation one. The validation test on the Ethernet
LAN attack ensured that the vulnerability still existed and was evidence that the trust-based
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STP protocol allows a rogue device into the Ethernet LAN. The outcome of the manipulation of
the second independent variable provided the justification requirement of a dependent variable
(Creswell & Creswell).
Figure 5. Pre-Experimental Control Group Variable Assignments
The dependent variable in the pre-experimental design is the research solution that pro-
vides a second set of observable data on the control group. The same control group was observed
before and after applying the dependent variable because the solution was tested for its ability
to detect the control group’s condition after manipulation by the second independent variable.
The pre-experimental quantitative guide provides the requirement for proven elements in the
experiment. The choice of independent and dependent variables provides a methodological ap-
proach to experimenting with scientific validity (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The Ethernet
LAN from the Observation One was presented with the the dependent variable for Observation
Two. The dependent variable is the software research solution created for the test environment
to prevent the STP Root-takeover attack. The attack vector from the experimentation in step one
is reintroduced, and the results observed tested the validity of the research question. Concerning
the research study, the STP Root-Takeover attack was administered on the Ethernet LAN to be
observed and observed for its response to the attack. After the research solution was applied
to the Ethernet LAN, the same STP Root-Takeover attack vector was administered on the Eth-
ernet LAN for observation. The research solution is a software-based application that uses the
blockchain protocol-based encryption algorithms to validate devices in an Ethernet LAN.
Research Procedure
A research procedure is a step-by-step plan for the study based on its approach, design,
and selection of variables (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The plan creates replicable results in
a controlled lab environment to answer the research question. The study began with creating
a lab environment to house the experiment, and the pre-experimental methods to the research
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design required one control group. The control group consists of entities affected by the research
problem were tested to validate the relevance of the research question in Observation One. The
same control groupwas then used to add the research solution used for testing and data collection
in Observation Two. The control group was made up of independent and dependent variables.
The independent variables are those that remain consistent, namely, the test environment and the
control group. The dependent variable was introduced in Observation Two for data collection
and observation. The research procedure is described in three sections: Control Group setup
and Observation One, Implementation of the STP DApp and Control Group STP DApp setup,
and Observation Two. Each section provides the implementation procedure.
Figure 6. High-Level Pre-Experimental Research Procedure
The Control Group with the Ethernet LAN and the attack vector was set up for both
observations. Observation One validates that the STP Root-Takeover attack is performed suc-
cessfully on the control group. The implementation of STP DApp, represented by X in the
diagram, follows the validation of the attack. After the implementation is complete, Observa-
tion Two is conducted on the Control Group with the attack in Observation One. In Observation
Two, the STP DApp is launched before the attack is performed. The results are based on data
gathered on the effectiveness of the STP DApp to detect the attack.
Control Group Setup and Observation One
This study’smost decisive stepwas to test whether the STPRoot-Takeover attack is still
a security problem. This circumstance is due to the nature of information technology. Informa-
tion technology is a field that is rapidly changing, which results in rapid responses to publicized
security problems. The control group environment must reflect the IEEE standard of updated
technology in widespread use to form a valid research study. Further, this control group, albeit
housed in an experimental test environment, must provide a sample that can prove that STP
Root-Takeover attacks still exist on modern networks. The question of the research problem’s
validity was still in question at the time of the research proposal. Any such experiment con-
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ducted to prove the current status of the STP Root-Takeover attack as a security problem was
beyond the scope of the archives of academic research. At the time of the literature review, the
newest experiment proving the STP Root-Takeover attack’s validity was six years old. The first
step answered the first question in the experiment. When the attack vector is introduced, is the
STP Root-Takeover attack successfully executed on the control group? In a valid test, the con-
trol group is exposed to the attack vector and undergoes the STP Root-Takeover attack. After
this crucial first step has been conducted to prove the problem, a solution is introduced to the
experiment to test the research question. The second step in the experiment is to test the control
group’s response to the attack vector using the research solution introduced in the study. The
research solution is implemented on the control group after the research problem is validated in
the first step.
Figure 7. Diagram of the Control Group in Observation One and Observation Two
Can the research solution for this study prevent the STPRoot-takeover from happening?
The research solution is implemented on the previously affected control group, and the attack
vector is reintroduced. Observational data is then conducted for analysis to prove the scientific
validity of the solution. The resulting control groupwill bemade up of the independent variables,
the Ethernet LAN and the attack vector. These independent variables are the same in both steps
of the experiment. Hence, the procedural setup of these variables is crucial to maintain proven
continuity.
The Ethernet LAN
The Ethernet LAN required to conduct both steps of the experiment must be made up
of switches with interconnecting media that use the STP protocol. Due to varying costs of lab
environments, the pragmatic solution resulted in an entirely virtual Ethernet LAN. An Ethernet
LAN made up of virtual switches and virtual media interconnecting them can be housed in a
virtual environment called a hypervisor. A hypervisor is a software environment that can run
large-scale enterprise networks and one host computer with no limitations to typical day-to-
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day functionality that is vulnerable to the research problem (Blenk et. al., 2016). The ease of
use, low cost, and accessibility in cloud networks provided an opportunity to create an optimal
Ethernet LAN with a stable implementation and the required resources to test the problem and
its solution (Browne et.al., 2018). The Ethernet LAN test with the solution provides observable
data relevant to Ethernet LANs of all formats and sizes.
Yersinia: The Attack Vector
A separate virtual machine is also introduced to the Ethernet LAN to run the Ethernet
LAN’s STP Root-Takeover attack. This virtual machine is also a Debian Linux distribution
called Kali Linux. The 2004.3 LTS version was the most current at testing time. The Kali
distribution was chosen to perform this task because it is a widely used operating system used
for penetration testing and performing attacks such as the STP Root-Takeover attack. The latest
available version of the Yersinia application is installed on the Kali virtual machine. Lai et al.
(2014) used Yersinia is an attack tool used on an earlier Kali distribution in the test environment
for the STP Root-Takeover attack.
Observation One
Yersinia was initialized as a root user to provide its functionality through the graphical
mode to perform the task. Due to its predictable functionality in claiming the root role, the
graphical interface was used to send BPDU_conf frames to the Ethernet LAN. At initialization,
Yersinia detects an interface for listening to all network traffic, configures it to accept all traffic.
The tool provides the option of making a MITM attack with MAC spoofing to gain access to
the traffic for information gathering. After selecting the option ”Claiming the Root Role” is
launched in the application, Yersinia sends a fake BPDU frame into the Ethernet LAN. Proof of
a validated attack is verified by checking the current Root for the Ethernet LAN bridges.
Implementation of the STP DApp
The STP DApp is an implementation that is built into two parts. One part is the kernel-
based interceptor written in C. The other part is a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain framework in
userland. It is a web application written in the NodeJS runtime environment with an interface to
communicate with the interceptor for Root validation, front-end application, and nodes written
in JavaScript and Chaincode written in Go. The nodes are virtual machines that make up the
blockchain framework. The virtual machine used to house the STP DApp tool has the latest
Ubuntu 20.04 LTS Desktop installation running eight cores of CPU, 29GB of RAM, and 256GB
of hard disk space in the VCloud datacenter. This virtual machine resource configuration is
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relevant to the data collection used for the study.
The Network Interceptor
The interceptor’s setup directly connects to the LEB’s network traffic from the Data
Link Layer to the application layer kernel /net module. The kernel space provides the main
operating system functionality. It is written in the C language, and a modification to the kernel
space is most directly handled by adding and initializing a definition of the modification. The
C language uses kernel libraries that provide functions that control network traffic’s ingress,
egress, and manipulation. It is the part of the operating system where Ethernet frames can be
parsed and accepted or rejected according to set rules. 
The Hyperledger Fabric Blockchain Framework
The Hyperledger Fabric framework is an open-source project by IBM for research and
development in enterprise systems. It provides a platform for ease of use and testing. The study’s
test framework is encased in a NodeJS runtime environment and deployed with two Peer nodes
that handle the search and addition of Root IDs to the blockchain. A JavaScript interface pulls
the Root IDs from the interceptor’s memory file called root_out in the proc folder. The Root
IDs are pulled from the root_out folder to run the search and return validation results.
Control Group STP DApp setup, and Observation Two
The control group used for Observation One is used for Observation Two. In Obser-
vation One, only the independent variables were used to verify the attack. Observation Two
includes the two independent variables in observation one and the dependent variable. The de-
pendent variable is the STP DApp research solution. The control group already exists, so there
is no need to set up the three bridges and the rogue attack vector in an Ethernet LAN. First is the
addition of the implemented STP DApp to the control group. The STP validation tool is imple-
mented in an LEB similar to the LEBs in the control group. The LEB is added to the Ethernet
LAN. In Observation Two, the Ethernet LAN includes the three bridges, leb1,leb2, and leb3, the
attack vector, rogue, and the STP DApp VM called bcvm. The STP DApp is first activated by
initiating collection and querying the Root IDs in the network traffic. Since any bridge could be
elected as the Designated Bridge, the blockchain ledger holds a list of the Ethernet LAN bridges
as valid devices. The attack will then be initiated on Yersinia as the STP DApp collects data in
proc files from the interceptor. The virtual machine will be running the Wireshark application
and the STP DApp to collect data for the study.
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Data Collection
CPU usage and RAM utilization were measured while using the STD DApp. The im-
plementation of the STP DApp is part kernel-based mod called stpverify and part Hyperledger
Fabric blockchain framework. It measures the stability of the resource load during the STP
DApp validation process. The measurements were taken in one-second intervals using the vm-
stat command tool.
• Six trials of a hundred measurements were taken as a baseline on a separate Ethernet
LAN bridge
• Six trials of a hundred measurements were taken of STP DApp validation during an
attack.
• Six trials of time efficiency were collected based on Wireshark packet analysis
The research plan included a procedure that is appropriate for the quantitative approach with a
pre-experimental design. This section outlines the research methods that were employed for the
research plan. The following section is a description of the research solution that was imple-
mented for this study.
Research Solution
The previous sections in this chapter describe the study’s research methodology and
procedure. It includes the implementation of the STP DApp research solution. This section will
detail the STP DApp and how it functioned in Observation Two. The solution to the STP Root-
Takeover attack integrates the SHA256 Hash algorithm used for authentication, transmission,
and storage of data in the blockchain ledger. It also uses the Merkle Tree algorithm to validate
the integrity of the data in storage in the blockchain ledger. Implementing a Decentralized
Application (DApp) that performsRoot validation is proof of concept and stepping stone towards
a trustless peer-to-peer solution in a large-scale distributed peer-to-peer network as blockchain
ideology would have it.
Testing Environment
The STP Root-Takeover attack research problem was validated in Observation One of
the experiment. Observation Two began after the implementation of the STP DApp solution.
The tool is integrated with the control group as an additional LEB in the Ethernet LAN. Obser-
vation is continued in a controlled and virtualized lab environment on a hypervisor. The LAN is
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made up of network devices installed on virtual machines. The LAN connections are made up
of virtualized media using the TCP/IP protocol for NAT assignment on device interfaces from a
Pfsense router. Observation One was intended to prove the validity of the virtualized test envi-
ronment using software-based switches in a virtualized Ethernet LAN. The version of all devices
used for these experiments is significant due to the rapid pace of updates and security patches
made to them. Knowledge of the operating system allows the researcher to understand if it had
a vulnerability during testing. The Ethernet LAN is configured in the VMware VCloud 10.2
hypervisor environment. The control group was test Ethernet LAN housed in a VMware hy-
pervisor environment consists of three bridges, a rogue machine to run the attack, and a router
used as a firewall to protect the Ethernet LAN from common attacks. The network switches
that make up the LAN bridges are four virtual machines installed with the Ubuntu 20.04 LTS
desktop version that was current during the study. All four of these virtual machines were con-
figured as Linux Ethernet Bridges (LEBs) using integrated bridging application programming
interfaces (APIs) in the /net/bridge module. A second network interface was added to the LEBs
for bridging. Three of the bridges are used as Ethernet LAN network devices, and the fourth has
the STP DApp solution installed. In Linux nomenclature, the configuration of a bridge makes
the device akin to a switch. Therefore, the switches in this Ethernet LAN will be referred to as
bridges moving forward. It is important to note that the words ”bridge” and ”switch” are syn-
onymous in this study. These bridges are configured to use the STP protocol for STP-enabled
Root validation in the Ethernet LAN control group.
The STP Root-Takeover attack was launched from a virtual machine installed with
the Debian Linux-based Kali Operating System 2020.4 LTS Desktop, the latest stable Kali OS
version. This attack was aimed at an Ethernet LANmade up of three switches and a router using
version 2.4.5_p1 of pfSense, providing a firewalled LAN interface. The rogue virtual machine
uses the Yersinia attack tool on the Kali operating system. The key to proceed with a research
solution is based on the validity of this attack on a similar system and network environment
seven years later. In the study by Lai et al., Yersinia was installed and run on a Kali virtual
machine to launch an attack with falsified STP topology information to allow it a Root role and
subsequent control of the Ethernet LAN (Lai et al., 2014). During the test experiment for this
study, forged BPDU frames claiming Root role by the rogue systemwere launched and validated
by the Ethernet LAN bridges. 
ObservationOne showed a successful STPRoot-Takeover attack launched by theYersinia
attack vector on the control group. The LANLEBs were running the latest version of the Ubuntu
Desktop OS. It’s success also validates that current attacks available on the latest Kali Operat-
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ing System prove a vulnerability in the STP protocol of the Data Link layer in the LEB’s STP
implementation. A solution using a hybrid blockchain framework was implemented to provide
a Proof of Concept (POC) . Although the STP DApp was permissioned due to test environ-
ment constraints, the blockchain system’s potential allows the researcher to provide a theoret-
ical example of a trustless STP protocol through validation. Although the Merkle tree hashing
algorithm provides an element of trustlessness in that validation is made through automation
and immutability, a small-scale corporate solution that allows manual entries for blockchain
transactions requires a trusted component for testing. A large-scale move towards an inherently
secure network infrastructure would provide the testing ground for integrating a peer-to-peer
distributed network. This network is required to implement the full capacity of trustless val-
idation using consensus algorithms and the Merkle tree. The STP DApp solution is a hybrid
permissioned blockchain system with CAs, SHA256 based PKI authentication, encrypted trans-
mission, and Merkle tree validation integrated into the framework to eliminate the trust-based
nature of STP that lacks BPDU validation.
Construct and Function
This STP DApp research solution’s functionality is to validate Root IDs in the Ether-
net LAN. This functionality adds a validation element to the trust-based STP algorithm. The
blockchain framework is used to perform validation of BPDU Root roles intercepted by the
stpverify kernel net module. The solution is trustless because it adds validation. However, a
genuinely trustless solution based on blockchain protocol would not require a trusted user to
add valid Root IDs to the blockchain manually. This quasi-trustless solution solves the research
problem in small-scale networks that would require a trusted network administrator to validate
and manually add the MAC address of all new switches added to the Ethernet LAN. The use of
a trusted administrator makes the blockchain framework centralized and permissioned by defi-
nition (Nakamoto, 2009). The STP DApp works by dropping frames from bridges invalidated
after a Chaincode query. When Yersinia’s forged frames are dropped, the attack in Observa-
tion Two can no longer take the Root role. This solution provides a reasonable modification to
the current trust-based STP protocol used in integrating new switches to an Ethernet LAN by
requiring validation. The practical solution is a stepping stone towards solutions in large-scale
enterprise environments with trusted network administrators. The modification to trustless val-
idation will eliminate the vulnerability that causes the STP Root-Takeover attack by validating
BPDU frames before the official selection of a new Root. The hybrid solution introduces an
additional LEB that acts as a Layer 2 switching device with an encrypted and immutable ap-
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plication layer based MAC table created by the blockchain protocol. A search of this emulated
MAC table implemented in the blockchain ledger, allows BPDU frame validation by rejecting
traffic containing a Root ID that does not match the list of known devices in the Ethernet LAN.
Therefore, the blockchain framework search determines if the new Root selection is a validated
switch in the Ethernet LAN. DApp, or Decentralized Application, is the standard nomenclature
for an application connected to a blockchain. The decentralization aspect alludes to a distributed
and anonymous peer-to-peer network emulated by two localhost Peer servers in secure contain-
ers making up a part of the blockchain framework. A standard switch typically has a MAC table
that consists of validated devices in the Ethernet LAN but it is not traditionally used for STPRoot
validation. For validation, the research solution emulates two encrypted ”MAC tables” with a
protected current state hashed database for quicker searches and a blockchain for the immutable
storage of validated bridge IDs using an emulated consensus protocol. These two ”MAC tables”,
accessible only through encrypted and authenticated transmission, provide quicker searches with
the implementation of encrypted current state databases on Apache CouchDB 3.1 servers and
immutable storage for validated bridge IDs using an emulated consensus protocol (Xu et al.,
2021).
The experiment to validate the STP Root-Takeover attacks on modern Ethernet LANs
answered questions in the research proposal about the validity of Linux Ethernet Bridges (LEBs)
for a test experiment emulating the average Ethernet LAN. According to the experiments in this
study, the Linux-based software bridge replicated the functionality of a traditional hardware
switch by popular vendors in its vulnerability to the STP Root-Takeover attack when using the
STP topology. More specifically, the research study shows that the STP protocol on Linux-based
switches is implemented by IEEE 802.3 standards, as evidenced by the Ethernet frames’ format.
The STP-based Ethernet frames used as Layer 2 traffic are identical in byte by byte format to
those transmitted among popular hardware switches by vendors such as Cisco and Juniper. The
difference between these hardware switches and the LEB is that the latter uses the Applica-
tion Layer and has a kernel module called net that holds various network-related modules with
application interfaces to network components. Some of these modules have applications that
allow a direct connection to Layer 2 traffic from the bridge interface (Kankipati, 2020). This
construct allows the LEB to perform as a Layer 2 device that passes BPDU frames. In a descrip-
tion of LEBs, Nuutti Varis maintains that the Linux Ethernet Bridge operates in the Application
Layer (Varis, 2012). The exploration of how the Linux-based software switch works in the net-
work stack and its integration with the Data Link Layer to create an Ethernet LAN led to the
kernel module called /net/bridge that contains programming for bridge functionality and access
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(Kankipati, 2021).
Figure 8. The Anatomy of the Linux Ethernet Bridge (Vaaris, 2012)
The stpverify kernel modification collects network traffic through the LEB’s network
interface. It allows the BPDU frames’ interception by manipulating their route from the Data
Link Layer to the Application Layer through the network interface. Access to BPDU traffic
in the kernel allows the use of the STP DApp for blocking attacks. The benefit of implement-
ing the DApp is the additional functionality and control over the BDPU frame validation on
the LEB by using a blockchain protocol. Due to its ability to forward or drop Ethernet frames,
the LEB provides adaptability to the use of a DApp, an application layer-based web applica-
tion for validation. A typical DApp has its front-end functionality at the Application layer
with a cloud-based blockchain for anonymous crowd-sourced validation. The research solu-
tion uses a hybrid blockchain framework with a front-end run in a NodeJS runtime environment
connected to containerized Peer servers that form an emulated cloud system with a localhost
network of authenticated artifacts. A DApp model was implemented to intercept STP frames
(BPDU messages) from data link layer traffic and perform a validation check by comparing the
extracted Root ID with a database of valid Bridge IDs that have been hashed and integrated
into a blockchain. It will perform the validation and respond to whether the Root selection is
a valid switch in the blockchain before a new Root selection is approved. The DApp was built
and executed on an LEB similar to the network devices. It has the latest NodeJS and Docker
software to support implementing the hybrid blockchain framework called Hyperledger Fabric.
Based on the Hyperledger framework created by the Linux foundation, Hyperledger Fabric by
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IBM provides a turn-key approach to building a functional blockchain application for research
and testing (Parisi, 2020). Its robust system allows ease of use to program business logic out-
side of a blockchain to increase speed and efficiency. It allows the easy addition of a database
of the blockchain’s current state. The database allows resource-efficient searches because the
traversal of the blockchain is energy consumptive and slow (Xu et al., 2021) Lastly, it provides
a user interface (UI) in the front end that allows user accessibility for decoded searches and
manually adds transactions to the blockchain (Adhav, 2020). The lack of integration with the
distributed peer-to-peer cloud for the blockchain network eliminates the consensus protocol that
adds a blockchain network’s actual trustless functionality. However, the use of distributed net-
work validation through the consensus protocol does not add value to this grassroots-level study
on a blockchain network’s feasibility for localized validation of network devices.
Figure 9. The Anatomy of the STP DApp
Why a Hybrid Framework instead of the Average Blockchain?
The experiment is built on a pre-experimental approach that requires a working solution
with empirical data to measure and base conclusions. This experiment will require a working
product to deliver a usable solution in a current testing environment. The average blockchain,
which is trustless, immutable, and permissionless, provides security ideology. A true consen-
sus algorithm uses Proof of Work (PoW) or Proof of Stake (PoS) to build trustless validation
(Lepore et al., 2020). Such an environment requires a distributed cloud environment with par-
ticipants that lend resources. This environment can take years to build, especially in validation
for network devices. Using consensus in a peer-to-peer environment is not feasible for a test net-
work. IBM’s Hyperledger Fabric has provided an environment for testing that builds on many of
blockchain’s encryption algorithms. A partial or hybrid blockchain environment allows for a test
environment where testing is feasible for research. This study provides value when it is possible
to reproduce and build on for future study. Although not ideal, the permissioned blockchain or
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hybrid approach allows a test-bed for future ideas to come to fruition. The Hyperledger Fabric
framework has many differences from Bitcoin Core’s technology and its permissioned option is
one of them (Parisi, 2020).
The key elements are based on the trustless nature of a peer-to-peer environment. It
took years to build; however, Bitcoin Core’s ideal allows for a trustless environment where
the distributed nodes are run in a self-automated fashion (Nakomoto, 2009). The consensus
algorithm to reward those that provide resources uses PoW algorithms rather than a salary from
a trusted authority. Lastly, the permissionless environment in which a trusted authority is not
required; an ideology on which Bitcoin Core is based (Nakamoto, 2009). The underlying feature
of the Hyperledger Fabric is that it is a permissioned environment to emulate the corporate
atmosphere in which it is being integrated. The reality of integrating the blockchain into the
corporate atmosphere allows for a smoother transition to new technology. The permissioned
approach to Hyperledger Fabric allows for research and development. Funding for research and
development by the commercial industries builds practical use cases for blockchain technology
(R. Shores, personal communication, May 15, 2019).
STP Validation Built on Hyperledger Fabric
For the sake of this experiment and its environment, a hybrid blockchain solution has
been created to test its ability to use Smart Contract validation. Smart Contract validation is
trustless when it is run on a large and distributed network system like the Ethereum blockchain.
Such a network infrastructure is impractical in a test environment. Therefore, the Ethernet LAN
has demonstrated the solution with a permissioned blockchain framework by IBM and the Linux
Foundation. Due to the trusted and permissioned nature of the test network for this study, the
solution’s framework in this test environment is aptly named a hybrid blockchain solution. Such
a hybrid blockchain solution has been created for the testing of corporate blockchain solutions.
The blockchain solution for this study is Hyperledger Fabric, a popular enterprise solution that
has been created for enterprise systems that are undergoing research and development (Adhav,
2020). Suppose the nodes in this blockchain are distributed in a cloud, and the system has
the time and resources to establish itself. In that case, the code can be used as permissionless,
trustless, and transparent as the blockchain was created to do on economic systems. In other
words, if this solution has an environment where it can build a distributed network in the cloud,
it will no longer be a hybrid but fully trustless, as is the concept introduced by this study.
This experiment has been created with a permissioned blockchain framework run on the
localhost of an Ubuntu 20.04 LTS desktop virtual machine. The Hyperledger Fabric blockchain
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is a web application written in JavaScript. This front-end of the web application houses the ap-
plication that manages access control and blockchain requests through Smart Contracts. Smart
Contracts are software programs that run inside virtual machines in the blockchain and are made
to perform a task (Buterin, 2014). The Smart Contracts in the hybrid framework for the study
are made to perform Root ID validation. These Root IDs are pulled by an API written in the
NodeJS runtime environment for JavaScript after being collected from the root_out proc file
created by stpverify. The Hyperledger Fabric framework uses this runtime environment to cre-
ate an interactive front-end and back-end blockchain system with Smart Contracts. The Smart
Contracts are called Chaincode in Hyperledger Fabric nomenclature. 
Figure 10. Process Diagram of the STP DApp
The Chaincode uses SHA256 PKI token validation to run a search for the Root Id in
the blockchain. If a hashed copy of the Root ID is in the blockchain, a front-end script written in
JavaScript returns Root IDs that are not in the blockchain to the root_in file. Frames that come
from valid sources automatically forward. Per the kernel’s bridge functionality, if there is no
record of the Root ID in the blockchain, the front-end interface will output this value to root_in,
and the stpverify modification will drop the frame to block it from the Root role.
Security Framework and Node Architecture
The study’s blockchain network is driven by the Hyperledger Fabric framework of a
permissioned blockchain to run on a localhost web application server in a VM. It allows for per-
missions setting for multiple level organizations. The servers that make up the web application
are called nodes and are housed as images in docker containers. The docker containers provide
secure modularity with networks that connect them. The docker containers have updated im-
ages of the required artifacts in the Hyperledger Fabric ecosystem. The ecosystem is established
with an Orderer, Peers, Certificate Authority (CA) servers, and CouchDB containers to record
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hashed transactions to the blockchain (Adhav, 2020). The Orderer node is a permissioned ver-
sion of the consensus algorithm in the permissionless large-scale blockchains. The consensus
algorithm validates transactions to add them to the blockchain, and the Orderer is a permissioned
version of the consensus entity. It is made to fit with smaller business applications that require
the use of automated administration. The Orderer node’s role is to handle the business logic
by authenticating network connections between other nodes managing the ecosystem (Adhav,
2020). When the blockchain is first deployed, the Orderer authenticates network connections
using validation from the CA nodes, issuing certificates for all the nodes. The Peer nodes are
used to process transactions. Each Peer can have different levels of access to the blockchain.
For example, one Peer node may only have read-only access while the other has read-write ac-
cess. The read-only Peer queries a blockchain, and the Peer with write access queries and adds
transactions to the blockchain (Adhav, 2020). Blockchain-based Peer nodes that represent each
organization handle these rights. The organizations are connected through a network channel.
The channel connects nodes allowing authenticated communication between nodes. If one node
does not have access to information communicated in another node, the channel handles this
access control. The business logic or the main program is called the Chaincode. The Chaincode
is defined on the channel and installed on the Peer nodes.
Figure 11. The Hyperledger Fabric Architecture for the STP DApp
Internal Threats to Validity
The previous section provides a plan for a procedure on the research plan. It has a
detailed description of a plan to collect measurable data for the results of this study. The quan-
titative pre-experimental design used to observe the results of a viable solution to the research
question has internal threats to its validity. Internal threats to validity pertain to incorrect con-
clusions drawn from observable data that can invalidate control group and variable choices
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(Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The internal threats addressed in this section are the lab envi-
ronment choices, Ethernet LAN, media connections, and network devices in representing the
STP protocol. Further, the attack vector and observable data that are collected in this study are
validated. Intentional measures have been taken to define the research environment to measure
data in stable conditions. The selection of virtualized devices rather than hardware ones reduces
any complications from faulty hardware or environmental factors that could affect the observed
data. An environment that can provide stable conditions that are replicated with precision is pos-
sible with virtualized media. The Ethernet LAN in the control group is a virtual representation of
the network infrastructure. Hence, the experiment’s lab environment is not a physical represen-
tation of typical hardware and software used in home and enterprise networks. A typical home
network using wired Ethernet may have a router, switch, and computers. A typical enterprise
network would have either a hardware-based Ethernet LAN or a partially virtualized one with
more devices. These real-world environments introduce another set of variables that are difficult
to control for scientific research limited to a specific protocol. This study aims to research the
validation of networked devices in a LAN based on STP topology. This type of study is accom-
plished in a controlled environment unbound by disruptions made by external features that are
not required for the study. Further, the use of software-based switches and media connections
that are exact duplicates of each other creates results based on the protocol’s effects rather than
the possibility of characteristic differences between the devices that could affect collected data.
Lastly, this environment provides stability to run multiple tests that can be compared and ana-
lyzed with controlled precision. The STP protocol’s importance as the standard is based on the
popularity of the Ethernet LAN topology over the Token Ring topology introduced in Chapter
1 and its standardization by IEEE (IEEE, 2018). The Ethernet LAN topology used to represent
Data Link layer traffic is supported by IEEE 802.3 and represents the Data Link Layer’s most
utilized topology in the overall network infrastructure affected by vulnerability IEEE standards
(IEEE , 2016). The Ethernet LAN’s services are contained within a hypervisor environment.
The hypervisor environment provides a software-based setting that provides the required tech-
nology to run services to maintain virtualized computers, network devices, network topology,
and network connections using protocols used by the network infrastructure. A hypervisor’s
virtual test environment was used for a comprehensive network protocol experimentation and
data analysis in BGP Route Attestation: Design and Observation using IPV6 Headers (Ham,
2017). The hypervisor environment used in the experiment is provided by the vendor VMware.
VMware has a hypervisor environment that is widely used for enterprise-level LAN environ-
ments. The experiment will utilize the latest supported version of this hypervisor environment
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to test the STP Root-Takeover attack vector’s validity (Browne et al., 2018). The test created
in Vmware provides the researcher in this study the freedom to choose the type of resources
required for optimal functionality rather than being bound by the limitations of the hardware
(Kurniawan et. al., 2018). For this reason, a virtual environment provides confidence otherwise
challenging to obtain from a hardware-based environment affected by hardware differences or
defective media. (Blenk et. al., 2016; Kurniawan et. al., 2018). Although the STP protocol was
initially designed to expand hardware switches, the STP protocol is made up of software algo-
rithms that provide the same service to software-based switches as to hardware-based switches.
The test of a security problem in the virtual data link layer does not require a physical network
that consists of hardware switches that transmit and receive digital information in the Ethernet
format. It is important to note that all switches, aside from minor software differences, use the
same STP topology algorithm. Although some switches may have add-on features to enhance
their security, the basic IEEE standard for the STP algorithm is standardized and used for this
study (IEEE, 2016). A hypervisor set up in a physical datacenter can house virtualized switches
that perform the same function as physical switches and media connections for a specific study
of the STP protocol because IEEE standardizes the STP protocol in its requirement to maintain
an adequate global network infrastructure (IEEE , 2016). Modern-day networks consist of hard-
ware and software switches made by various vendors. Although in the spirit of competition, one
vendor may claim its superiority over another, no proven data supports that one type of switch
over another in terms of functionality as large-scale enterprise solutions are comprised of any
variation of these switch formats. An example would be that of a vehicle. There are different
types of transport such as a bicycle, motorcycle or trucks. The form of transport chosen pertains
to its user’s requirements rather than its ultimate task of transporting the user from point A to
point B. In that respect, the software-based LEB switch must uphold the IEEE standard for the
STP algorithm (IEEE, 2016). A way to check this functionality is to observe topology changes
and the Root role election based on the Ethernet frames’ inspection.
The network traffic analysis to the device’s network interface for inspection was Wire-
shark, a popular tool for network traffic inspection. This inspection of the Data Link Layer
traffic’s format and behavior provided confidence that the STP algorithm implemented in the
LEB net/bridge module corresponds to the IEEE standard. A test using a hardware Ethernet
LAN made up of Cisco switches, and a comparison with packet inspection of Wireshark may
strengthen its validity. However, this exceeds the limitations of this study. According to the
Review of Literature and an analysis of its architecture, a critical difference between the LEB
and a hardware-based switch would be that the former provides functionality for the Data Link
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Layer and the Application Layer (Varis, 2012). Although there is a lack of literature and study
of the core kernel module that drives the Layer 2 functionality in the LEB operating system,
the network traffic’s behavior upon inspection showed no difference in Ethernet’s formatting or
behavior after packet analysis. Currently, hardware switches work exclusively in the Data Link
Layer. Therefore, the inspection of the network traffic comes from the media connection to an
intermediary. Due to its ability to function at both layers, the LEB can provide access to Layer
2 network traffic through the Application layer and user-space inspection tools in the same op-
erating system. The LEB’s ability to create an environment to perform both functions in one
virtual machine provided an opportunity to collect unobstructed data from external disruptions
by media connections. The research study explored limitations that the Application layer had
to the network traffic in the Data Link layer for the research solution in this study. The LEBs
that make up the Ethernet LAN use virtual media connections rather than the physical copper
connections with physical switches as set de-facto by IEEE for 802.3 (IEEE, 2016). It is impor-
tant to note that the network infrastructure represented by the OSI model includes the Physical
layer that creates the conversion of data from analog to digital using its protocol services and
that the first complete abstract layer, Layer 2, is represented virtually in the experiment. Hence,
a virtual environment can represent the protocols and services defined by the IEEE 802.3 stan-
dard for a reduced-sized Ethernet LAN. Although the nomenclature for Ethernet 802.3 is wired,
the assumption that the wiring must be hardware is unnecessary for testing the protocol (IEEE,
2016). The physical wiring used in the Ethernet LAN uses Physical Layer services, and the
LAN connection using the STP protocol is provided exclusively by the Data Link layer, so it
does not affect the validity of the connection because the analog to digital conversion service
of the Physical layer is not required in a virtual connection. This pre-experimental design is set
up to test the security of the STP protocol’s algorithmic design in the Ethernet LAN. Therefore,
it has no dependency on hardware-based components for observable data. Virtual media con-
nect the virtual switches to form an Ethernet LAN. This LAN is contained within a hypervisor
environment. The attack vector utilized for observation used on the control group is a virtual
machine connected to an Ethernet LAN made up of STP-enabled LEBs using IEEE 802.3 pro-
tocol services. The virtual machine will send the software-based attacks STP Root-Takeover
attack using the latest LTS version of the Kali operating system based on a Debian Linux frame-
work for operating systems. This operating system is commonly used in penetration testing to
represent common attacks. This STP Root-Takeover attack is performed with installed soft-
ware called Yersinia, a popular attack tool used for controlled MITM and STP Root-Takeover
attacks. It is a tool that provides measurable data and stable conditions to perform attacks with
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precision. The attack tool is open-source, which provides the opportunity for code analysis.
This code analysis featured in Appendix B, is crucial to the transparency of the controlled study
attacks in a lab environment. The last observation of STP Root-Takeover attacks provided by
the literature review was designed with the same independent variables in this study. Lai et
al. (2014) conducted their observations of this attack on an LEB using Yersinia’s installation
on Kali OS in 2014 in the article, Trust-based security for the Spanning Tree Protocol (Lai et
al., 2014). This research provides an updated study on the same variables for comparison and
insight. 
The research solution is the STP DApp tool used to block changes in the Root role
based on a list of validated devices in the blockchain ledger. The research problem indicates
that the STP protocol is trust-based and requires device validation to provide a trustless solution
to the STP Root-Takeover attack. The encryption algorithms used in blockchain protocol are
set up to withstand common cryptanalysis attacks for standard enterprise resource availability.
It provides an infrastructure of trustless algorithms to add a unique component of security to
trust-based validation. One of the trustless algorithms, consensus, is based on the distributed,
anonymous peer-to-peer network functionality based on a fully built and operational blockchain
network. The purpose of this study was not to create a fully trustless infrastructure because it
is meant to test the applicability of validation through blockchain protocol. The issue of attacks
on a trust-based network is a part of security research and solutions contain ways to validate the
behavior of nodes in the framework (Ma et al., 2020). Insider attacks on a trust-based hybrid
blockchain framework can occur, however, algorithmic security measures can be implemented
to prevent them (Cho&Cho, 2020). Hence, the DApp is a hybridized approach to the blockchain
infrastructure that provides practical functionality for the research solution.
It is a hybrid framework created by IBM called Hyperledger Fabric for research and
development testing of use cases in enterprise security solutions. It can be easily in a localhost
network on a virtual machine. It works in a research environment without the external variables
created by a distributed network. Further, it provides an additional databasewith the current state
of blockchain transactions. The solution is designed to validate a new root network device in the
Ethernet LAN by searching the blockchain for valid network devices. Typically, the blockchain
traversal for a search is resource consumptive and creates latency, especially in a distributed
network. This test framework allows for the addition of a database holding the blockchain’s
exact contents for searches eliminating the need for blockchain traversal (Xu, et.al., 2021) . The
database speeds the process up and does not undermine security because it also utilizes hashing
and authentication. An additional trustless feature provided by blockchain is the modularity of
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the nodes that make up the framework. It is made up of Docker containers in a bridged localhost
network that only functions with authentication at all endpoints (Adhav, 2020). This hybrid
solution uses the NodeJS web application as an intermediary for trusted users to search and add
to the blockchain through SHA256 token validation. It is not an additional feature required for
the research solution. However, it provides a visual format meant to represent such a system’s
usability in a real-world environment. The use of a hybrid system like Hyperledger does not
retain the full value of security that the Bitcoin Core does, however, the integration of a hybrid
system is more compatible with today’s infrastructure (Ma et al., 2020). A few security issues
with this framework is it’s use of third party vendor and open source solutions. The integration
of these features creates more backdoors, security holes and potential zero day attacks. The
upkeep of this framework would require consistent updates to maintain its security.
The encryption algorithm used for endpoint authentication, transmission, and storage
in the blockchain ledger is SHA256. This solution is unique because the underlying infrastruc-
ture behind the validation is based on encryption and the Merkle tree algorithm that makes the
blockchain ledger immutable. This feature provides a trustless record that an attacker cannot
alter. It is trustless because it eliminates data alteration of the record of valid devices. At the
time of this study, the SHA256 algorithm provided the highest encryption level that is secure
and efficient (Nakomoto, 2009; Rachmawati et al., 2018). The effectiveness of SHA256 as an
algorithm is based on the resource advantage of the attacker. If the attacker uses a quantum
computer that can break these algorithms, it will invalidate the solution. However, the use of
such resource-heavy attacks to perform an STP Root-Takeover attack would have an economic
impact on the attacker, so its likelihood is slim.
External Threats to Validity
The external threats to validity pertain to assumptions made from the experiment’s data
that can affect past or future situations (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The research methodology
provided a route to the natural progression of resulting data collection. The research problem
indicated a vulnerability in the IEEE standardized STP protocol in device validation that leads to
the STPRoot-Takeover attack. The study aimed to provide a practical solution and the collection
of data to analyze the study results. The defense will cover a few points to validate the measured
data in this study. Threats to the observed data’s validity may come from the environment where
the tool collected the data. The validity of the data that was observed can be questioned for its
relevance to the research problem. The operating procedure during data collection may affect
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the observed results, and it may have flaws. However, the controlled hypervisor environment
and variables used can undermine the possibility of such questions during this study.
The virtual environment has significantly decreased external variables that can threaten
the observed data’s validity (Bushouse & Reeves, 2018). The use of software-based resources
provided regulation to external factors that typically create hardware devices and media limi-
tations. Hence, the attacks conducted for data collection provide insight into a reduced set of
external variables in the implemented hypervisor environment (Browne et al., 2018). At this
point, the only circumstance that could affect the devices’ validity would be an outside contam-
inant from the internet. The VCloud hypervisor environment is available as a web application
through a web browser. Such a contaminant could be observed through a browser attack during
the time of the study. A second contaminant that could come from the Ethernet LAN’s expo-
sure to the internet could lead to software changes. External threats in both modes can skew the
validity of the data collected. A live Xubuntu operating system running the latest patch updates
limited the power of browser attacks and unauthorized handling of the VCloud interface from
the host computer. Host modifications denied network share protocols and standard software
used for remote desktop connections. Lastly, settings on the browser limited attacks on session-
based cookies and tokens by deleting saved metadata from browsing. The network used with
the host computer made use of encrypted VPN connections to limit host information revealed
by the browser and encrypted all LAN traffic.
In light of interference from the internet provided by VCloud, the security of the vir-
tualized application in the hypervisor was methodically observed by its limited access to the
outside internet after the initial setup. The virtualized application was protected by a Pfsense
firewall used to block incoming traffic to the LAN. The initial setup required secure and en-
crypted connections to operating system servers and installing all updated software applications
for the Debian Linux-based Ubuntu and Kali distributions used in the experiment. Once all
installations and upgrades were made to create the control group environment, the virtualized
application remained disconnected from the outside internet. The interference of other users in
the VCloud can always threaten the consistency of resource usage and can cause performance
degradation (Nikounia & Mohammadi, 2018). At the time of data collection, a check on the
blockchain network and incoming STP traffic was observed for consistency. Data for the attack
was collected in two separate blockchain networks to ensure the framework’s validity. Once
the Ethernet LAN traffic stability, host network connections, and hypervisor resource availabil-
ity were deemed satisfactory, the control group’s attacks were repeated. The research solution
was implemented into the Ethernet LAN to observe and collect data. Two forms of data were
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collected: CPU usage and RAM utilization. Vmstat’s command provides access to CPU us-
age in a virtualized lab environment. The VM used for the STP DApp tool used 2 CPU cores,
and the vmstat tool collects system measurements systematically from the proc file in the ker-
nel. RAM utilization is measured with the active memory used, and the CPU usage is an added
average of the two running cores using the userspace and kernel.
The hybrid framework was implemented to increase the search efficiency by using a
current state blockchain ledger inApache CouchDB that usesMerkle Tree hashingwith SHA256
for validation and storage. Although there is no comparative data with a search in the blockchain,
this data is meant to be compared to other validationmethods rather than validation through other
blockchains. At the time of this study, there were no other blockchains created to validate STP
Root roles. The collection of this data is also meant to be analyzed for its efficiency in resource
usage in the test environment. This data provides a basis for future research. The second form of
data collected is the amount of time the STP DApp tool takes to detect the Root role change. The
inspection process is measured against that of the tool. Lastly, the time required for a topology
change after Yersinia stopped the forged frames is calculated from theWireshark packet capture
for perspective and more information about the lab environment. Documenting the threats to
validity provides an opportunity to look at how the research has been conducted to answer the
research problem with attention to details that can affect the data. All of these elements can
affect the results of the study if not implemented with close attention. These last two sections
provided more insight on how the STP DApp solution is implemented and how it fits with a
valid test environment for the study. The next section takes a brief look at the solutions that
were discussed in the Literature Review and how they compare to the STP DApp solution used
in the experiment.
A Comparison of the STP DApp to Existing Solutions
The last section is an overview of internal and external threats to validity of the STP
DApp. This section is another look at the previous solutions introduced in the Literature Review
as compared to the STPDApp tool that was used for this study. It is a review of the cryptographic
validation solutions that included a PKI and HMAC validation system for STP. The second
section of comparisons are made with the STP alternates such as the Cisco configuration tools
that block STP functionality, the Partitioned Infrastructure introduced by Yeung et al.(2006), an
IDS/ DIDs solution and an SDN. Each of these solutions are defined with a comparison to the
STP DApp tool for perspective. The last section of comparisons made are with the blockchain-
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based solutions introduced in the Literature Review. They include a peer-to-peer IoT network,
the Marconi Protocol and a blockchain-based approach to an SDN.
Cryptographic Validation




The last section provided a review of the literature analysis in the Review of Literature
by reintroducing existing solutions to the STP Root-Takeover Attack and comparing them to
the STP DApp tool. This section will provide a quick summary of this chapter. A look into
the validity of the environment, its variables, and the measured data is part of taking a second
look at the research problem and the methodology used to study it. Questioning the validity of
the research also brings to question the choice of research methodology. Sometimes, during a
study, one may surmise that a different research methodology would be appropriate to achieve
conclusive results. For this study, a look into the research methodology through questioning
its validity has provided more confidence in its application. Moreover, a comparative study of
existing solutions for STP validation provides a perspective for the STP DApp. It is a unique
research solution that takes the best of many worlds. The current infrastructure is based on a
client-server model that requires a trusted authority (Gilder, 2018). To go against this fabric and
build solutions that are difficult to implement will give rise to an idea that will not easily come
to fruition. The reality of creating a solution that requires empirical test data fixes a network
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security problem and uses the security elements of blockchain has required some compromise.
To integrate with the current network infrastructure, the requirement for a permissioned
solution allows a research model that can be tested. It allows the researcher control to test the
solution. Although it is not trustless under blockchain ideology, the use of validation makes the
solution less trusted than a purely made of design and algorithms. The pre-experimental quan-
titative methodology has resulted in data that answered many questions posed in the research
proposal. The permissioned, hybrid approach to a blockchain has allowed for an experiment
that blocked an STP Root-Takeover attack in a software-based Ethernet LAN. The ability to
perform this block provides a path for future study that can create solutions to other trust-based
network problems. The requirement for measurements has provided a path for integrity in the
research solution. It also created data that gives more opportunities for research and raises more
questions. The choice of data is essential to the experiment because it guides the study in fu-
ture research. The following chapter provides an overview of the study, details the experiment





The previous chapter describes the research methodology used to answer the research
question for this study. Can a reliable and trustless solution replace the trusted STP protocol,
which leaves the Data Link layer open to STP Root-Takeover attacks? The research framework
used to answer this question takes on three main distinctions: the approach, design, and meth-
ods (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). The quantitative pre-experimental research method provides
a means to use the optimal procedure that guides data collection to gain perspective on the ob-
servation. This chapter will present a detailed analysis of the experimentation and its results
after implementing the research solution. The results will be analyzed based on how it applies
to the research question. Two questions were sought to be answered to provide value to the
recorded measurements during the observation. Can the research problem be resolved by the
trustless blockchain solution implemented in this study? How can this solution be implemented
to increase its resourcefulness? In light of these questions, the measurements taken provide nu-
merical data on CPU usage, RAM utilization, and environmental factors to provide insight into
the experimental conditions.
Data Collection and Analysis
The pre-experimental method in the quantitative research approach requires two obser-
vations on one control group. The first observation sets the stage for the study by validating the
research problem. In this study, the first observation was the STP Root-Takeover attack per-
formed on the control group; an Ethernet LAN made up of three LEBs. The second observation
included the STP DApp to manage the detection of the same attack and control group in the
first observation. Data was not collected in the first observation because there was no apparent
correlation between integrating the validation tool and the control group’s attack. Instead, data
was collected in Observation TWo before, during, and after the STP Root-Takeover attack on
a baseline bridge and the STP DApp VM in the same Ethernet LAN as Observation One. The
Ethernet frames were accessed by a popular packet capture program calledWireshark to provide
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comparable data on frame captures. Lastly, the vmstat. the command was used to collect data
on RAM and CPU utilization during the trials. This section will provide a detailed account of
the data collected and an analysis of possible correlation and causality relationships detected in
the data. The following two sections will provide details on the data sets and observations made
on the CPU resource usage and time efficiency for the STP DApp.
Baseline: CPU and RAM Performance
The STP DApp runs traffic interception and parsing in the kernel’s dev.c in the net/core
folder. It intercepts the network traffic from the __netif_receive_skb_core function that pulls in
traffic for reading (Kankipati, 2020). The stpverify mod isolates the BPDU frames and outputs
the Root IDs to a root_out memory-based file in the kernel’s proc folder (Kankipati, 2021).
Simultaneously, the blockchain framework imports the Root ID and runs a Chaincode query to
see if the Root ID is a validated device found in the blockchain’s list of Root IDs (Adhav, 2020).
The results are sent to a memory file in the kernel’s proc folder called root_in. The stpverify
modification in dev.c drops the frames that match the Root IDs marked as invalid. This cycle
is repeated to collect information from all of the frames. While the validation tool is working,
the vmstat tool is used to collect stats that are collected in the virtual machine’s proc folder
(Ljubuncic,2015).
In the datameasurements, several processes are running that encompass CPU and RAM
utilization. The vmstat tool is used to collect active RAM utilized in kilobytes and the CPU
usage for the kernel and userspace (Malcher & Kuhn, 2019). The CPU usage is an average
percentage of CPU utilization taken by adding each CPU core (Van Vugt, 2015). The kernel
space utilization in the stpverify modification is based on network traffic inspection. Due to
frequent authentication processes, the blockchain framework may be heavy in resource usage in
the userspace. The literature review did not show a comparison with STP validation solutions
and the time is taken to perform validation. A bridge in the experiment’s Ethernet LAN was
chosen as a baseline to perform the calculation because it does not have the kernel modification
or the blockchain environment installed. For the baseline, CPU and RAM utilization measure-
ments were collected in an Ethernet LANs bridge during each trial. The CPU Usage for the
measurements shown is an average calculated by adding each CPU core. It is also the kernel
and userspace usage added together. They are collected from the measurements collected in the
virtual machine’s proc folder and displayed using the vmstat tool (Ljubuncic,2015). There were
six trials of attacks that were run for data collection in Observation Two. The vmstat tool was
run every second for a hundred seconds. During this time, the STP DApp tool and rogue STP
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Root-Takeover attack tool were running on separate virtual machines in the LAN.
Figure 12. Average Baseline Total CPU Usage % for 100 Intervals
• Max Average CPU Usage:21%
• Min Average CPU Usage:0%
• Mean CPU Usage:0.71%
Figure 13 shows an average per trial for six trials of hundred intervals each. This
provides a look at the CPU load over time to see if there is a variation in CPU utilization.






The variance and standard deviation are calculated to show the CPU utilization trend during the
six trials. The calculations show as follows:
Variance: s2 = SS(Sum of Squares)⁄(N – 1)(No. Of Trials) = 0.06/(6-1) = 0.01
Standard Deviation: s = √s2 (Square Root of Variance) = √0.01 = 0.11
This baseline shows the CPU utilization on a LAN bridge without the kernel modifica-
tion or STP DApp. The vmstat tool has collected CPU usage for the system and kernel from the
virtual machine’s proc folder. These measurements were taken in one-second intervals over a
hundred seconds. This baseline measurement was taken during six different attacks made on the
Ethernet LAN. The bridge being measured does not have the STP DApp installed and is not run-
ning any validation tasks. The next baseline measurement shown is the active RAM utilized in
kilobytes. This usage indicates the amount of active virtual memory while the data is collected.
For the sake of perspective, this RAM measurement can be converted to gigabytes using the 1
KB = 0.000001 GB ratio (Schmidt, 2019). This conversion will later be utilized in the analysis
of RAM utilization. It is collected from the virtual machine’s proc folder and displayed using
the vmstat tool. There were six trials of attacks that were run for data collection. The vmstat tool
was run every second for a hundred seconds. During this time, the STP DApp tool and rogue
STP Root-Takeover attack tool were running on separate virtual machines in the LAN.
Figure 14. Average Baseline Total RAM Utilization for 100 Intervals
• Max Average Active RAM:1144993 Kilobytes
• Min Average Active RAM:1139069 Kilobytes
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• Mean RAM Usage:1139565 Kilobytes
Figure 15 shows an average per trial for six trials of hundred intervals each. This provides a
look at the RAM utilization over time to see if there is a variation over time.
Figure 15. Average Baseline RAM Usage for each Trial
• Highest Average:.1144460 Kilobytes
• Lowest Average:1117737 Kilobytes
• Variance:.114653968 Kilobytes
• Standard Deviation:10708 Kilobytes
The variance and standard deviation are calculated to show the RAM utilization trend during
the six trials. The calculations show as follows:
Variance: s2 = SS(Sum of Squares)⁄(N – 1)(No. Of Trials) = 573269842/(6-1) =
114653968 Standard Deviation: s = √s2 (Square Root of Variance) = √114653968 = 10708
This baseline shows the amount of active RAM utilization on a LAN bridge without
the kernel modification or STP DApp. The vmstat tool has collected active RAM usage for a
hundred intervals per second in six trials. The average RAM used out of six trials of a hundred
seconds, with measurements taken per second, is 1139565 Kilobytes. This section provides a
baseline for CPU and RAM utilization on a bridge in the control group. This bridge does not
have the kernel modification and blockchain framework installed. It is used for data collection
to provide comparative data for the STP DApp. The next section analyzes the measurements
taken while the STP DApp is blocking an attack from the rogue attack tool from the VM with
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the STP DApp. The STP DApp is a kernel interceptor and blockchain framework combined. It
drops frames based on payload information invalidated by the blockchain.
STP DApp: CPU and RAM Performance
This section provides data collection results on a virtual machine with the STP DApp
blockchain framework and kernel modification for BPDU frame interception. This section
provides perspective on the number of resources consumed by the virtual machine using the
blockchain framework. The results from this section can be compared to the baseline results
collected in the last section. The number of resources required to run a blockchain increases
with the number of peer nodes that are used (O’Dowd et al., 2020). This study provides a per-
spective for a general use case that utilizes consensus algorithms and endpoint validation with
two peer nodes. Encryption algorithms used in the Hyperledger Fabric include public key pairs
using SHA256 hash encryption (O’Dowd et al., 2020). Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
keys are used to utilize Smart Contracts in this framework (O’Dowd et al., 2020). The STP
DApp provides a service that adds validation to the STP protocol’s functionality in an Ethernet
LAN. With blockchain validation, encryption and decryption are utilized by the framework on
each BPDU frame that is parsed by the kernel. Encryption and decryption are CPU intensive;
therefore, the measurement of CPU and RAM utilization by the STP DApp in the process pro-
vides valuable data (Novak et al., 2019). The interceptor bridge in the Ethernet LAN contains
an STP DApp blockchain framework to validate the Root IDs and a kernel modification to in-
tercept, parse and drop frames that are not valid according to the blockchain. During the STP
DApp validation during an attack, the measurements taken for the baseline are the same as were
taken for the baseline. This baseline measurement was taken on a non-STP DApp bridge in the
LAN during the rogue attack. This observation indicates whether the blockchain framework
creates high RAM and CPU utilization in the kernel and userspace. The data collection includes
a hundred CPU usage and RAM utilization measurements taken by the vmstat tool per trial for
six trials. The virtual machine housing the STP DApp is running on two CPU cores and 29GB
of RAM. The CPU usage is the percent utilized in the kernel and userspace combined. This
combination provides an overall view of the CPU usage of the STP DApp tool since it works in
the kernel to intercept, parse frames to extract Root IDs, write Root IDs to root_out in the proc
folder and block all frames matching the ID in the root_in file. Figure 16 will show the average
CPU Usage of the STP DApp in a hundred measurements per trial for six trials.
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Figure 16. Average STP DApp CPU Usage for each Interval in Six trials
• Max average CPU Usage:71%
• Min average CPU Usage :11%
• Mean clock ticks:30%
Figure 17 shows an average per trial of a hundred intervals of one second each. This provides
a look at the CPU load over a short time to see if there is a variation in CPU usage during the
six trials. This provides insight into the behavior of the CPU while the STP DApp is running
validation.






The variance and standard deviation are calculated to show the trend in a hundred CPU
percentages in each of the six trials. The calculations show as follows:
Variance: s2 = SS(Sum of Squares)⁄(N – 1)(No. Of Trials) = 299/(6-1) = 60
Standard Deviation: s = √s2 (Square Root of Variance) = √60 = 8
The data collection shows that the average amount of CPU usage varies slightly while
the STP DApp runs in the system. This correlation may be attributed to other processes that are
run in the system. Another correlative trend shown in Figure 17 is that the number of CPU clocks
increases from 16%CPUUsage in trial one to 38%CPU usage in trial three before steadily going
back down by trial six. This data set marks an increase of 138% between trials 1 and 3, setting
the variance up to 60. The increase in variance lowers the predictability of the CPU usage in
this data set. The average CPU usage in the baseline is 0.71%. When the STP DApp is running,
the average CPU usage goes up to 30%, which is a 4125% increase in CPU load. Both bridges
are running 2 CPU cores at the time of data collection. This data shows that the STP DApp
has significantly increased CPU usage. This trend may be attributed to a higher CPU load sent
to the blockchain framework as it begins Chaincode validation in the blockchain ledger. The
validation mechanism runs hash encryption and decryption at each endpoint, providing for the
additional CPU load added by the STPDApp (Novak et al., 2019). In addition to CPU usage, the
active RAM utilized during STP DApp validation was measured and collected using the vmstat
tool in one-second intervals.
Figure 18. Average Active RAM Utilization in Six Trials
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• Max Active RAM usage:4014874 Kilobytes
• Min Active RAM usage:3815978 Kilobytes
• Mean Active RAM usage:3950978 Kilobytes
The utilization of active RAM shows a slight increase over time. These measurements per trial
show an average kilobyte of RAM taken per second for 100 seconds. The lowest average is
measured in the first second of the trials, and the highest average is in the last second. The
increase in RAM utilization is 5% over a hundred seconds. The data shows no spikes or events
that show a marked increase or decrease in the amount of RAM utilized during the six trials.
Figure 19. Average RAM Utilized for each Trial
• Highest Average:4890092 Kilobytes
• Lowest Average:2758825 Kilobytes
• Variance:565447028865
• Standard Deviation:4.2
The variance and standard deviation are calculated to show the trend in a hundred measurements
of RAM usage in each of the six trials. The calculations show as follows:
Variance: s2 = SS(Sum of Squares)⁄(N – 1)(No. Of Trials) = 2827235144325.5/(6-1)
= 565447028865.1
Standard Deviation: s = √s2 (Square Root of Variance) = √565447028865.1 = 751962.1
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This data set variance increase is because of the 77% rise in average active RAM uti-
lization from the first trial to the sixth trial. To put this information into perspective, a simple
calculation can be made to convert the kilobytes to gigabytes using a conversion ratio of 1GB
per 1,000,000 kilobytes (Schmidt, 2019). Although a correlation between RAM utilization and
the STP DApp functionality may exist, any causal relationship between the two is unclear. This
section included data collected on for RAM utilization and CPU Usage for the Observation
Two attack with the STP DApp blocking it. There were six trials taken and measurements were
recorded using the vmstat tool’s stats every second for a hundred seconds. In each trial, a base-
line reading was done on a non-STP DApp bridge and the bridge with the STP DApp and kernel
modification installed. The following measurements were collected and analyzed:
• Baseline: CPU average- 0.71%
• Baseline: RAM average- 1.14GB
• STP DApp: CPU average- 30%
• STP DApp: RAM average- 3.96GB
The measurements show that the STP DApp usage shows a marked increase from the
baseline bridge. The CPU usage increased by 4125% and the RAM utilization increased by
247%. The next section analyzes the amount of time difference between the arrival of the first
and last forged frames while the STP DApp tool invalidates and drops the frames. The function
to detect the absence of a bridge and remove it is based off of three hello_time message attempts
according to Wojdak’s (2003) modification of the STP protocol. It can be inferred that the
amount of time required to receive a new valid Root ID would include the time required to
remove the invalid device from the Ethernet LAN.
Time Efficiency
A software application’s overall efficiency can be measured using resources and the
amount of time it requires to function. These two variables are often used to measure the overall
efficiency of an application. This section provides a comparison for future research and STP
validation solutions. The first data set for time measurement calculates the detection speed of a
forged BPDUby the STPDApp. Several methods are used to capture Ethernet frames in an LEB.
The kernel modification called stpverify uses dev.c’s internal function that intercepts network
traffic to identify and parse BPDU frames for its elected Root ID. This Root ID is added to a
proc file called root_out. The IDs are read and validated through the blockchain framework, and
those that are not validated in the blockchain are written to a proc file called root_in. Stpverify
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is then used to drop the frames that have this Root ID.
The kernel logs written to the /var/log/syslog file in a Debian Linux operating sys-
tem provides timestamps for all STP frames found and rogue Ethernet frames that are dropped.
Stpverify modification writes this information to the kernel log using C’s printk() function. Un-
fortunately, the Yersinia tool does not effectively provide system logs for getting the time for
the first rogue frame’s launch. Its associated Yersinia.log file does not contain timestamps for
the launch of attacks. The Yersinia.log file only logs the time Yersinia is opened and closed with
a notification of the network interface status. The exact time between the launch of the frames
in Kali is only possible by manually tracking the time of frame launch as indicated in the GUI
interface of Yersinia. Its detection in the STP DApp VM is available through packet analysis
in Wireshark. The Wireshark tool is a direct approach for frame arrival times because it is also
connected to the kernel to intercept and read network traffic (Bock, 2019). With Wireshark, it
is possible to get the arrival time of the first bogus Ethernet frame and the time when the last
rogue frame is captured. In six trials of data collection, the STP Root-Takeover is launched in
Yersinia. The validation checks begin at the STP DApp tool, and Wireshark is used to note the
arrival time for the first and last forged frame from Yersinia. Figure 20 provides the time the
STP DApp takes to block the STP Root-Takeover attack from the Yersinia tool.
Figure 20. STP DApp: Time to Block the Forged Frame
The time required to block the framewas calculated by noting theYersinia attack launch
and a Wireshark frame analysis for arrival times. The noted times for each trial were the time of
launch, the time of the first forged frame’s capture, the time of the last forged frame captured,
and the time of the frame with a new valid Root ID. In every trial, the time of the first forged
frame’s launch in Yersinia matched the first forged frame’s capture in the STP DApp VM to a
hundredth of a second. The Ethernet frame capture by the STP DApp is instantaneous, so there
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was no chart made to show an event with no values. The next time collected was capturing
the arrival time of the last forged frame in the STP DApp VM. The difference between the last
forged frame and the first forged frame is calculated as the time taken to block the STP Root-
Takeover attack. The results for six trials are shown in Figure 20. The next measurement of
note is the arrival time of the first valid Root ID after the STP Root-Takeover attack. The time
to revert to a valid Root ID is measured by the difference between the first valid frame and the
last forged frame. Figure 21 provides the results of six trials and measurements drawn from the
Wireshark packet analysis tool.
Figure 21. Time Taken for Valid BPDUs after Invalid Frames are Dropped
Figure 21 shows the amount of time it takes for a new valid Root ID to be captured in
the STP DApp validation bridge. It is shown as a ”convergence” time; however, it is not official
”convergence” because that normally requires a TCN from all of the bridges in the LAN. Due
to the nature of the study, the STP DApp was not fully deployed to every bridge in the Ethernet
LAN to completely block the attack. The time to capture a new valid ID shows an average of
21.7 seconds over six trials. The time required to block the attack on the host with the deployed
STP DApp tool and kernel modification is 5.2 seconds on average. The measured trials are
based on the successful STP Root-Takeover attack in which the host bridge first accepts the
forged frame before blocking its frames. Other trials, which remain unrecorded, blocked the
acceptance of the forged Root ID completely. This section provided the results of six trials
made using the STP DApp tool and kernel modification to block the STP Root-Takeover attack.
The STP DApp and kernel modification’s CPU and RAM utilization on an Ethernet LAN bridge
were collected. A baseline measurement was taken to provide comparative data on the resource
usage of the research solution. Time efficiency measurements were taken from successful STP
Root-Takeover attacks that were blocked within seconds to show the behavior of the detection
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and prevention of an attacker that claims the Root role in the experimental Ethernet LAN. The
next section is a summary of the data collection and its analysis. The summary will go over all
of the results and what they imply.
Summary
With the nature of the blockchain framework and its mathematical processes, the as-
sumption was that the STP DApp’s use would show a significant increase in CPU utilization
(Novak et al., 2019). The baseline CPU usage measured by the sum of all CPU cores in the ker-
nel and userspace indicates an average of 0.71% used. On the other hand, on the host with the
STP DApp installed with the kernel modification to manipulate Ethernet frames, the average us-
age was at 30%. This figure shows an average increase of 4125%. The correlation between the
CPU resources and the STP DApp tool shows a causal increase due to the cryptographic calcu-
lations required by the system during validation at each endpoint. The average baseline figures
versus the STP DApp host’s figures for active RAM utilization shows a different pattern. The
baseline average shows 1139565 Kilobytes or 1.14 GB of RAM utilized to run an average bridge
in the control group’s Ethernet LAN. The average RAM utilized while running the STP DApp
and kernel modification shows an average of 3950978.6 Kilobytes or 3.95GB of RAM. The
average RAM utilization indicates high usage, considering the experiment’s blockchain runs on
only two peer nodes. The findings also indicated a steady increase of RAM utilization of 5%.
This finding creates a question as to the causality of this increase. Further, will such an increase
continue with more trials, or will it plateau at a certain level of RAM usage?
After a look at the CPU and RAM utilization, time efficiency was measured for six
trials. In these trials, the time of detection and prevention of the STP Root-Takeover attack
was measured. The average time taken to block a successful STP Root-Takeover attack in this
study was 5.2 seconds. The next measurement taken was the host’s time to produce valid BPDU
frames after it had accepted the forged BPDU frames. The time between the last forged frames
before they were dropped and the first valid frame showed an average of 21.6 seconds. This
chapter provides an interpretation of the data that was recorded by the STP DApp, Wireshark,
and the NodeJS application. The data was based on trials that collected CPU clock ticks and
system time logs on relevant events. The data is insufficient to provide an accurate depiction
of correlative and causal relationships derived from the data. Instead, this data creates a basis
to drive further research and study. The data provides a springboard for resource usage and the
behavior of a blockchain framework tool that detects a change in network traffic. This chapter
has provided some interesting results to CPU and RAM utilization by the STP DApp tool to
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validate the STP-enabled LAN devices. It effectively prevents the STP Root-Takeover attack,
and data collection shows its resource usage in doing so. The data collection also provided
results for time efficiency in blocking the STP Root-Takeover attack. Measurements are taken
in the acceptance and block of an attacker claiming the Root role shows a quick defense of the
attack and returning to a valid Root within seconds of the attack. The next chapter wraps up
this study with an overview of this research and its solutions. It will provide an overview of
the assumptions and limitations that guided this journey and a detailed account of the research
solution. The conclusion will include a security analysis of the research solution and ideas for





STP is a trust-based Data Link Layer protocol created as an automated algorithmic
solution to provide network expansion. However, it does not validate new bridges’ election,
making it vulnerable to modern-day attack vectors that create a gateway for attacks that affect
the entire network infrastructure (Lin et al., 2017; Strawn, 2019). One such attack vector is
the STP Root-Takeover attack which allows the integration of new network devices to control
the Ethernet LAN without proper validation (Mahmood et al., 2020; Rahalkar, 2018; Younes,
2017). The protocols that govern the services in the Data Link Layer of the network stack are
not designed with security in mind. Consequently, the vulnerabilities incur a risk to every sub-
sequent layer in the OSI referenced network stack. As a fundamental weak link, a security
solution is recommended to maintain the network’s integrity, with end-to-end secure commu-
nications starting from the Ethernet in the Data Link layer (Gilder, 2018; Strawn, 2019). The
internet infrastructure as it stands today is the weakest link, and its solution is a trustless peer-
to-peer based architecture for blockchain technology (Gilder, 2018). Carrying Bitcoin Core’s
blockchain’s original ideology, the built-in consensus protocol in a permissionless blockchain
is the basis for the efficiency and security in the blockchain system (Zhang et al., 2019).
This experiment was designed to test a potentially trustless feature to the STP proto-
col by using blockchain algorithms by introducing end-to-end encryption and immutability to
Ethernet device records to block new Ethernet devices from entering without validation. This
study introduces a hybrid blockchain framework that can emulate a large-scale peer-to-peer
blockchain validation protocol in a controlled virtual Ethernet LAN environment. A modern
attack tool called Yersinia was used to perform the STP Root-Takeover attack to prove the at-
tack’s validity on current Ethernet devices. The experiment’s success indicated that little change
was made to the network topology and devices to prevent the STP Root-Takeover attack’s root
cause.
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The research solution to the STP Root-Takeover attack performed on the virtual Eth-
ernet LAN is a hybrid permissioned blockchain that uses Smart Contract programming. Per-
missioned validation is emulated with a UI provided for a network administrator to add a new
Ethernet device. A /net module modification called stpverify is used to intercept STP-specific
Ethernet traffic called BPDUs and drop invalidated ones to block STP Root-Takeover attacks.
These BPDUs provide Root ID information which is queried and validated through a blockchain
framework.
Limitations
The most exciting part of the Proposal Defense’s journey to the Dissertation Defense’s
completion is working through research limitations. Some limitations were predictable because
the ideas behind them did not seem feasible. However, as the research study was fine-tuned
from the initial idea to the proposal defense, the research plan included implementing new types
of software and programming languages. The research process sheds light on the reality behind
a logical progression of an experiment. Typically, a procedure that seems standard may create
unforeseen roadblocks. This section is an overview of significant roadblocks that have created
challenges in achieving the research study’s objective. These limitations are not ordered, and all
of them have required forging a new branch in the research path. Part of this study was to test the
validity of the research problem, and the implementation of the solution was uncharted territory.
The procedure was taken step-by-step, partially by hope and part by luck. Once the research
study was validated by verifying the research problem’s significance, unforeseen problems with
Ethernet frame accesswith userspace-based frame interception led to the creation of two versions
of the STP DApp. The first one only provided detection of an invalid frame providing an IDS
service for the STP Root-Takeover attack. Access to Ethernet frames in this version came from
a socket API connected to the bridge interface. Although access to parse and extract the Root
ID from the frames was possible, the ability to then functionality to drop those frames for Layer
2 STP protocol did not exist (Kankipati, 2021). The second version of the STP DApp uses a
kernel modification called stpverify to directly access the frames through the dev.c application
in the kernel’s /net/core module. The second version was an IPS that successfully blocked the
STP Root-Takeover attack.
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Trusted instead of Trustless
The purely trustless, immutable, and transparent blockchain system creates a large-
scale infrastructure change to any current system it replaces. The peer-to-peer network is built
over time through distributed resources worldwide that gain rewards from validating transac-
tions. Such a network takes time and effort to build and is challenging to use in a controlled
environment for scientific research. This limitation required a hybrid system called Hyperledger
Fabric which automates the framework of a permissioned blockchain system. The blockchain
framework is built in a localhost bridged network with two peers. The peer-to-peer validation
in anonymous distributed networks is emulated through a UI for manual entry after validation.
This framework is meant to provide an alternative means for Ethernet device validation through
encryption and immutable device records. It introduces a foundation based on encryption with
the potential of a peer-to-peer blockchain framework in a distributed environment. The use
of this hybrid approach is easier to integrate into a small-scale modern network infrastructure.
However, it can create a trustless network infrastructure that is not affected by the client-server
model’s trusted nature used in the current infrastructure. The trustless part of the STP validation
tool is that an unrecognized Root ID will be dropped automatically.
Bridged Network Systems
The Hyperledger Fabric framework’s hybrid system requires servers run in docker con-
tainers that create a local TLS based bridged network using the virtual machine’s primary inter-
face. This system posed challenges to the program used to intercept Ethernet bridges because the
bind created to intercept traffic disconnected the blockchain framework’s localhost bridge net-
work system when using the first version of the STP DApp with a socket connected to the same
bridge interface for network interception. This issue required that the interceptor directly access
the kernel rather than the interface for binding and streaming traffic. This limitation was not a
part of the research solution as it was a tool to intercept and filter network traffic for the BPDU
frames used for the STP topology. The Hyperledger Fabric framework that requires the use of
a bridged network of docker containers in localhost was used due to the limitations of creating
a test environment to test the effectiveness and validity of a concept. Neither of these issues
is related to the actual research problem or solution, but due to the framework and technology
used to test the test environment’s solution.
At the time of setup, the framework used to create the test environment’s research
solution seemed pragmatic. However, the Hyperledger Fabric network is designed for hybrid
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adoption and does not have the simplicity of standard and traditional blockchains. It may be a
quicker turn-key solution to demonstrate on a localhost network for permission-based validation,
quicker searches, and an easy-to-use interface. However, the way it was constructed interfered
with the use of the interceptor tool its network connectivity. In hindsight, the research of a more
straightforward open-source blockchain may have been more effective.
Kernel Modification for Layer 2 Interception
This study required a lot of trial and error for the implementation of an interceptor. The
interception and manipulation of Layer 2 traffic seemed to have little support on the userspace
level with the current kernel version of Ubuntu 20.04 LTS at the time of the study. Several
standard methods used to access and manage network traffic had failed. The first attempt was
made with a Socket API connection using the socket(), ioctl(), and bind() functions to access
header and Root ID information in Layer 2 traffic through the virtual machine’s bridged network
interface. Although the information could be accessed, common forms of dropping frames to
perform the block of invalid frames were not functional. The effectiveness of firewall config-
uration tools like ebtables and iptables did not provide the proper documentation or support at
the Layer 2-level. Moreover, the ebtables and iptables have been replaced by nftables which
also has little support and no control of the traffic. For example, after accessing the network
traffic through essential filtration with the socket connection, the ability to drop invalid frames
did not pass any testing using netfilter configurations for ingress traffic (Kankipati, 2020). In-
evitably, this research suggested that a socket connection to Layer 2 readily allows inspection
rather than interception. The next attempt to directly manipulate the Ethernet traffic to the inter-
ceptor was with the netfilter hooks. The connection to the Layer 2 bridge functionality existed
in the kernel /net module; however, on testing, the access to STP network traffic was not avail-
able through the interface. There was documentation to support bridge layer traffic; however,
the functionality did not pass testing because it did not pass the frame traffic to the userspace.
Lastly, an attempt was made to intercept traffic directly in the net/core/dev.c  file where frames
are received.
The socket logic used in the IDS version of STP DApp was translated into the ker-
nel’s /net/core/dev.c module with a few modifications, traffic manipulation was possible. The
goto drop functionality that calls the function to drop Ethernet frames in ingress and structure
them properly is the only option to block invalid Ethernet traffic from Layer 2 attack tools like
Yersinia. The use of kernel modification made blocking invalid and forged Ethernet frames
from Yersinia possible. In this section, some limitations made the ideal solution difficult to
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implement; however, the journey towards arriving at unexpected conclusions provided much
insight into carrying out a research study. For instance, the choice in methodology required
experimentation and data with measurable results. Hyperledger Fabric’s unique solution had
surprising elements that allowed for an ideal test environment. As a corporate-based solution,
it had features that made it practical to use in a software-based network infrastructure. Its in-
tegration with the modifications required in the kernel was almost seamless; it allowed for an
easy infrastructure to adapt to the research study. As the future brings software-based network
infrastructures, the hardware-based protocols that exist due to hardware-based problems can be
phased out (Amin, 2017; Rietz et al., 2018). In the end, many of the limitations led to more
discoveries and opportunities for research. The following section will provide a deeper analysis
of the STP DApp solution and its limitations.
Security Analysis of the STP DApp
The STP DApp solution was created to provide validation to STP-enabled Ethernet
LANs. A significant contributor to attacks in the network infrastructure is based on the vulner-
abilities in the Data Link Layer (Younes, 2017). This research aimed to mitigate the STP Root-
Takeover attack using a form of validation used by the blockchain protocol. The blockchain
protocol is known for its immutability in securing data (Nakomoto, 2009). The concept of
immutability is about data integrity. Immutability does not allow easy modification, and in
blockchain, all modifications are trackable (Kereki, 2020; Lantz & Cawrey, 2020). Immutabil-
ity due to the consensus algorithm that provides Merkle tree hashing gives blockchain a unique
value add for validation (Parisi, 2020). Validation can be made from various lists available for
checks in a network devices forwarding table to a standard database. However, the data integrity
in that table is not certain unless it is secured in a proven way. To this day, applications are cre-
ated with security as an add-on. The concept of security by design is where an application is
built with security as an integral part of a strategy for secure hardening (Deogun et al., 2019).
Blockchain is a proven technology that is secure by design and has security mechanisms that
can ensure less vulnerability than average data storage provides (Nakamoto, 2009). The STP
DApp is built to be secure by design using blockchain consensus algorithms for validation. The
inevitable direction of the research study’s methodology requires a working product that can
be used in experimentation as the pre-experimental quantitative approach requires (Creswell
& Creswell, 2018). The choice of a Hyperledger Fabric framework to use various blockchain
elements without the limitation of the peer-to-peer distributed node technology provides signif-
92
icant security using consensus protocols for immutability. It is different from Bitcoin Core and
Ethereum’s decentralized networks. However, Gaur et al. (2020) describe Hyperledger Fabric’s
unique combination of security elements:
• It employs the use of certificate authorities (CA) to manage the access of users
• SHA256 hashing and Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECDSA) to use for consensus val-
idation on the data’s stored contents.
• Digital signatures are tracked for effective non-repudiation.
• Distributed file systems have a copy to prevent ransomware attacks.
• Smart Contracts are used to ensure the integrity of business logic.
• Its permissioned nature adds trust, and different variations of it form amodified consensus
algorithm.
• All network nodes are built with a modular design that requires endpoint authentication
at each use which makes it different from the average trust-based server infrastructure.
Due to these security elements, the inherent security built into the Hyperledger Fabric’s
blockchain allows for modifications that may alter the security ideology from which it is based;
however, it is built with security by design (Gaur et al., 2020). A kernel modification called
stpverify compiled into the Linux Ethernet Bridge (LEB) allows it to parse all network traffic
for BPDU frames that provide information about the Root ID. The Root ID is the identifier for
the bridge that controls the Ethernet LAN’s topology. Stpverify puts these Root IDs into a file
called root_out which the STP DApp reads to validate each ID as part of the Ethernet LAN.
If one is unrecognized, it is put into a root_in file where stpverify will drop the ingress of the
frames, so it is completely removed from the Ethernet LAN’s topology. This action blocked
Yersinia’s STP Root-Takeover attack in Observation Two. The STP DApp provides a specific
role in blocking STP Root-Takeover attacks performed by the Yersinia tool. With this tool,
BPDU flooding, claiming the Root role, and bridge priority attacks are constructed. A function
for the attack sniff’s frames to gain access to the Ethernet LANs topology.
Based on the BPDU frame’s information about the current Root, the attacker behind
Yersinia decrements its ID to gain automatic acceptance in the LAN as Root role. This tool can
be used for any attack that uses a different Root ID from the validated ones. The STPDApp is not
created to prevent MAC spoofing, MITM or DoS attacks by Yersinia. It only validates the Root
ID and no other metadata that comes from the BPDU frames. This tool can block malformed
BPDU frames, and Root hijacking. If a frame is sent with the same Root ID, the current solution
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will accept the lesser priority frame unless it has a decremented Root ID. This solution has only
been tested in the Ethernet LAN in a virtualized environment using Yersinia. The results may be
different in a non-virtual environment or with a different attack tool. Currently, the experiment
is limited to a virtual LAN using LEBs configured with the STPDApp to block an attack to claim
the Root role from Yersinia installed on a Kali VM. It has not been tested in hardware-based
environments, so it is difficult to predict whether it will have the same ability to block attacks
in the current test environment. Lastly, the STP DApp requires full deployment in the Ethernet
LAN to be fully effective. A full deployment requires that each bridge in the Ethernet LAN will
require the kernel upgrade with the stpverify modification and Hyperledger Fabric network in
the NodeJS runtime environment to be fully effective. A full deployment in the Ethernet LAN
ensures that all of the bridges in the LAN will block an invalid Root ID to prevent repeated
attacks or a divided LAN. (Marro, 2003; IEEE, 2016).
Contribution
The integration of the security-based algorithmic framework of blockchain is at its
grassroots worldwide. As a new technology at its birth of adoption, it is only at its research
and development phase. As it stands, in large-scale adoption of corporate systems, a complete
upheaval of the current infrastructure is required. A proven use case is difficult to find; however,
the technology can solve many Cybersecurity problems. The root cause of several large-scale
attacksmay be prevented bymanually validating Ethernet devices in a hybrid blockchain system.
Infrastructure changes are required for complete validation in a peer-to-peer network. Such a
change would prevent the MITM attack and Mac spoofing. The prevention of these two attacks
would allow an automated validation system for the STP Root-Takeover attack. This study
is strictly based on the STP Root-Takeover attack in the data link layer. The prevention of
MAC spoofing and the MITM attack is a solution for a different research problem. Large-scale
automation would require a total transformation of the entire network infrastructure to validate
and encrypt. Implementing a different network infrastructure is not an easy solution and a costly
one, but every new technology starts somewhere even if its just an artist’s conceptualization
through science fiction.
Cybersecurity faces a problem because the basic infrastructure for the transmission,
maintenance, and storage of digital data is not inherently secure. With the increase of human
reliance on digital information comes the increase of fraud and cyber-based attacks. An infras-
tructure change with new technology is inevitable to meet the increasing demand for digital
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information and automation. Creating a new infrastructure takes decades to consider accessi-
ble use cases, but this technology has the potential to create solutions for today’s Cybersecurity
issues. Permissionlessness, trustlessness, and immutability are creative new security solutions,
and research may drive its adoption. As a step towards adopting inherently security data trans-
port and storage is imminent, a hybrid approach in some environments is better than doing
nothing and could secure its user from common attacks. As these hybrid solutions are adopted,
and cyberattacks are created to circumvent them, the demand for a larger scale change will be
imminent. Currently, blockchain can be used to solve security issues at the Physical Layer with
identity management, the Data Link Layer by trustless validation, and the Network Layer with
layer-based encryption integrated into the infrastructure. Better database management using
a network of encrypted transmission with modular storage devices are possible with the Hy-
perledger Fabric network and other blockchain systems. This hybrid approach challenges the
researcher to imagine a secure network topology, a new hybrid from the bottom up rather than
application layer security patching used to fix new cyber attacks as they come. It will challenge
the Cybersecurity community to see security as a foundation rather than persistent fires that are
put out one at a time. Adopting secure-by-design solutions such as blockchain will increase like
the ripple effect in the Merkle tree system of validation.
Recommendations
This study provides a unique perspective to secure transactions and storage in a web
application designed to validate Ethernet devices. The applicability of such a perspective can
be used to solve many security issues with trust-based systems; however, from a networking
perspective, this framework provides an effort to dissolve the trusted nature of the Data Link
Layer by forcing the validation of all network traffic. Although firewall filters can be used for the
same purpose, it is not straightforward or efficient. The framework of blockchain algorithms in
this study introduces elements that provide recommendations to solve trust in the STP protocol
and its effectiveness in maintaining a network of valid Ethernet devices. Elements unique to
a blockchain framework such as encryption, validation, and immutability provide support for
security as inherent and not as an add-on. The added hybrid approach provides a pragmatic
solution to use as a stepping stone for testing and further research. It speeds up queries by
adding quicker traversal of an encrypted current state database separate from the blockchain
and a user interface for permissioned management by institutional users.
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Encryption
All blockchain frameworks use encryption for data transmission and storage. The web
application created by the Hyperledger Fabric framework uses SHA256 hash algorithms for
PKI-based authentication for users and servers in the network for every transaction. Java-based
token authentication is used as is standard for a web application in the NodeJS runtime envi-
ronment. The use of encryption inherent in the bridged network connections for the blockchain
system provides security as a foundation. The use of token authentication in the Hyperledger
Fabric framework emulates the inherent nature of encryption in a traditional blockchain. The
framework uses a database that matches the current state of the blockchain. It is comprised of a
hashed list of transactions that is encoded/decoded with token authentication. All stored data is
encrypted and can be decoded when managed in the UI for accessibility. 
Validation
The root cause of the STP Root-Takeover attack is the lack of validation of new net-
work devices added to the Ethernet LAN. This concept is called a permissioned blockchain
(Nakamoto, 2009). The STP protocol is a trust-based automation algorithm for LAN topology
management. Validation provides a quasi-trustless solution that requires trusted users to manu-
ally validate and add new bridges to the Ethernet LAN. The STP DApp in the test environment
creates a hybrid approach to trustless validation by adding valid devices to the network with
manual management through a UI. This research solution can provide control over the LAN
devices and a software solution for a network administrator to add valid devices to the network
in a small network. A BPDU frame is automatically invalidated and blocked if the Root ID has
not been added to the blockchain. Although it is trusted in nature at this scale, it moves towards
a trustless framework bound by secure automation. 
Immutability
Immutability is unique to the blockchain framework and is a secure solution to pre-
serve data integrity in storage. Every transaction that is stored in the blockchain is hashed and
saved as a hash. Its predecessor’s block will have a hash in its header to incorporate the new
block. The Merkle tree algorithm is how transactions in the blockchain are validated, so there
is no way to delete a blockchain transaction. Such a characteristic of security provides secure
record manageability. Hybrid solutions Although the Hyperledger Fabric does not have the ex-
act characteristics of the traditional blockchain, its emulation of these characteristics provides an
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approach to securing digital information without the complete upheaval of the infrastructure. A
hybrid solution is a pragmatic approach to building a foundation with enhanced security without
the expense of using a traditional blockchain. These solutions are also under research and devel-
opment but provide options to test secure records management with a web application interface
for usability. It also provides solutions to lower resource usage for efficient use on a large scale.
Two such solutions for usability and integration in current environments are the NodeJS runtime
environment and docker containers to manage a secure framework. The second is the addition
of a current state database to avoid a blockchain query, which is not time efficient.
Recommendations for Future Research
Creating testbeds for the grassroots blockchain technology sets the stage for research
into new security solutions with encryption algorithms. The use of a hybrid approach of this
grassroots technology to solve a problem provides a means for pragmatic solutions that are eas-
ier to experiment with and test. Although the solution came with many problems, the learning
component came with ideas for future research. The solution was to test a hybrid framework
to emulate a difficult technology test in a controlled environment. The test to manage network
traffic by blocking STP frames with unknown Root IDs can solve a standard attack using a
different framework. In the same light, this introduces the technology to solve many Cyberse-
curity problems. The research solution demonstrates how a blockchain solution can increase
the Confidentiality, Availability, and Integrity of an Ethernet LAN. It provides Confidentiality
with SHA256 PKI encryption at every endpoint and Availability by preventing a rogue device
from taking Root in an Ethernet LAN. The inherent immutability of the blockchain system with
Merkle Tree and consensus algorithms provide the Integrity required to provide a fully secure
cloud-based database system. This type of research provides a foundation for robust solutions
to solve more significant problems.
There is a curiosity spurred by using the Hyperledger Fabric framework in the business
sector (Parisi, 2020). It works for corporate research proposals but is not a stable solution in
terms of security and growth. It is open source but full of third-party dependencies. All of these
dependencies are difficult to manage and update for vulnerabilities. A more robust framework
could be run without constant updates and dependencies if it does not use the NodeJS runtime
environment and its libraries. A stable blockchain that integrates the authentication and trans-
actions with the SHA256 algorithm and a local test network would provide an even more secure
foundation for the blockchain system. Resource usage can be lowered with a tool that was not
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in two parts but rather, one system built in C. Although the UI and database added usability, it
added bulk to the solution that was not required. This tool was modified to open source systems
to create a unique solution to a common problem. The interaction between an interceptor tool
written in C to interact with a modified Hyperledger Fabric template causes inefficiency issues
and is not streamlined.
Although the MITM attack was not a part of the solution, it is a gateway that is an
even bigger problem for the Data Link layer. Further filtration in the interceptor could be made
to prevent some common Mac spoofing attacks. The STP validation tool can also be made to
identify all source addresses for frames to identify the bridge IDs for all LAN devices. All
traffic can be stopped from an unidentified address to make it a more effective tool for attacks.
A prevention system would make this tool much more potent as a type of layer two firewall
approach. The solution could also be integrated with a firewall. The STP validation tool is
made to replace the trusted nature of the BPDU frames. It is also made to replace the use of
the MAC table, which is referenced in switches. Layer 3 devices use ARP tables, and such a
validation tool could be configured to filter IPv4 traffic at the interceptor to validate IP addresses.
In this light, blockchain systems can be researched for other layers in the network infrastructure.
The Ethernet LANwas runwith the Linux Ethernet Bridge, which provided traffic at the
Application Layer. Although the LEB is a switch, it is also run in the Application Layer. Hence,
the LEB provides an ideal platform for a userspace tool with an Application Layer blockchain.
Effectively, if the blockchain is run within the LEB with a kernel-based interceptor, it is tech-
nically compiled as a switch with a blockchain inside of it. As they move towards virtualized
switching increases for the large-scale enterprise, an Application Layer switch may meet future
demand in the increasingly popular SDNs.
The solution could also be tested with hardware Ethernet LANs made up of Cisco
switches using the STP topology. It could be measured against the Root Guard and BPDUguard
technology used to replace STP in some Ethernet LANs. Could such a solution be integrated into
Cisco IOS to add an inherent add-on to the switch in Layer 2 rather than in an outside interceptor
in the LAN?
Summary
Although at the grassroots level, blockchain technology is growing as a solution to
today’s problems. It is well known for providing a solution to today’s economy. Not only does
it provide a platform for a global currency, but it also solves solutions in institutional economic
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systems that cause inflation. Each aspect of the blockchain system of protocols solves a different
problem. The network infrastructure was built with protocols made to expand and speed up
networks. The automation of Ethernet LANs through the STP protocol was a breakthrough that
aided in today’s global network. Unfortunately, the grid-based network system infrastructure
uses the same technology and protocols it has had for a long time with no real efficient solution
for a change. The ’if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” approach is not is now sounding more like
”it’s broke, how do we fix it?” with cyberattacks on the rise. Although it is a solution, the
biggest problem with integrating blockchain into any system is the expense of a change in the
infrastructure.
On the other hand, cyberattacks caused by the current network infrastructure are also
costing businesses money. At the moment, most research and development have been seen in
industries that require blockchain protocol for risk management. Examples of these industries
would include banking and healthcare. Although the research problem tested in the study is for
the STP Root-Takeover attack and the STP protocol, a similar solution can be for other network
attacks. It also prevents attacks to subsequent layers in the network by keeping control of the
Ethernet LAN. This study is meant to validate the attack is still an issue on modern systems and
provide a unique solution that can prevent it. It is also meant to bring to light a problem with
trust that requires a unique solution that can be researched and improved. Due to the increased
reliance on digital information and wide-scale use of the network infrastructure, security solu-
tions have to catch upwithmainstream technology. Blockchain provides an approach that would
provide integral security as part of the infrastructure rather than providing add-ons to patch up
a problem until another one pops up. The network infrastructure problem is similar to the story
of the three little pigs and the big, bad wolf. The most industrious pig built a house of a strong
foundation and was not eaten. Where the pigs using accessible things like hay, mud, and sticks
continually patch up holes and put out fires created by the big, bad wolf.
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Appendix: Definition of Terms
Data Encapsulation - a Layer 2 MAC sub-layer protocol service that organizes data
for transport. The Data Link layer service encapsulates data into an Ethernet frame 
Frame Synchronization - a Layer 2 MAC sub-layer protocol service that is used to
validate Ethernet frame data.
Flow Control - a Layer 2 MAC sub-layer protocol service that controls the orderly
flow of frames to avoid congestion, overwhelm and collision
Access Control - a system where authentication is used to validate a user or a process
Collision - occurs when two or more frames are transmitted at once which requires
frame re-transmission leading to a lag and denial of service
Convergence - in STP protocol topology management, all traffic is stopped while a
new Root is verified by all LAN switches
Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) - Spanning Tree Protocol is a data link layer protocol
and algorithm created to automate the management of Ethernet LANs
802.1d - the IEEE standard based on the STP protocol algorithm
802.1w - he IEEE standard based on the rSTP protocol algorithm for metropolitan net-
works
Ethernet LAN Topology - -an organized structure of Ethernet LAN switches based
on efficient message transmission
Hyperledger Fabric - Hyperledger Fabric is a software-based corporate solution cre-
ated by IBM based on the Linux Foundation’s open-source Hyperledger blockchain framework
Switch - a device that works on an Ethernet LAN in the Data Link layer to connect
networked devices to ports that can be managed. The words switch and bridge are used inter-
changeably in this study. MAC - Media Access Control - a protocol at the Data Link layer that
provides a unique identifier for networked devices.
Frame - the protocol data unit for data transmitted on the data link layer using MAC
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addresses
Packet - the protocol data unit for data transmitted in the Network layer using the IP
protocol
CIA triad - an information security term to represent the principles of confidentiality,
integrity and availability. It is often represented as three parts of a triangle.
Confidentiality - data that is private
Integrity - data that remains unchanged from unauthorized entities
Availability - data or resources that remain usable for intended users
Authenticity - validation is used to prove that users are who they say they are
MITM - Man in the middle - an attack where a malicious user has infiltrated a network
to intercept communications between or among legitimate devices.
DoS - Denial of Service - when resource or data availability is compromised from an
attack
DDoS - Distributed Denial of Service - when several resources are compromised during
an attack
Bridge - A Layer 2 network device used to transport Layer 2 traffic or Ethernet between
two LANs. The words bridge and switch are used interchangeably in the study.
STP - Spanning Tree Protocol - a protocol in the data link layer used in a LAN to
prevent loops and expand resource efficiency
RSTP - Rapid Spanning Tree Protocol - an update to the STP protocol in 2001 that
increased computational efficiency
STP Root-Takeover, Root-Takeover - the Root-Takeover attack is when an attacker
uses a rogue device to take over the function of a legitimate Root in the STP/RSTP protocol
BPDU - Bridge Protocol Data Unit - these are messages sent by switches using the
STP/RSTP protocol to maintain a self-automated network topology
Yersinia - an attack tool used for various data link layer and MITM attacks
Ettercap - an attack tool used to perform data link layer attacks.
Blockchain - a technology underlying the original Bitcoin electronic cash system that
keeps record of transactions.
Decentralized - a feature of bitcoin’s blockchain. It features no central authority or
trusted authority to provide a service
Immutable - cannot be changed or altered
Centralized - an entity governed by a central authority
Trustless - an entity that is not reliant on a trusted authority and is maintained with no
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trusted entities
Permissionless - an entity that does not rely on a trusted or central authority for function
Trust based - a system that requires a trusted authority to function
PKI - public key infrastructure - an asymmetric algorithm that validates an item using
a random number generated private key and public key. The private key validates a transaction
with a digital signature
Digital signature - a validation mechanism used by PKI where a transaction is signed
with a private key
Encryption - when an item is altered using a pattern created by a cryptographic algo-
rithm.
Bitcoin - the electronic cash system created by Satoshi Nakamoto
Bitcoin Core- the electronic cash system to include the blockchain created by Satoshi
Nakamoto
OSI reference model - an abstract layering diagram to describe the various services
performed within the network infrastructure
Data link layer (layer 2) - the second layer in the OSI reference model provides ser-
vices including MAC addressing and encapsulates data into a protocol data unit called a frame
Root Bridge - the bridge in STP/RSTP elected as the head of the Ethernet LANs net-
work topology based on lowest ID
Designated Bridge - a switch that is has the Root Path Cost (RPC) to the Root
Port - a channel on a switch that connects a network device with its own MAC address
Root Port - the port on the Designated Bridge that is closest to the Root
Designated Port - the port on the Root that is closest to the Designated Bridge
Topology change notification (TCN) - a type of BDPU message sent from the root
bridge to notify all the switches of a topology change, typically, a change in the root bridge
Topology change - when a new root bridge is elected in STP/RSTP
Metasploit - a package of tools that can be used to perform various social engineering,
network and system attacks
Kali - an operating system that can be used to perform attacks with various social
engineering network and system attack tools.
Smart ContractA Smart Contract is software-based business logic. It allows practical
uses for a blockchain, such as supply chain management, identity management, and contracts
by adding a software program to the blockchain




The hypervisor used to host the Ethernet LAN is called VMWare Vcloud on the current
version 10.2. It provides the resources required to conduct the experiment with integrity and
observe results due to its resource scalability and availability. Vmware provides the resources
to host the Ethernet LAN. Switches are devices that pass Ethernet traffic called frames in the
virtualized data link layer. Some of the Ethernet traffic is specific to the STP protocol for switch
topology management. The requirement for the switches in the control group is that they can be
enabled to pass STP-specific frames. The Debian Linux kernel comes with bridge modules that
can provide switch services enabled with STP. Although the nomenclature can be confusing,
the words bridge and switch can be used interchangeably. When configuring the Debian Linux
kernel for bridge mode, it is being configured for switch functionality. Hence, it can be enabled
with STP and pass Ethernet frames. The Debian Linux distribution used for the Ethernet LAN is
Ubuntu 20.04 LTS Desktop edition, the latest version at testing. Ubuntu is a widespread Debian
Linux distribution known for its ease of use. Three Ubuntu 20.04 Desktop virtual machines have
been configured as LEBs to create the Ethernet LAN. Each virtual machine is connected with
two network interfaces to provide optimal bridge functionality. The first interface is configured
with a LAN and gateway IP address, and the second interface is configured to create a connection
between the physical device and the bridge.
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Linux Ethernet Bridge Configuration
Network Utilities: Network Manager
NetworkManager is a popular network management tool that can create a persistent
bridge configuration on the LEB. With network persistence, the bridge configuration is already
written into the system’s network configuration files, so it does not have to be reconfigured on
restart. The virtual machine’s NICs are two network interfaces for each bridge. Each NIC had
a MAC address to form the bridge ID nomenclature to provide a unique identifier for each net-
work device in the LAN. One interface was used to create an outgoing LAN interface, and the
other interface was configured as the bridge interface for LAN traffic.
The resulting configuration file is written in the Network Manager
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Network Utilities: Bridge Utils Each Ubuntu VM was provided an installation of the bridge-
utils tool. Bridge-utils is a utility package that allows the user to run simple commands to pro-
vide some configuration and bridge information. An essential part of setting up the bridge for
this study is to add STP protocol functionality. As it is not set up to use STP by default, it can be
turned on by the bridge-utils tool. The bridge-utils tool provides details about the Ethernet LAN
topology based on the STP protocol. The details provided match those sent in the BPDU frame
as part of the decision-making in the Root election, and this is how the bridges are monitored to
see what it recognizes as the designated root. The designated bridge is based on the NIC mac
address used for Ethernet bridge traffic and a unique identifier for the bridge. The bridge-utils
application provides this information.
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The bridge id designation shows the id of the bridge which is 8000.005056013fa0. The bridge
ID is based on the MAC address of the NIC that is used for Ethernet bridge traffic and it is
also a unique identifier for the bridge. Below the bridge id, the designated root is also a key
element in the study. It is the elected Root for the Ethernet LAN topology. Right now, it is
8000.0050560138bc which is different from the bridge id which is 8000.005056013fa0. This
means that the bridge, leb1, is a bridge in the Ethernet LAN but is not the elected Root. The
details provided show the path_cost and hello_time which are key elements to Root election in
the STP algorithm. When there is little difference among these key elements, the Root election
is based on setting the bridge ID in numerical order.
Yersinia: Code used for the STP Root-Takeover attack
Yersinia is an open-source tool that can work with attacks on various network proto-
cols. Although this study’s focus is its ability to perform attacks based on the STP protocol, it
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has robust functionality that attacks other network protocols. For this study’s purpose, it also
can perform attacks in varying types of Ethernet LANs. These Ethernet LANs can be made up
of popular vendors, virtual switches, or open-source software bridges such as the Linux Eth-
ernet Bridge. The tool’s ability to pick up information from varying frame formats makes it a
powerful tool. At the time of the study, the URL to access the latest version of Yersinia and
its source fragments is https://github.com/tomac/yersinia/tree/master/src. This study’s objec-
tive is to examine the attacks based on the STP protocol within the folder structure. These files
are called xstp.c and xstp.h. At the time of the study, these files have not been updated in four
years. Curiously, no changes were required to these files. They continue to maintain successful
attacks on network devices with updated security patches such as those on the Ethernet bridges
in this study. The attack vector device listens for STP Ethernet frames on the network at the
beginning of the STP Root-Takeover attack. This stage is the passive information gathering
MITM attack described in the introduction chapter. The goal is to gather information about
the current Root ID by collecting its information from the BPDU messages passed among the
LAN bridges. Due to the nature of the experimental environment, the broadcasted configuration
frames were collected by all of the bridges of the LAN, showing the forged Root ID within a
second because the election through brute force did not use a topology change notification due
to the nature of the trust-based STP protocol implemented on the LAN. In the xstp.cfile, the
function xstp_learn_packet searches all of the interfaces for packets and parses them for STP
information. This function filters for packets that hold STP-based Ethernet frames called BP-
DUs. More specifically, it looks for BPDU_conf frames that match those for STP and RSTP
protocols by parsing the packets for indicators for the 802.3 Ethernet frames used for the STP
topology. It structures the data it needs for a forged frame, such as the source mac address,
destination mac address, bridge id, root id, hello time, forward delay, max-age, and root path
cost.
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This first part of the function creates the structure to collect the required data for the attack
using a BPDU structure defined in line 1048: structstp_data *stp_data = (struct stp_data
*)data. To pick up BPDU information, the interfaces_get_packet function is called by the
xstp_learn_packet function. This function is used for passively sniffing information by gath-
ering packets on the Ethernet LAN. The packet is parsed and identified as a BPDU frame.
The contents of information such as the source mac address and destination mac address are
copied from the packet to the stpdata structure for future use in the STP Root-Takeover attack.
The code in lines 1097 and 1098 shows how the source mac address (mac_source) is set in
the stp_data structure for the forged frame.  The code in lines 1113 and 1115 shows the same
method used to copy the bridge ID (bridge_id) and root ID (root_id) into the stp_data structure
using the memcpy function. Once the xstp_learn_packet function completes the preliminary
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work, it is requested by the xstp_th_nondos_role function defined in line 648 of the xstp.c file.
This function requests the source mac address, destination mac address, bridge id, root id, hello
time, forward delay, max-age, and root path cost of the current designated Root ID. This infor-
mation is saved to use in the forged frame created to implement an attack to claim the Root role.
All of the information is inserted into the forged frame except for the Root ID. The Root role
functionality is claimed by providing a Root ID with all of the same information except for the
Root ID’s bottom-up numerical order. The Root ID’s numerical order is only used to decide
on a new Root Bridge’s election when the other information matches. The decremented bridge
ID is created using the function xstp_decrement_bridgeid, which is implemented in line 688.
The key to the election of a new Root in an STP topology is that if the path cost elements are
the same, the bridge with the lower numerical bridge ID will be elected as Root. The use of this
function provides a BPDU frame that is set up to create a topology change.  After this function
has been used, the fabricated BPDU frame with a lower Bridge ID is sent out into the Ethernet
LAN to incite a topology change. This topology change will use the fake Bridge ID in the frame
and provide the rogue device control of the Ethernet LAN. Now the attacker gains the ability to
gather more information, route traffic, and eventually gain control of layer three devices such as
routers.  Considering the information provided on how the attack is performed on an Ethernet
LAN, this study’s first question would be to figure out Yersinia’s ability to attack the control
group’s Ethernet LAN. Can an old tool that has not been updated in four years still perform
the STP Root-Takeover attack on currently updated Ethernet LAN devices? This experiment is
conducted as Step 1: The validation of the STP Root-Takeover attack.
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STP DApp Code Analysis
The research solution is the STP MAC validation software tool used to prevent an
STP Root-Takeover attack performed by Yersinia in the Ethernet LAN defined by the pre-
experimental Control Group. The first part of the experiment demonstrates the STP Root-
Takeover attack using the control group’s attack vector variable and evaluates its effectiveness
on the Ethernet LAN variable. The second part of the study proposes a trustless solution that can
be used to prevent the experimental attack on the same Ethernet LAN and attack vector variables
in the control group. In this light, the research solution was administered on a virtual machine
created with the Ubuntu 20.04 LTS Desktop operating system and configured as a bridge like
the Ethernet LAN’s other bridges. The STP DApp and attack are run from the virtual machine
simultaneously to prove effective detection of the STP Root-Takeover attack administered by
the Yersinia attack tool in the virtual machine running the Kali 2004.3 LTS operating system. It
is made up of two parts to create a whole system. The first part is a kernel modification called
stpverify added to dev.c. in the /net/core folder of the Ubuntu 5.8.1 kernel. The second part
of the blockchain framework in the Nodejs runtime environment. Both parts run on a single
operating system on a virtual machine. The source code is made up of several open-source
frameworks and is available in Github at https://github.com/milapaul/stpmacverify.  Validation
begins with the kernel modification in dev.c to track the established Root ID and new bridge
IDs added to the Ethernet LAN. A blockchain will hold hashed values of bridge IDs that have
been validated in the Ethernet LAN. The stpverify mod written in C will output the bridge ID to
a proc file called root_out. Javascript interface in the NodeJS runtime environment. NodeJS is
the runtime environment for the blockchain framework by Hyperledger Fabric. The framework
includes a UI for user interaction with the blockchain. The interaction with the blockchain is
managed by Smart Contracts called Chaincode, and they manage a query or an addition to the
blockchain.  The STP DApp begins its functionality with the stpverify mod and then connects
to the blockchain framework in the NodeJS runtime environment for validation. The results
are sent back to the proc file root_in. If the discovered bridge ID is established in the Ethernet
LAN is validated by an entry in the blockchain, the network traffic is allowed to continue in the
Ethernet LAN. If the bridge ID is new to the Ethernet LAN, its network traffic will be dropped
until a network administrator can validate and add it to the blockchain. The kernel modification




The kernel modification is registered and initiated in the main.c file. The definition
shown notifies the kernel that this modification will be used. The code is a modification of the
open-source traffic analyzer module called trafficsqueezer.
Credits for TrafficSqueezer
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If stpverify is defined in the program, required initialization is found in these include
files. #ifdef is used to define the stpverify modification in main.c. In main.c it runs its initial-
ization.
init.h
Variables used in stpverify are initialized in init.h. The use of the stpverify module can
be verified in the kernel syslog.
proc.h
Memory-based files used in stpverify are created in proc.h. The files in the stpverify
module can be accessed in the kernel /proc folder.
dev.c
The core logic for the stpverify module is defined inside the__netif_receive_skb_core
function. This is a function in dev.c that receives Layer 2 traffic and processes it in the Layer 7
kernel. It is here where the data is organized into the structure of an Ethernet frame and parsed
for its Root ID. The list of Root IDs is created in the root_out file. The root_ID is also checked
for a match from the root_in file which holds the blockchain’s invalidated root_IDs. The goto




The procedure for the initial setup for the environment is on https://hyperledger-fabric.readthe-
docs.io/en/release-2.2/. The latest release at the time of the study is 2.2. The environment setup
includes installing the latest git, curl, python, go, nodejs, docker-ce, docker-ce-clip, and docker-
compose to set up the runtime environment and nodes. The latest hyperledger fabric frame-
work’s base framework is to be cloned into a local repository from https://github.com/hyper-
ledger/fabric-samples.git. Next, the latest docker virtual machine images for the nodes were
downloaded from the latest production release in Github. Lastly, the hyperledger-specific bi-
naries for the network setup are downloaded and placed in a /bin subdirectory. Regardless of
the project-specific nomenclature added for some personalization, the framework’s main func-
tionality is available on a template. For the study, the base code was renamed to personalize
the open-source project. Further, open source node-modules were downloaded for running the
application, UI, and Root ID input script in the blockchain framework.







Artifacts are created to initialize the creation of the blockchain framework in Hyperledger Fab-
ric. These artifacts are the access control configurations for rights to the blockchain and the
certificates used to implement those rights. The initial block in the blockchain is also created in
this stage. After the artifacts are created, the latest Hyperledger Fabric virtual machine images
are pulled from Github and installed as virtual machines to create the network’s nodes. For this
experiment, these nodes emulate distributed servers in a blockchain network. The base network
requires a peer server, CA server, CouchDB server for each organization, and an orderer. . A
network connection is established through creating a channel. The channel manages the end-
points to each node through SHA256 token authentication. Next, the channel is connections
to the nodes are initialized to manage access to the Chaincode. Lastly, the Chaincode is de-
ployed using CA certs to manage authentication of the Chaincode to the peer nodes to manage
access control to the blockchain. The last part of setting up the blockchain network is generat-
ing a network connection between the NodeJS application and the peer organizations through
CA certificates. After this, the web application is initialized through the JavaScript front end.
It manages access control and transactions from the NodeJS application to the UI, Chaincode,
and blockchain. The Hyperledger Fabric framework provides a small-scale and manageable
environment allowing the researcher to observe data and analyze the solution’s effectiveness.
It provides the framework for a secure validation mechanism that provides immutability for its
transactions. Two organizations are created to provide access to the blockchain. The first or-
ganization, Org1, is delegated as admin and can validate and add a bridge ID to the blockchain
in read-write mode. The second organization can log in and run searches of the established
Root IDs in the blockchain in read-only mode. This search can also be evoked manually in the
browser UI for user-friendly interaction with the blockchain ledger. The Org1 user can also log
into the UI and add an entry to the blockchain. The UI written in JavaScript provides user login
access to the blockchain. These users are registered with the organizations based on their access
level. Encryption is established at all endpoints in the framework through SHA256 key/pairs
and validated through the CA nodes.
The Hyperledger Fabric nodes used in the blockchain network include:
• One Orderer Node
• Two Peer Nodes
• Two CA Servers
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• Two Database Nodes
The Blockchain Framework
The blockchain framework is an ecosystem that contains four parts. The first part is
the interface between stpverify and the blockchain framework. The blockchain framework is
housed in a Nodejs runtime environment that runs JavaScript. Therefore, the interface is written
in JavaScript. The second part is the main NodeJS App that handles the front-end functionality.
It can be seen as the control center or the brains of the Hyperledger Fabric framework. It is the
first step to interaction with the blockchain, hence an intermediary that forms the front-end of
a blockchain web application. Functions that make up the App set up the network connections
with the various nodes and run functions that will search and add transactions to the blockchain
ledger. It also handles users and tokens for authentication for access control among the nodes.
Lastly, it connects to the user interface (UI) written in a JavaScript web interface framework
called React. The UI is part of the front-end program that connects to the back-end blockchain
ledger using the NodeJS App as an intermediary. In the construct of an average web application,
this scenario is akin to a web interface that connects to a database such as a login page. A web
application usually includes a UI in a browser as part of the front-end program. Entries submitted
in the UI are sent to a database where queries are used to manipulate or process the data.
The third part of the blockchain framework is the Smart Contract. The Chaincode
performs the programming that manages queries and modifications to the blockchain ledger.
The last part of the framework is the blockchain ledger. The blockchain ledger comprises a
database and blocks that hold encrypted transactions using algorithms based on immutability.
As described in Chapter 1, immutability is the algorithmic assurance that attackers can make no
changes to the blockchain without a complete record of it. It is made up of two parts: a world
state database and the blocks. The former is a current state copy of the blockchain, and the latter
makes up the blockchain. Both record formats utilize a SHA256 hash of the transaction and a
Merkle tree for validation. The current state copy is a part of the framework because it provides
a database query method that consumes a lot of energy. The STP validation tool requires quick
searches because it manages each STP frame in the Ethernet LAN
The capabilities and options for node configuration are defined in the config.YAML file
in artifacts/channel. The figure shows options available for setting rights for Org1. The read-
write capabilities for Org1 are established when the nodes are deployed with this script.  The
orderer node is used to establish a channel and create the genesis block in the blockchain. It sub-
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sequently organizes blocks and the transactions inside of them. The orderer node also establishes
authentication with the peer nodes by defining access control to their associated port numbers.
The peer nodes on this network are called peer0.lanadmin.stpverify.com and  peer0.lan.stpver-
ify.com.  Org1 uses the peer node named lanadmin with write access. This peer node manages
the transactions to write or invoke a transaction to the blockchain. It runs its copy of the Chain-
code through a network channel called mychannel. It also has an authenticated connection to
one of the database nodes called couchdb0.stpverify.com. This database has a hashed list of
transactions that are written to the blockchain. Org1 uses a human network administrator to val-
idate new bridges added to the Ethernet LAN and submit their bridge IDs to the blockchain. The
peer node called lan has read access and is defined as Org2. It also has an installed copy of the
Chaincode, a connection through mychannel for authenticated querying, and an authenticated
connection to the couchDB1.stpverify.com database node. The Org2 lan peer is available to run
searches in the blockchain. The research solution requires an automated search of the current
bridge IDs extracted from the root_out file in proc.  Parts 2, 3, and 4 are a part of a typical
Hyperledger Fabric framework that includes a NodeJS app, Chaincode, and blockchain ledger.
The Chaincode is proprietary nomenclature for Smart Contracts used in Hyperledger Fabric, an
open-source Linux Foundation project.
Part 1: The Javascript Interface
The /scripts folder in the Github root directory holds checkData.js. This file collects
the Root ID that is output from root_out. It sends the data to the Chaincode to run a search
in the blockchain to see if there are earlier records of this bridge ID in the Ethernet LAN. If
there is a record, it returns ’0’ to the root_in file. If there is no record of this bridge ID previ-
ously, it returns a ’1’. This data is later processed in the kernel to complete the functionality of
this tool. The JavaScript interface initiates a connection as a user with read-only rights to the
blockchain by retrieving a token for user validation. The user login information is located in a
CouchDB container holding user information on localhost. It returns a token resp.data.token as
identity verification and authenticates the user. The JWT token is used to manage access to
the Chaincode for identity verification at each endpoint in the transaction. After identity ver-
ification through PKI, the checkRootIdAvailability() function retrieves one or more Root IDs
from root_out.csv and sends them to the Chaincode to run a read-only search to the CouchDB
current state database in the Blockchain Ledger formatches. The result is an isAvailable variable
that marks zero for false and one for true. This result is written to a file called root_in.csv as
validation output. 
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Part 2: The NodeJS app
The NodeJS app is written in Javascript and manages the modules required to create
a web interface that connects to the Chaincode and blockchain artifacts through PKI verified
connections. It connects to a UI that provides a visual interface that increases the accessibility of
the blockchain’s functionality to institutional users. Due to the test environment’s limitations,
the nodes and connections in the framework are accessed by a localhost network inside the
virtual machine housing the STP validation tool. The NodeJS front-end code is available in
the /api-2.0 folder of Github’s root directory.   The blockchain framework’s front-end NodeJs
application is initialized with token verification through permissioned organizational usernames
established for the blockchain network. The jwt.verify() function is token authentication to all
endpoints for every transaction made to query and invoke the blockchain. The server connection
is initialized on localhost port 4000. The user mila is enrolled and verifiedwith read-write access
through Org1 using token verification. The user tokens are stored in api-2.0/org1-wallet/. 
 Chaincode connections are token authenticated for adding and querying bridge IDs
in the blockchain using the app.post()  and app.get() functions. When an organizational user
with read-write access submits a Root ID to the user interface, this function will add it to the
blockchain. The app.get() function is used to query or search CouchDB current state database,
and the app.post() function is used to add a transaction to the CouchDB current state database
and the blockchain. All transactions are hashed using SHA256 and validated through Merkle
Tree hashing after they have been added.   Per access control rights managed by the Chain-
code, lanadmin users have read-write access and can act as the network administrators that man-
ually add new Bridge IDs to the network. Read-only rights are available to lan users who can
run a search. Although managed by the front-end application using app.post() and app.get(),
the UI can search and add Root IDs. 
Part 3: The Chaincode
In the blockchain framework made by Hyperledger Fabric, the Chaincode is the pro-
gramming that runs the decision-making and programming for the blockchain. A Smart Con-
tract is software-based business logic. It allows practical uses for a blockchain, such as supply
chain management, identity management, and contracts by adding a software program to the
blockchain. For example, a Smart Contract can be used to ensure a monthly rental payment. It
will keep track of the funds available and issue the digital payment based on a programmed time
stamp. This contract uses digital payments and allows transparency, so the cash transaction re-
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ceiver is assured that the funds are available or that the payer will not go back on the contract. In
the same light, the STP validation tool’s contract will pull the Root ID, run a search, and allow
a network administrator to add new ones to the blockchain manually.  The Chaincode is writ-
ten in a file called bridge.go. In main, it imports open-source Hyperledger Fabric libraries that
can be used to automate basic asset transactions connected to a blockchain. SmartContract is
an open-source Hyperledger Fabric proprietary library of functions for Smart Contract develop-
ment. The DesignatedBridge object defined in lines 19-25 creates the assets queried and added
to the blockchain. Each asset added to the blockchain will have a Bridge ID, the authenticated
user who added it when added, and the user’s organization. The Chaincode is written an open-
source template provided by Hyperledger Fabric written in Go, a language by Google. Go,
as a language for Smart Contracts, provides efficient integration into the Hyperledger Fabric
blockchain network. The original Smart Contracts, written in solidity for Ethereum-based or
ERC-20 blockchains, require the use of a virtual machine to provide a platform to execute a
Smart Contract. The Go package comes with executables that allow Smart Contracts written
in Go to compile and translate to machine code, making it as efficient as C. It also integrates
with Javascript objects for running the blockchain app and UI. Integrating Chaincode written in
Go will execute in the NodeJS runtime environment to allow for the secure modularity required
in the peered blockchain framework increasing the overall efficiency and speed of Chaincode
execution. The SmartContract library available by Go, has functions used for the management
of the DesignatedBridge asset. A Chaincode consists of initialization, where it is first deployed
to the blockchain network and connected to the peers. Each of the peers run in separate docker
containers with its instance of the Chaincode. Figure x shows the initialization of a new asset
object called contractapi in the main() function. Line 11 includes the package contractapi used
to manage the Smart Contract and its contents.
Once the network connections among the Chaincode, orderer, and peers are authenti-
cated, assets that are managed by the blockchain can be queried or invoked. The Chaincode is
the program that has function definitions and calls to run the queries and invocations. In a query,
the blockchain can be searched, and an invocation would allow a modification to the blockchain,
such as a new transaction that is added. 
The CreateBridgeID() function is used to invoke the new bridge ID to the blockchain.
It passes in the Smart Contract object, called ctx contractapi. The package contractapi included
from fabric-contract-api-go/contractapi defines the parameters that are used for the Chaincode. Trans-
actionContextInterface is used to create an interface for transactions to manage the identity of
the creator. The last parameter, bridgeData string, holds the details that will be added. 
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Part 4: The Blockchain Ledger
There are two parts to the management of the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain ledger;
the record of all of the transactions made to the blockchain. An invocation to the blockchain is a
transaction added to it. It is added to the world state and the blockchain. The world state keeps
a copy of all of the transactions made and a hashed value that maintains an updated record of all
previous hashed transactions. However, it has the format of a traditional database with differ-
ences that provide more security for its record-keeping. The transactions are added to the world
state using theMerkle tree algorithm. This study’s world state is an Apache CouchDB container
and provides a bridge to the JSON structure used by the Hyperledger Fabric framework. It is
object-based and integrates with the NodeJS App control center and UI for querying and in-
voking transactions. The blockchain holds the transactions in the form of blocks, each holding
a set number of transactions. As implemented by the Merkle tree algorithm, each block has a
unique identifier: the hashed value of all of the hashed transactions within it. Each subsequent
block holds an identifier of the hashed identifiers of blocks previous to it. Due to the Merkle tree
algorithm, the blockchain is immutable, and any changes made to any transactions will show a
record of the change and its previous state.
The World State
The world state is provided by an Apache CouchDB database that holds the transactions and
their hashed contents in a container. It holds a copy of the blockchain’s current state and all
of the transactions in it for an accessible search and view. It provides a UI that allows the user
to look at the hashed contents of the blockchain ledger and see the transactions that have been
invoked to the blockchain. As does the blockchain, the contents of the CouchDB database in-
clude the Merkle tree hashes that ensure the database’s immutability. It also makes for faster
queries because parsing through the blocks of a blockchain is commonly slow. The use of the
database makes for a quicker way to run searches for Bridge IDs, hence, speeding up the STP
validation process. The use of the world state as an integral part of the blockchain ledger is
a part of the Hyperledger Fabric network. For this study, the option of database queries from
the Chaincode to the CouchDB world state allows more efficient speeds for Ethernet traffic.
The CouchDB structure works hand-in-hand with the JSON structure of the NodeJS framework
making authenticated queries and invoke calls from the main App.js and UI direct and efficient.
The Blockchain 
The blockchain is the primary security foundation of the framework. It could be classified as a
database; however, the algorithms drive it to provide additional functionality. The blockchain
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is named as such because it is made up of blocks. The blocks are made up of a fixed set of
transactions based on size. Typically, the block size is set in the algorithm based on efficiency.
Authentication is required to add a transaction to the database. The transaction is hashed using
the SHA256 has an algorithm and added to the block. Every transaction hash in the block is
then combined with SHA256 to create one hash that creates the unique identifier in the block’s
header. This unique identifier is then hashed with its predecessor’s unique identifier. Like a
ripple effect, the Merkle tree will change the header SHA256 hash values of the previous blocks
to integrate with the blockchain’s latest addition. Ultimately, the genesis block, or the first block
in the blockchain’s header hash value, will change to integrate every blockchain’s hash value.
This algorithm and the hash values assignment to the headers make any change to a transaction
in the blockchain a herculean effort. It is nearly impossible because one change to a transaction
will change every block’s hash values in its path and, ultimately, the genesis block. If the Smart
Contract requires a change in the transaction, blockchain is designed to allow that change and a
different version. In this light, a record of the initial transaction will be kept in the blockchain,




Appendix C is a place for all of the data collection that was used for measurements,
graphs and charts that were made. The raw data was organized into trials to make calculations
of averages. The appendix will include data collected for the baseline CPU averages for six
trials, baseline RAM averages for six trials, STP DApp averages for CPU usage, STP DApp









STP DApp CPU Averages
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STP DApp RAM Averages
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Times Collected for Six Trials
